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Abstract: It is well known that institutions work very differently across countries 
because their political contexts are different. It is also understood that this has 
important implications for the design of governance priorities in different countries. 
This paper develops an analysis of the ‘political settlement’ to provide an analytical 
framework for analysing institutions and governance in developing countries. 
 
Central to this analysis is an understanding of the distribution of power. We define 
this as the relative holding power of different groups and organizations contesting the 
distribution of resources. Holding power is partly based on income and wealth but 
also on historically rooted capacities of different groups to organize. A political 
settlement emerges when the distribution of benefits supported by its institutions is 
consistent with the distribution of power in society, and the economic and political 
outcomes of these institutions are sustainable over time. In advanced countries, the 
distribution of power is largely based on the distribution of incomes generated by 
formal institutions and rights. The correspondence between power and formal 
institutions explains why Weberian states in advanced countries can effectively 
enforce formal institutions. In contrast, the distribution of power in developing 
countries draws significantly on organizational abilities based in non-capitalist 
sectors. In many cases, the historical roots of these capabilities go back to colonial 
history or earlier. Here, formal institutions alone cannot support distributions of 
benefits consistent with these distributions of power. Informal institutions like patron-
client allocative rules, and informal adaptations to the ways in which particular formal 
institutions work play a critical role in bringing the distribution of benefits supported 
by the institutional structure into line with the distribution of power. Differences in 
the political settlement can therefore explain why developing country institutional 
structures are different and similar formal institutions also perform differently. The 
political settlement also defines the ‘growth-stability trade-off’ facing particular 
institutional changes: institutional changes cannot be implemented if their 
implementation pushes political stability below the tolerance limit of that society. An 
understanding of the political settlement can therefore provide a framework for 
looking at institutional performance and evolution across countries. 
 
While all developing countries have variants of ‘clientelist’ political settlements, there 
are significant differences between these clientelist settlements. Differences between 
countries are examined along two dimensions: the organization of the ruling coalition 
and its relationship to the emerging productive sector. The analytical framework is 
applied to the case study countries studied in this series of papers to outline how their 
political settlements evolved over time in terms of these characteristics. The evolution 
of their political settlements is shown to be closely related to changes in their formal 
growth-enhancing institutions and the performance of these institutions. This analysis 
can therefore help to identify governance changes that can be sufficiently enforced to 
make a developmental difference in particular countries as well as providing a 
framework for understanding the paths along which the political settlement is 
changing in different countries.  
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1. Introduction  
In a work published in 1995 I used the concept of a ‘political settlement’ to explain 
why apparently similar institutions can perform very differently in different countries 
(Khan 1995). This paper builds on and significantly extends that early analysis. It is 
also part of a series of papers examining the institutional and governance challenges 
of sustaining growth in developing countries (Khan 2008, 2009a, 2009b). While the 
other papers focus on particular institutions and governance issues necessary for 
sustaining growth, this paper provides an analysis of the political economy 
background in which institutions have to operate, and relates the institutional analysis 
of our case study countries to an analysis of the evolution of their political 
settlements. These considerations are vital for the design of governance reform 
because the latter has to identify the most appropriate growth-enhancing institutions 
for particular contexts, or alternatively, identify how the context itself may need to 
change if developmental institutions are being systematically blocked.  
 
A political settlement is often loosely used to describe the ‘social order’ based on 
political compromises between powerful groups in society that sets the context for 
institutional and other policies. To capture the key features that make a political 
settlement sustainable enough to be the subject of analysis, we define it more 
precisely. A political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that is 
mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability. 
Institutions and the distribution of power have to be compatible because if powerful 
groups are not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institutional 
structure they will strive to change it. But the compatibility also has to be sustainable 
because institutions, both formal and informal, have to achieve the minimum levels of 
economic performance and political stability that are required for the reproduction of 
particular societies. Even though this may appear to be a very general definition, it 
allows us to show that there are limits to the types of institutions that can survive in 
particular contexts, and that substantial differences in institutional performance are 
both to be expected and can be the subject of rigorous analysis.  
 
A political settlement that reproduces itself over time must have institutions whose 
benefits are consistent with the distribution of organizational power and which also 
achieves the minimal levels of political stability and economic performance required 
to be viable. If powerful groups are getting a distribution of benefits that is too low 
given their relative power, these groups will strive through different means including 
conflict to change institutions till they are satisfied or they give up. While this conflict 
is going on the contestation can directly affect political stability or it affects economic 
performance by affecting the implementation of institutional rules. A serious 
incompatibility can make the political settlement unviable. But a compatible 
combination of institutions and power can also be unviable if economic performance 
is too poor. A political settlement is therefore a dynamic and interdependent set of 
variables and our first task is to make these interdependencies analytically tractable.  
 
If a political settlement ceases to be viable, discontinuous change can come about in 
the evolution of institutions or the organization of power. This is to be distinguished 
from gradual processes of growth, institutional change and political mobilizations that 
incrementally alter political settlements in all societies. No political settlement is 
static and all settlements are continuously evolving. But the evolution can sometimes 
be gradual; at other times stability or economic performance can collapse as a result 
 5 
of incompatible evolutions of power relationships or institutions and lead to a crisis. 
In the latter cases, stability and growth are only likely to recover when a new political 
settlement defined by a different combination of institutions and power emerges, 
possibly at the end of a period of significant conflict.  
 
Political settlements in developing countries are structurally different from political 
settlements in advanced countries. Developing countries have small formal productive 
sectors and the incomes generated from these sectors do not and cannot define the 
broad distribution of power in these societies. If there are significant sources of power 
that are not based on formal institutions, the exercise of power in developing countries 
cannot simply be focused on the protection and operation of formal institutions. This 
explains why informal institutions structurally operate on a different scale in all 
developing countries. The most important ‘informal institutions’ are a polite way of 
describing the significant exercises of informally organized political power to 
generate distributions of benefits that could not be sustained by the operation of 
formal institutions alone. This also explains why the goal of a Weberian ‘good 
governance’ state is simply not achievable in developing countries as an immediate 
goal. More importantly, if the goal is to identify the most appropriate institutional 
reform strategies that can be implemented and deliver results, the Weberian good 
governance model is not even a good guide to incremental policy priorities.  
 
The political settlements in developing countries are ‘clientelist’. They are 
characterized by the significant exercise of power based on informal organizations, 
typically patron-client organizations of different types. Some patron-client networks 
can operate through formal organizations like political parties. Nevertheless, because 
of the importance of informally organized power, political parties in developing 
countries operate very differently from those in advanced countries even if they are 
formally constituted in the same way. At the same time, clientelist political 
settlements also display significant variations, with different levels of sustainability in 
terms of political stability and economic performance. The differences between 
clientelist political settlements have many dimensions, but the most important ones 
are sufficient to explain significant differences in their institutional performance.  
 
Once a political settlement based on a compatible combination of institutions and 
power emerges, both the institutions and the distribution of power become supportive 
of each other. As a result, the operation and introduction of further institutional 
changes has to take this social distribution of power as given. The performance of 
new institutions and the consequences of institutional evolution can therefore be 
analysed in terms of how institutions or institutional changes are likely to be resisted 
in the context of this specific distribution of power. The political settlement can 
therefore help to explain the performance of particular institutions because of specific 
costs of enforcement and resistance.  
 
In much of the standard institutional analysis, it is assumed that the governance 
agencies responsible for the enforcement of formal institutions have the power to 
enforce compliance. In fact, the degree of feasible enforcement, and the costs of 
enforcement depend on the strength of resistance to the enforcement of particular 
institutions. The difficulty of enforcing an institution can be measured either by the 
frequency of violations or the cost of enforcement or both. If frequent violations are 
occurring or if the cost of enforcement is high, some groups are trying to resist the 
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implicit distribution of benefits that the institution defines, or are trying to achieve 
higher benefits for themselves by free riding. Or the violations may be an informal 
arrangement through which a different distribution of benefits is achieved which 
makes the institution viable in that context. The extent to which any of these types of 
violation strategies can continue depends on the relative power of the groups who 
benefit from violation relative to those who want to enforce that particular institution.  
 
Power has been a difficult concept to pin down in the social sciences and has not been 
well-integrated into an analysis of institutions. A simple workable concept of power 
appropriate for the problems we want to address is derived from the analysis of games 
of cooperation with conflict, also called chicken games. In these games there are 
multiple equilibria (ways of cutting the pie). Different groups want the equilibrium 
most favourable to them. The likelihood of a group achieving the distribution it wants 
depends on its ability to hold out in conflicts. Engaging and holding out in conflicts is 
costly. This gives us the concept of holding power, defined as the capability of an 
individual or group to engage and survive in conflicts. Unpacking the components 
determining the holding power of different groups can give us insights into the 
likelihood of conflict and the way in which power, institutions and economic 
outcomes may be related.  
 
At a general level, two sets of factors can contribute to a group’s holding power and 
therefore its ability to engage in and win conflicts. The first is the ability to impose 
costs on others, and secondly and no less important, the ability to absorb costs 
inflicted on them. Together, these capabilities help to determine the group most likely 
to prevail in a conflict. The greater the costs a group can impose on others, the greater 
the likelihood that other groups will abandon their attempts to get their preferred 
outcomes. Similarly, a group more able to absorb costs can survive longer in conflicts 
and is more likely to ‘win’. Translating these observations into the context of 
institutions and governance, the enforcement of a particular institutional rule is likely 
to be more effective if the distribution of benefits under that institution is not 
contested by groups with holding power, and conversely its enforcement is likely to 
be weaker if powerful groups contest its enforcement.  
 
The factors that may explain differences in the underlying ability of different groups 
to impose or absorb costs are specific to societies. In general, economic strength is 
important but by no means the only determinant of holding power. Greater wealth or 
income can allow more expensive strategies and weapons of ‘warfare’ and allow 
richer individuals or groups to survive for longer in conflicts. Against this, poorer 
groups are more likely to be able to absorb pain. Richer individuals and organizations 
may also have commitments and expectations that may make it difficult for them to 
absorb the costs of conflict for very long. The net effect of greater economic 
capability on relative power is therefore likely to differ from case to case. More 
importantly, non-economic capabilities can play a critical role in determining holding 
power. The political ability to organize, the numbers of people that can be mobilized, 
and perceptions of legitimacy are particularly important for understanding the 
differential abilities of groups to inflict and absorb costs in the course of conflicts. 
These complexities explain why richer individuals or groups do not always win.  
 
But the combination of economic and political characteristics can only give a rough 
indication of relative holding power. Many aspects of power are based on difficult-to-
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observe features of a group such as its determination and its strategies of mobilization. 
The difficulty of identifying all the sources of power in a particular case is precisely 
why it is difficult to predict the winner, and this paradoxically explains why so many 
conflicts actually take place. If observable initial conditions like wealth or observable 
political capabilities significantly determined holding power, the chances of winning 
or losing could be more precisely estimated and most conflicts might never begin. 
Powerful organizations or groups would achieve the distribution that they might have 
achieved through fighting without having to fight. Those who might have fought them 
would not engage in conflicts whose outcomes could be fairly well predicted.  
 
Fortunately, we do not have to predict power or the outcomes of conflicts to pursue 
our analysis. We can begin with a historical observation of the distribution of power 
in particular countries, and look at how it has evolved using observable characteristics 
related to the organization of patron-client organizations. This can provide the basis 
for an analysis of important characteristics of the political settlement. Political 
stability is achieved with the emergence of a consistent set of beliefs or expectations 
in society about the relative power of different groups and a distribution of benefits 
consistent with those beliefs. The beliefs themselves are likely to be consistent across 
different groups and individuals if they are based on previous historical evidence of 
the outcomes of conflicts. It is only when a group believes that its ability to win is not 
reflected in the current distribution of benefits that conflict is likely to break out, and 
that too only if other groups do not concede.  
 
Conflicts are likely to break out either when a group believes that the underlying 
distribution of power has changed and the distribution of benefits is not reflecting it, 
or if changes in distributions of benefits do not reflect the perceived distribution of 
power. The conflict itself is often the only mechanism for demonstrating and 
establishing holding power so that subsequent distributions reflect this underlying 
power. Conflicts end when the relevant groups accept a distribution of benefits as 
compatible with the distribution of power. In reality, the distribution of political 
power is continuously changing in a society, particularly in a developing one that is 
going through rapid social transformations. Consistent expectations about relative 
holding power may therefore be difficult or impossible to establish. Developing 
countries are likely to be characterized by ongoing social mobilizations and 
distributive arrangements have to be flexible in responding to these mobilizations if 
conflict is to be minimized and the political settlement in a broad sense sustained. 
These features of developing countries mean that we need to describe political 
settlements in a dynamic way, and yet we should be able to identify points of 
discontinuous changes in a political settlement. Organizational activity, drawing on 
gradual changes in economic and political conditions, can occasionally upset the 
gradual evolution of a political settlement. Thus, occasionally discontinuous changes 
in the distribution of power can occur, which can sometimes accelerate and at other 
times slow down or even halt the evolution of a political settlement in particular 
directions. It is not our task to predict these changes in the distribution of power, but 
to observe and track these changes so that the implications for institutional 
performance can be analysed.  
 
The analysis in the subsequent sections is at two different levels. The levels are 
interdependent but there is also a logical hierarchy in that the analysis of the lower 
level cannot be meaningfully conducted till we have an understanding of how the 
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higher level problem was resolved. The higher level is the emergence of the social 
order itself, without which society is likely to be in a state of violence or anarchy and 
economic development is unlikely. The emergence of social order implies a 
significant decline in violence and the achievement of some minimal level of political 
stability. A social order must therefore involve not only some degree of centralization 
of violence capabilities but also a series of institutional and distributive compromises 
that ensure that the distribution of benefits is in line with the underlying distribution 
of power. This is essential if powerful groups are to stop fighting. The institutional 
and distributive arrangements that achieve this social order clearly have to be 
consistent with the distribution of power between the factions whose conflicts 
threaten the social order.  
 
As soon as a social order emerges, the distribution of power becomes embedded in 
institutional arrangements that sustain it. Some of these may be formal institutions, 
but in a developing country formal institutions are not likely to be able to sustain the 
distributive requirements of all powerful groups. Inevitably, there will be a substantial 
variety of informal institutional arrangements, including the organization of informal 
power in patron-client organizations. These informal organizations can help to 
achieve a defined political settlement if they generate distributions of benefits that 
bring the overall distribution of benefits closer into line with the distribution of power. 
Thus informal institutions both reflect but also ultimately sustain the distribution of 
power by creating supportive benefits for powerful groups. Therefore, once a political 
settlement emerges, it reflects a distribution of power and also sustains it at the level 
of society as a whole. This analysis allows us to develop a typology of political 
settlements. We argue that developing countries are characterized by clientelist 
political settlements. These are structurally different from capitalist political 
settlements that characterize societies where the formal productive sector (we use the 
shorthand ‘capitalist’ to describe this sector) dominates the economy. This analysis 
also helps to explain why the governance structures that characterize advanced 
economies are not achievable in developing economies.  
 
At the lower level of analysis, the distributions of power that a political settlement 
sustains are ‘given’. The distribution of power is effectively an exogenous variable for 
understanding the performance of specific institutions and the constraints facing 
institutional change in particular directions. In some political settlements, particular 
formal institutions may work quite well, in other variants the same formal institutions 
may have poor or even negative effects. Different political settlements in developing 
countries also define very different ‘growth-stability trade-offs’ for institutional 
strategies that attempt to improve the enforcement of particular institutions or 
incrementally change the institutional structure in particular directions. We identify 
two sets of characteristics distinguishing different clientelist political settlements that 
are likely to be important for explaining differences in institutional performance 
between them. Both are observable characteristics of the structure of patron-client 
organizations, and therefore they provide a framework for classifying the evolution of 
political settlements in our case study countries. 
 
The first dimension of difference is in the organization of the ruling coalition: the 
factions that control political authority and state power in different societies. The 
ruling coalition of factions faces distributions of power ranged against it both 
horizontally and vertically. The greater the power of horizontally excluded factions, 
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the greater the vulnerability of the ruling coalition. This reduces its time horizon 
which affects the types of economic strategies it will be willing to support through 
formal and informal institutions. But ruling coalitions also have to organize factions 
below them to give them the holding power necessary to rule. The power of the ruling 
coalition vis-à-vis their lower level supporters can also vary. The stronger the lower-
level factions, the lower the capacity of the ruling coalition to enforce institutional 
rules that lower-level factions may contest. A second dimension of variation is in the 
technological capabilities of productive entrepreneurs in that society and their 
relationship of power with the ruling coalition. Differences in these two dimensions 
define important differences in clientelist political settlements that are relevant for 
understanding the performance of specific institutions and for the growth-stability 
trade-off facing particular directions of institutional change.  
 
We begin with a quick review of the standard institutional analysis coming from the 
new institutional economics (NIE). An analysis of the limitations of that framework 
also allows us to establish the importance of an analysis of political settlements. 
Subsequent sections then develop our analysis of the political settlement and its 
application. We then use this framework to look at how the political settlement has 
evolved in each of our case study countries. Our classification of changes in the 
political settlements within each country, and comparisons across countries, shows the 
relevance of this framework for understanding differences in institutional 
performance and the evolutionary paths of institutional change across countries.  
 
2. Institutions: The Analysis of New Institutional Economics 
The analysis of institutions was (re-)introduced into economics by the body of 
literature collectively referred to as the new institutional economics. Institutions were 
defined as rules that define the right to do certain things or make decisions of a 
particular type. Rules for driving on a particular side of a road are simple institutions 
that define activity that is permissible by defining rights. Property rights are complex 
rules that specify who can make what decisions with respect to a particular asset, the 
types of uses that are allowed and ruled out, how the output is subsequently allocated 
and so on. The contribution of the new institutional economics (NIE) that developed 
through the work of Douglass North and others was to highlight that institutions 
mattered because rules were essential to make social interaction possible. The 
facilitating role of institutions was often described in terms of transaction costs, the 
argument being that in the absence of rules, the costs of organizing particular types of 
interaction may be so high that coordination and cooperation may be precluded. 
Going further, the new institutional economics argued that different sets of rules could 
have significant implications for the types of social activity that was possible (North 
and Thomas 1973; North 1981, 1984; Williamson 1985; Matthews 1986; North 1990; 
Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991; Knight 1992; Papandreou 1994; North 1995; Olson 
1997; Rodrik 1999; Bates 2001; Rodrik 2002; Acemoglu, et al. 2004; Rodrik, et al. 
2004; Bardhan 2005).  
 
Institutions as rights or decision-making rules define the types of decisions that can be 
made, and indirectly, the cost of making decisions. Some institutions are formal in the 
sense that these rights or rules are defined openly and in public by laws and are 
externally enforced by formal governance agencies. The governance or enforcement 
agencies for formal institutions are typically ‘state’ agencies like the police, 
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prosecutors, regulators, courts and so on, which are typically themselves subject to 
higher level institutional rules. Our focus in terms of policy is primarily on formal 
institutions and the governance agencies necessary to make these institutions 
enforceable to an adequate extent. An important characteristic of formal institutions is 
that they are typically impersonal, meaning that the rules are typically specified 
without reference to named individuals or organizations and therefore apply to all 
individuals or organizations with similar general characteristics. In principle, formal 
institutions do not have to be impersonal. Historically, formal institutions often took 
the form of charters that were rules specific to named organizations. However, the 
contemporary political reality even in relatively underdeveloped societies is that 
formal institutions are typically defined in impersonal terms. This makes the 
enforcement of formal institutions an important characteristic of the rule-following 
and impersonal ‘Weberian’ state.  
 
However, the operation of formal institutions can depend on informal institutions, and 
these interdependencies turn out to be very important. Institutions are informal when 
there are no formal rules written down and enforced by formal (state) enforcement, 
but there are nevertheless ‘rules’ that are systematic enough to be identified. There are 
a number of types of informal institutions. First, informal institutions could refer to 
patterns of behaviour of individuals who are following internalized norms and values. 
An example would be an internalized norm of respect for property that may restrain 
individuals from appropriating assets owned by others even if the property rights are 
not well enforced. This type of informal institution is most often referred to in the NIE 
in explanations of why particular informal institutions may support the operation of 
particular formal institutions. For instance, the norm just referred to would 
significantly lower the cost of enforcement of formal property rights if the norm was 
widely adhered to.  
 
Informality can also refer to rules that are not formally written down (or cannot be 
written down for political reasons) but which are nevertheless enforced by third 
parties who may formally be within the state but whose operations in any case rely on 
the mobilization of informal power. Examples of informal enforcers would be the 
mafia or patron-client structures that may operate through a state or independently. 
The informal rule that job-seekers who come with a recommendation from the local 
mafia boss should be given the job is an informal institution of this type. We will be 
particularly interested in important variants of this type of informal institution based 
on the mobilization of power by informal organizations like patron-client networks.  
 
Finally, some informal institutions simply describe behavioural regularities of 
individuals or organizations in the game-theoretic sense of ‘equilibrium behaviour’, 
given the behaviour of other individuals and organizations. These tacit institutions are 
likely to emerge where the problem is simply one of coordination. For instance, if I 
know you will drive on the left I may drive on my left without any external 
enforcement. However, even driving is never simply a game of coordination and 
different types of free riding behaviour are possible, for instance when crossing 
junctions. In the absence of any third party enforcements efficient driving outcomes 
may be precluded. We will not focus much on tacit institutions that can emerge 
without any type of enforcement.  
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An important characteristic of all informal institutions is that there is no necessity that 
these rules are generally followed or are applicable to all individuals of the same 
category. By definition, while most or all formal institutions are impersonal, informal 
institutions are never impersonal. In particular, the second type of informal institution, 
where rules that are not formally written down are enforced, emerges precisely 
because it brings differential benefits to some individuals or groups and is therefore 
deliberately personal in its application. This type of informal institution is widespread 
in developing countries and indeed explains why the typical developing country does 
not conform to the Weberian ideal. The systemic reasons that could explain why 
informal institutions of this type are widespread in developing countries are discussed 
later. 
 
Institutions are important because social activity requires many individuals to work 
together using different assets and inputs to produce outputs. This involves many 
interdependent decisions and agreements. Agreements are required about the ways in 
which assets and inputs are to be used, production organized, discipline and effort 
ensured and the net product (or loss) shared out. The critical decision-making rules in 
a productive network could have been allocated to individuals or groups in many 
different ways. For instance, in the NIE discussion about setting up a capitalist firm 
out of a team of co-workers, different individuals or groups of individuals could have 
become the residual claimant (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Each way of allocating 
decision-making rights is likely to result in subtle differences in decision-making 
costs, as well as significant differences in the distribution of benefits. However, the 
NIE analysis has focused only on the implications of differences in decision-making 
costs in evaluating the efficiency of different institutions. This discussion has focused 
on a narrow definition of transaction costs and asked how specific institutions can 
reduce transaction costs and thereby increase economic efficiency or growth.  
 
Transaction costs were initially thought of rather narrowly but have gradually become 
broadly defined. But in applications, transaction costs continue to mean a rather 
narrow range of decision-making costs. The narrowest interpretation of a transaction 
cost is literally the cost of exchanging ownership rights in acts of exchange 
(Eggertsson 1990: 14). In the narrow sense, this includes the cost of finding a person 
to exchange with, agreeing on a price and agreeing to a contract that covers basic 
contingencies. But even if we look at this simple act of exchange, it soon becomes 
clear that exchange cannot happen if the rights that are being exchanged cannot be 
enforced. A house can only be sold if the deeds give effective ownership and are not 
themselves contested. This soon extends the concept of transaction cost to include a 
variety of enforcement costs which determine whether the rights that are being 
exchanged can actually be defined at a reasonable cost to enable an exchange. Once 
enforcement costs are included it becomes clear that the concept of transaction costs 
can be applied to the organization of any type of collective action. For instance, 
organizing production also involves a series of agreements that have to be enforced at 
different points. The costs of enforcing these contracts are very similar to the costs of 
enforcing property rights.  
 
A broader definition of transaction costs in Matthews (1986) says transaction costs are 
the costs of arranging a ‘contract’ ex ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post. In 
contrast, production costs are the direct costs of executing the contract. The broader 
definition allows us to look at a variety of coordination, contestation and enforcement 
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costs that are involved in making collective arrangements of different types work. 
There are well-known grey areas in such definitions since many production activities 
are practically inseparable from monitoring and enforcement activities. For instance, 
production supervisors may be producing themselves as well as monitoring the effort 
of others and enforcing high levels of effort. ‘Contracting’ in this context should not 
necessarily be seen as entirely voluntary agreements, since what can be contracted 
depends on the initial rules defining rights. The underlying rights may therefore be 
heavily contested at one level, while the contracts representing working agreements 
may appear to be voluntary agreements at another level.  
 
At the broadest level, transaction costs include the costs of constructing the groups 
involved in the activity, agreeing on the contributions and benefits of different 
individuals and groups, monitoring the exchange or production process over time to 
ensure that agreements are upheld, and enforcing and punishing violations of 
agreements, including breaking up the agreement under specific conditions. 
Transaction costs can clearly be very significant, and indeed, may be so significant 
that many potentially desirable activities may not be viable because the agreements 
are too costly to organize or enforce. This was one of the most important propositions 
of the new institutional economics (NIE). Specific institutions could reduce some 
transaction costs but only if the costs of enforcing the institution were also low. 
 
Institutional analysis aimed to identify how institutions could explain economic 
performance, and also why dysfunctional institutions could continue to persist in 
some societies. The emerging analysis focused on three different types of variables. 
Not surprisingly, the formal institutions were studied first. Formal institutions can 
include both the rules that guide the activity of economic organizations, but also 
political and constitutional rules that define the rules for changing rules. As a first 
approximation, an analysis focusing only on formal institutions can take us some way 
towards understanding economic performance and the constraints limiting 
institutional change. But a focus on formal institutions could not explain why the 
same formal institutions perform differently across countries, or why formal 
institutions remain persistently inefficient in some countries but evolve rapidly 
towards greater efficiency in others.  
 
Secondly, informal institutions were looked at as possibly affecting the operation of 
formal institutions. In the NIE analysis, informal institutions matter because they 
affect the costs of enforcing formal institutions and they can provide alternative forms 
of third-party enforcement that could be effective in some contexts. This may explain 
why the same formal institutions could be associated with very different outcomes in 
different contexts. But this approach too had its limits because informal institutions 
are not necessarily exogenous. If informal institutions are inappropriate, why do they 
remain so? Why do they fail to evolve in some countries in ways that allow the 
appropriate formal institutions to attain efficiency?  
 
In response to these problems, a further evolution of institutional analysis looked at 
non-institutional factors that could explain differences in institutional performance. 
For instance, North suggests the importance of cognitive capabilities to explain why 
some societies appear to be slow to adapt poorly working institutions (North 1995). 
This is a logical extension of the institutional approach but implicitly suggests very 
problematic sources of differences between societies. Instead, in the approach that we 
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will develop, we will look at the organization of power to explain differences in the 
costs of enforcing institutions and in the costs of creating new institutions.  
 
A First Approximation: Formal Institutions 
The early new institutional economics (NIE) was a reaction to textbook neoclassical 
models of the market. The latter assume that the decision-making process is costless 
(zero transaction costs) and therefore institutions are not necessary for solving 
problems. Property rights do exist in textbook neoclassical models but only to 
describe the initial endowments of individuals. The main effect of different initial 
allocations of endowments in neoclassical economics is on distribution. Property 
rights are not necessary for reducing transaction costs (because transaction costs do 
not exist) so the initial allocation of property rights has no effect on the efficiency of 
the system. The zero transaction cost assumption makes it impossible to ask how 
institutional rules could possibly matter. But of course in reality transaction costs are 
not just positive, they may account for as much as half of all economic activity even 
in apparently efficient market economies (North and Wallis 1987).  
 
The contribution of the new institutional economics (NIE) was not just to point out 
that these decision-making (transaction) costs are significant. A more significant 
observation was that small differences in the magnitude and incidence of transaction 
costs could have important economic implications. Differences in the performance of 
market economies may have a lot to do with the design of institutions that reduce 
specific transaction costs constraining the achievement of particular social objectives, 
including economic growth. This much would be agreed upon by most economists 
studying comparative institutions and growth.  
 
If rules can be enforced at relatively low cost  
 
this could reduce 
the ‘transaction costs’ faced by individuals/organizations 
operating under these rules ( For instance,  if property rights 
allow the exclusion of free-riders at low cost they could help to 


















Figure 1 Formal Institutions Explaining Growth in the NIE 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the initial contribution of the NIE. Institutions defined as 
decision-making rules (or rights) matter because while institutions themselves have a 
cost of enforcement, they may nevertheless reduce the overall transaction costs faced 
by organizations operating under these rules. As a first approximation, the initial NIE 
models suggested that economic efficiency would be higher if the overall transaction 
costs of the system could be lowered. For instance, clear rights (or rules) giving 
owners of assets the right to own the profits and the right to make production 
decisions could reduce the costs of agreeing to and enforcing a number of relevant 
production decisions (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). In the absence of a prior allocation 
of returns and decision-making rights to a specific group such as the owners of assets, 
there may be too many possible ways of enforcing production decisions and sharing 
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the returns. The absence of a clear and enforceable rule may then involve so much 
bargaining over how production is to be organized and shared that production may be 
abandoned altogether.  
 
The NIE focus on aggregate transaction costs was, however, too simplistic. It is 
possible that a reduction in some transaction costs in the presence of others may be 
damaging for growth (for instance, if it reduced the organizational costs of those 
harmed by growth to oppose it more effectively). It is also important to distinguish 
between overall transaction costs and the transaction cost per unit of transaction. 
Advanced countries pay for a significant part of their aggregate transaction cost in the 
form of a collective enforcement of property rights and other economic rules as part 
of the ‘rule of law’. Aggregate transaction costs (when we include the cost of 
enforcing the rules) may be very high, but collective provision ensures that the cost 
per unit of transaction facing individuals or organizations is relatively low. These 
complexities have significant implications for understanding developing country 
problems. Nevertheless, the NIE made an important early contribution by proposing 
that poor economic performance was related to inappropriate institutions that failed to 
reduce the costs of coordinating social activity in appropriate ways.  
 
A more fundamental question is why in many countries failing institutions continued 
to persist and more effective institutions failed to emerge? In developing countries, 
the experience of more successful countries can provide prima facie evidence about 
economic possibilities. The evidence of actual economic performance compared to 
the potential should feed back to create pressures for institutional change. If this does 
not happen, we need to ask why this might be the case. Inefficient or ineffective 
institutions should in principle be renegotiated through a political process. The early 
response of the NIE was to look for formal institutional explanations for why this 
process of negotiation could be blocked. In particular, it tried to identify ‘higher-level’ 
political institutions that could explain the costs of negotiating new and better lower-
level institutions (North 1990).  
 
One variant of this early NIE response is summarized in Figure 2. The relevant 
higher-level formal institutions are ‘political’ institutions which define the rules for 
changing rules, and these rules define the ‘political’ transaction costs of organizing 
changes in lower-level institutions. In principle, it should always be possible to 
negotiate the introduction of growth-enhancing institutions because the additional 
output should enable losers to be compensated directly or indirectly, if the political 
transaction costs of negotiating the compensations low. But if political institutions are 
inefficient and political transaction costs are too high, the cost of organizing 
beneficial changes in lower-level institutions may preclude a rapid evolution in the 
direction of greater efficiency. Political transaction costs do not refer to the actual 
compensations that are negotiated. They refer to the cost of negotiating these 
compensations, including the costs of creating coalitions, the costs of bargaining over 
appropriate compensations and enforcing the relevant agreements. These political 
transaction costs can depend on the design of political institutions in the same way 















Political transaction costs are costs of negotiating 
changes in lower-level rules. Different political institutions 
(democratic versus authoritarian or different variants of 































































Figure 2 Formal Institutions Explaining Institutional Change in the NIE 
 
Thus, ‘inefficient’ political institutions may constrain the evolution of efficient 
institutions, just as inefficient institutions can directly constrain economic output and 
growth. The obvious problem with this answer is that we have simply pushed the 
analysis up one level. If political institutions are inefficient their persistence also 
needs to be explained. Clearly, there are limits to how far a purely institutional 
explanation can take us. Eventually, we have to explain why formal institutions do not 
emerge or change without referring back to the presence or absence of other formal 
institutions.  
 
Further Developments: Informal Institutions and Non-Institutional Factors 
The puzzling persistence of inefficient institutions in many countries is closely related 
to two other empirical observations. First, apparently similar formal institutions like 
property rights appeared to have very different economic effects across countries. 
Secondly, very different institutions appeared to be successful in solving similar 
economic problems in different countries. These puzzles could be at least partially 
explained by the differential success of countries in enforcing particular formal 
institutions. It is clearly not sufficient to formally announce the introduction of an 
efficient institution if the conditions for its effective enforcement are missing.  
 
The obvious step for the NIE approach was to examine if differences in enforcement 
capabilities could be explained in terms of missing or mismatched institutions, both 
formal and informal. In particular, was it possible that inappropriate informal 
institutions could explain the high costs of enforcing particular formal institutions? 
Informal institutions refer to norms, values and cultures that explain particular 
patterns of behaviour and these may be relevant for explaining differences in the 
enforcement costs of formal institutions (North 1990, 1995). If individuals and 
organizations subscribed to an informal value-system that declared that particular 
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rules (or rights) ought to be respected, the cost of enforcing these rules through formal 
enforcement mechanisms would be lower because challenges would be less frequent.  
 
Growth Outcomes
But absence or weakness of other 
institutions including informal institutions 


















Figure 3 Informal Institutions Constraining Performance in the NIE 
 
These observations resulted in a more complex theorization of the effects of 
institutions compared to the simple relationship between formal institutions and 
economic performance in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Developments within the NIE 
elaborated the possibility that missing institutions and norms could affect institutional 
outcomes as shown in Figure 3. The poor performance of particular institutions that 
should have performed better according to theory and evidence could now be 
attributed to a broader set of missing institutional conditions and in particular missing 
informal norms that raised the costs of enforcement. This approach ultimately put a 
lot of explanatory weight on missing or inappropriate informal institutions and 
thereby raised a new set of problems. 
 
If norms can plausibly be dependent variables that adjust to formal institutions, the 
analysis has to be careful so as not to wrongly identify cognitive capabilities as the 
constraints on growth when other factors may be responsible for a particular 
equilibrium between formal and informal institutions. Consider for instance the 
relatively trivial norm that says people who have arrived earlier in a queue should 
have priority in getting on to a bus. If this norm is adhered to, some of the cost of 
enforcing formal rules for accessing buses can be saved. But people are more likely in 
the first place to internalize queuing behaviour as an informal norm if they know there 
are formal enforcement capabilities in the background that will punish aggressive 
behaviour at bus-stops and if they know that the next bus is coming along very 
shortly. If both of these conditions hold to an appropriate extent, violations of queues 
would be expensive for the violator, and an informal norm supporting queuing may 
then be rapidly adopted by almost everybody even if very few people held to this 
norm in the first place.  
 
The adoption of the norm as an internalized set of constraints would then indeed 
further reduce the cost of formal enforcement, and the formal enforcement may 
eventually never have to be called upon. Thus, once equilibrium has been established 
between a particular set of underlying formal institutions and supporting informal 
ones, the direction of causality may indeed be from the informal institution reducing 
the costs of everyday enforcement of the formal institution. However, while the norm 
clearly becomes very useful and plays a part in sustaining patterns of behaviour at 
lower cost, the evolution of the informal norm in this and other similar cases may 
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historically have been largely endogenous and dependent on the enforceability of 
some formal institutions.  
 
The importance of the historical analysis can be illustrated by a thought experiment 
about what is likely to happen in a queuing culture if the background enforcement 
capabilities for constraining aggressive behaviour suddenly collapsed, and/or the bus 
service deteriorated so that it was not possible to predict when the next bus would 
come along. If this happened, it is plausible that the queuing norm may be rapidly 
abandoned and access to buses organized on other principles, such as calibrated 
demonstrations of aggressiveness. In the absence of a significant increase in formal 
policing and enforcement, informal norms will adjust to these realities, and so the 
norm of queuing for buses may disappear rather rapidly. Instead, alternative norms 
may emerge, for instance a norm that says it is ‘normal’ for people to demonstrate 
their importance so that they have priority in getting on to buses. This may actually 
reduce the chances of fights breaking out by making the new rationing rule 
compatible with decentralized and informal ‘enforcement capabilities’. Clearly, it 
would be misleading to explain the absence of queues in this example in terms of a 
missing set of informal queuing norms as the norms in question are themselves (to 
some extent) dependent variables. Thus, in this example of disequilibrium the 
direction of causality can reverse, with changes in the enforceability of a formal 
institution driving changes in supporting informal institutions. 
 
Informal institutions are likely to continuously adapt in this way because if they did 
not, the individuals whose values were confronting a dissonant reality would soon 
suffer from cognitive dissonance. For instance, a strong person who may have got on 
a bus in the new situation by displaying signals of strength would soon begin to suffer 
if he or she persistently refused to do this. A few people would sooner or later 
opportunistically break the previous norm and they would benefit by improving their 
probabilities of getting on the bus. Strong individuals who persisted in standing in 
ineffective queues would not only suffer economic costs but also rapidly increasing 
psychological costs. The concept of cognitive dissonance refers to the latter. To avoid 
this, individuals are likely to develop normative justifications for what they have to 
do. People who have to demonstrate their social precedence or signal aggression to 
get on to a bus would be likely to rationalize in normative ways why this behaviour 
was justified in this context. At least, we should not be surprised if they did. 
 
These methodological warnings are important because it is often possible to read the 
same empirical evidence in a number of ways in the absence of a historical analysis. 
For the reasons just discussed, poor formal institutions are likely to coexist with 
informal norms that have adapted to them. If we do not allow for a reverse causality 
from formal to informal institutions, we end up with the troubling conclusion that 
informal institutions and ultimately cognitive capabilities of societies were the 
problem. This in turn leads to a possible overemphasis of ‘culture’ and ‘values’. 
Ultimately it takes us to the conclusion that societies may differ significantly in their 
capabilities to process information as suggested by an emphasis on cognitive 
capabilities. Cognitive capabilities can be interpreted as a society’s ‘software’ for 
information processing, in which case these capabilities are closely related to informal 
institutions. A focus on cognitive capabilities defined in this way raises very similar 
questions to the discussion of informal institutions: why does this software not change 
when confronted with evidence? But cognitive capabilities can also be interpreted as 
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the ‘hardware’ for information processing in the brains of individuals in some 
societies. Before we enter this domain, we should at least have satisfied ourselves that 
other more plausible explanations do not suffice.  
 
Apart from the fact that some implications of cultural and cognitive explanations are 
worrying, there is also historical evidence of dramatic path-changes that are not 
consistent with cultural and value-based explanations of performance. If we focus 
solely on the capitalism of the ‘West’, it may be possible to argue that Protestant or 
Christian cultural values were necessary underpinnings of market capitalist 
institutions (Platteau 1994a, 1994b). But in the second half of the twentieth century, 
the lethargic Confucianism that had been blamed for Chinese stagnation till the 1970s 
began to be associated with the rapid growth of the East. What changed in the values 
supported by Confucianism between the first and second halves of the twentieth 
century? Similarly, what could possibly have changed so rapidly in the values and 
norms of the Taiwan of the 1950s or the South Korea of the 1960s that set them so 
distinctly apart from their own societies of a decade earlier or the North Korea of the 
same period? The list of examples that challenge the importance of informal 
institutions as norms is a long one.  
 
The very significant institutional changes that happened in Asia and elsewhere in the 
second half of the twentieth century were not associated with dramatic prior changes 
in values and cultures, notwithstanding the tragically misnamed ‘cultural revolution’ 
in China. Rather, the precursor to significant takeoffs, including the Chinese one, was 
typically a significant political re-alignment that changed the internal balances of 
power in these societies and allowed new institutions to be introduced and enforced. 
The types of ‘capitalism’ that emerged in the East were different from each other and 
from the capitalisms that emerged in the West. Perhaps culture could explain some of 
these differences. But informal institutions can offer a more satisfactory explanation 
of differences in institutional performance if we see informal institutions as informal 
enforcement mechanisms based on power that are important for delivering benefits to 
powerful groups who would not immediately benefit from the creation of the modern 
formal institutions of capitalism.  
 
3. Power and the Political Settlement 
Power matters for institutional analysis because the power of different groups to 
contest, obstruct and oppose rules that are against their interests clearly affects the 
enforceability of institutions. Institutions can only be effective in reducing some 
relevant transaction costs to the extent that they can actually be enforced at a lower 
cost than the transaction costs they are supposed to save. For instance, property rights 
which define who can make specific decisions about the use of a piece of land could 
reduce the free access problem (the tragedy of the commons) if the rule can be 
enforced at a cost that is low compared to the social loss caused by free riding. 
Similarly, property rights can enhance the time horizon of investors by establishing a 
rule giving them ‘ownership’ of future profits, but only to the extent that enforcing the 
rule is possible at a cost that is low compared to the future profits generated by the 
additional investments. The NIE explanations summarized in Figure 1 did not address 
the question of enforcement in depth. What factors determine the extent to which a 
particular institutional rule can be effectively enforced at a cost low enough to make 
the relevant social activities feasible?  
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We can begin to answer this question by recognizing that all institutional rules have a 
dual character. In theory, an institutional rule, if it could be well enforced, would have 
a potential effect on efficiency and growth by changing the types of decisions that can 
be made and the costs of making these decisions. But at the same time, each 
institutional rule also defines the distribution of the net benefits of making these 
decisions. A few examples may help to illustrate the general principle summarized in 
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Figure 4 The Dual Effect of Institutions on Growth and Distribution  
 
Consider an asset such as a lake that is subject to free access overuse. The allocation 
of a property right over the asset that gives a specified person or group of people the 
right to decide the extent of use will, if enforced, assist in determining an appropriate 
level of use that sustains the value of the resource over time. The property right (or 
decision-making rule) can be created and allocated in a number of different ways, 
including an allocation to a single person or to various subgroups of individuals. With 
effective enforcement, each would imply specific transaction costs of reaching 
appropriate decisions about the level of use that was appropriate. But just as 
important, each institution implies a fundamentally different distribution of net 
benefits across individuals and groups. Individual ownership gives a specific 
individual most of the increase in net social benefit, while collective ownership shares 
the net social benefit across a broader group. In both cases, other potential claimants 
to the resource are excluded.  
 
The dual effect of institutions helps to explain why they may face high or low 
enforcement costs in different societies. Given any initial structure of norms and 
formal enforcement capabilities, the difficulty of enforcement is likely to be 
(significantly) greater if the distribution of benefits is not consistent with the 
distribution of power between the groups affected by the institution. Powerful groups 
are likely to (strongly) resist the enforcement of an institution that is against their 
interest. ‘Governance agencies’ responsible for enforcement do indeed have different 
enforcement capabilities that are partly to do with their internal capabilities: the 
quality of their personnel, the physical infrastructure and resources they have to work 
with, the incentives they can offer internally and so on. But the effectiveness of 
enforcement also depends on the resistance or support coming from powerful groups 
in society given that any institutional rule has differential costs and benefits for 
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different groups. This is why an analysis of the political settlement is important for 
institutional analysis and for the design of governance reform.  
 
Political Settlements: Two Levels of Analysis 
Institutional analysis requires that the context in which institutions are operating has 
some characteristics of order. Institutional effects are only likely to be regular if the 
context in which the institutions are operating displays some characteristics that are 
stable over time. We describe an institutional and political system that has 
characteristics that are reproducible over time as a political settlement. At the highest 
level, a political settlement is a description of the ‘social order’ that describes how a 
society solves the problem of violence and achieves a minimum level of political 
stability and economic performance for it to operate as a society. Of course, in many 
developing countries suffering from violence a social order is missing. Widespread 
violence threatens to break out or has already broken out. In these countries the 
pressing problem is the emergence of a social order. The achievement of a social 
order or political settlement requires in turn formal and informal institutions (such as 
property rights or informal rules of redistribution) that create benefits in line with the 
relative power of powerful groups. If this can be achieved, overt conflict can come to 
an end, provided that the institutional system manages to achieve at least a minimal 
economic viability for the system to be able to reproduce.  
 
At a deeper level, a political settlement implies an institutional structure that creates 
benefits for different classes and groups in line with their relative power. The 
commonsensical understanding of a political settlement as a stable agreement between 
elites (or a social order) is therefore only likely to be viable if it is underpinned at a 
deeper level by a viable combination of institutions and a distribution of power 
between organizationally powerful groups in that society. A distribution of benefits 
that is economically unsustainable will collapse. But an institutional structure that 
attempts to achieve economic viability with a distribution of benefits that is 
unacceptable to powerful groups will also collapse. By definition, a social order 
defined by the absence of violence must be based on a consistent set of institutions 
and power relationships to achieve minimal levels of economic and political viability. 
 
Power can be ranked along many possible dimensions. The dimension that is most 
useful for us is holding power. Holding power refers to how long a particular 
organization can hold out in actual or potential conflicts against other organizations or 
the state. Holding power is a function of a number of different characteristics of an 
organization, including its economic capability to sustain itself during conflicts, its 
capability of inflicting costs on competing organizations, its capability to mobilize 
supporters to be able to absorb costs and its ability to mobilize prevalent ideologies 
and symbols of legitimacy to consolidate its mobilization and keep its members 
committed. As the outcomes of conflicts depend on relative power rather than 
absolute power, our use of the word power refers to a distribution of power.  
 
We define a political settlement as an interdependent combination of a structure of 
power and institutions at the level of a society that is mutually ‘compatible’ and also 
‘sustainable’ in terms of economic and political viability. If a combination of 
institutions and power is not viable enough to survive, it is not a political settlement. 
We define viability in turn as a minimum level of economic and political viability 
necessary to keep that institutional structure together. Economic viability requires the 
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political settlement to achieve sufficient economic performance to avoid an economic 
crisis. Basic economic activities should be at least reproducible if not growing, but the 
minimum level of economic performance can also differ across societies depending 
on the expectations of powerful groups. Political viability is more specific to 
particular societies and requires the level of dissent or violence and conflict to not 
reach such a level that the core institutional and political arrangements that define the 
political settlement begin to unravel. How robust a political settlement is depends on 
how the economy and polity are operating with respect to these minimum viability 
limits. However, the minimum levels of economic and political viability are not 
defined in absolute terms but are themselves endogenous to the society.  
 
The minimum level of political stability (or maximum level of conflict) that a society 
can tolerate before major political mobilizations are triggered can vary significantly 
across societies and in the same society over time. Nevertheless, at any time there is 
some minimum level of political stability below which the social order is not 
sustainable, either because violence suddenly becomes much more widespread and 
the social order collapses, or because new political mobilizations are induced which 
establish a new political settlement that is more viable. Similarly, the minimum level 
of economic performance below which the political settlement is no longer 
sustainable can vary significantly across societies and over time. Some political 
settlements can tolerate substantial economic hardship and poverty without 
collapsing; others are more sensitive to economic performance. The detail is even 
more complicated because the economic and political tolerance limits can also depend 
on how economic performance or political stability declines. If the decline in either 
affects powerful groups first, the viability limits are likely to be reached earlier and 
significant counter-mobilizations will begin. In contrast if the decline hurts less 
significant groups, a political settlement can survive despite a significant worsening of 
economic conditions and/or an increase in violence. The aim of analysis is to identify 
these political and economic interdependencies within particular political settlements 
and the implications for institutional and governance reforms in these contexts. 
 




(Interacts till compatible combination emerges)
Political Settlement emerges when system achieves minimum economic and political viability
 
Figure 5 Political Settlements  
 
It is useful to distinguish between two levels at which the interaction of institutions 
and the distribution of power is analytically significant. The first and higher level of 
interaction operates at the level of a society as whole to define the political settlement. 
Figure 5 describes this interaction between institutional structures and distributions of 
power at the level of society. A compatible system of institutions and a distribution of 
power is a political settlement if the resultant economic outcomes and levels of 
political stability are sustainable for that society.  
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Institutions and the distribution of power are necessarily an interdependent system. 
First, institutions affect the distribution of power because institutions create economic 
benefits that contribute to the relative holding power of different groups. Secondly, 
the distribution of power affects institutions because powerful groups are likely to 
drive the evolution of formal and informal institutions to achieve the distributions of 
benefits that they desire. Both are likely to interact in interdependent ways till a 
compatible combination of institutions and power emerges. Once a compatible 
combination emerges, both the institutions and the distribution of power are mutually 
supportive. In particular, a political settlement is both based on and supportive of a 
distribution of power. The distribution of power supported by the current political 
settlement is in turn relevant for understanding the operation of particular institutions 
that already exist and the evolution of new institutions.  
 
Therefore, a second and lower level of analysis looks at how the distribution of power 
embedded in a political settlement is relevant for understanding the enforcement and 
operation of particular institutions and the evolution of particular institutions over 
time. Once it emerges, a political settlement is likely to be fairly robust in its broad 
outlines, even though it is inevitably evolving all the time. The configuration of 
holding power at the level of society is then buttressed by a range of formal and 
informal institutions that reproduce and sustain this configuration of power by 
enabling a consistent set of economic benefits to be created and allocated. The 
constraints set by the existing distribution of holding power are important for the 
analysis of particular institutions and governance capabilities because at that level the 
social distribution of power is exogenous for particular institutions. An individual 
institution is unlikely to change the distribution of power in society, but is likely to be 
affected by that configuration. If a particular institution, even one that already exists, 
would have implied an allocation of benefits that is significantly at variance with the 
distribution of holding power in society described by the political settlement, it is 
likely to result in high levels of contestation and therefore high enforcement costs, or 
very partial enforcement.  
 
An important analytical weakness of the NIE analysis of institutions is that it ignores 
how the political settlement can be a determinant of institutional performance at the 
level of particular institutions. Attempts to identify the effects of particular institutions 
on transaction costs without reference to the political settlement have often proved to 
be misleading because the effect of particular institutions can depend on the 
distribution of power sustained by the political settlement. Institutions that could 
reduce transaction costs in one political configuration may actually increase 
transaction costs in a somewhat different political configuration. This can happen 
because institutions not only define ways of solving particular economic problems; 
they simultaneously define the distribution of net benefits. If this distribution of 
benefits is accepted (or cannot be resisted) by the groups affected by the institution, 
the costs of enforcing the institution (a key component of overall transaction costs) 
will be low, but not otherwise. In some cases, the opposition to a potentially 
beneficial institution may be so high or its enforcement so distorted that its presence 
does more harm than good.  
 
An institution that was beneficial overall in terms of net social benefits may still be 
strongly contested if the implied distribution of benefits was not compatible with the 
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interests of powerful groups. It is sometimes assumed in NIE analyses that if net 
social benefits increase, the opponents of an institution can always be compensated so 
that the institution can be introduced and society can collectively benefit. This is often 
an arithmetically valid but practically naive proposition. The transfer of significant 
benefits from those who directly benefit from an institution to those who are losing 
out may itself be costly in terms of incentives and a promise to make these transfers 
formal may not even be credible over time (Khan 1995). More significantly, 
compensations may not be arithmetically feasible if there are multiple unconnected 
claimants who believe they deserve a share of the net value added by an institution. 
Their competing claims may add up to more than the net benefit added by the 
institution. The institution may then either not be introduced or it may be introduced 
with informal transfers to some groups who assist in its partial enforcement till 
enforcement can be gradually improved as a result of changing distributions of power 
at the social level.  
 
If a significant group refuses to accept the distribution of benefits generated by the 
institution, it can begin to undermine its enforcement in a variety of ways ranging 
from attempting to change the rule through legal processes, violating some or all of 
the rules and accepting the consequences, or by engaging in open conflicts. All these 
responses imply costs for all those involved. The transaction costs of enforcement are 
likely to go up depending on the intensity of the resistance and political stability can 
decline to different extents depending on the strategies of resistance and confrontation 
that are deployed by different parties. In contrast, if the distribution of benefits 
supported by the institution is consistent with the overall distribution of power, 
contestation is likely to be low. Enforcement costs overall will be correspondingly 
low and the transaction cost improvement achieved by the institution is likely to be in 
line with the theoretical expectation.  
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Figure 6 Lower Level Analysis: Effects on Particular Institutions 
 
If powerful groups contest the distribution of benefits implied by a potentially 
beneficial institution, there could therefore be two types of effects, summarized in 
Figure 6. One possible effect is that the full enforcement of the institution may not be 
attempted because the enforcements costs for full enforcement were effectively too 
high. Partial enforcement may result in more acceptable levels of damage for 
powerful groups, or it may reflect that powerful groups are capturing some of the 
benefits from the institution (with likely negative effects on the economic outcomes of 
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the institution). This is an important reason why apparently similar institutions display 
such significantly different results in different contexts.  
 
Alternatively, or in addition, the attempt to enforce the institution may also result in 
conflicts. These inflict ‘transition costs’ on the parties. Transition costs are the costs 
that parties to a conflict can inflict on each other through ‘political’ acts that can range 
from strikes and demonstrations to open violence. Because of the many different 
dimensions of transition costs, we are unlikely to be able to add up all the different 
transition costs that are involved during a period of conflict. However, we may still be 
able to rank situations in terms of ‘political stability’ or the ability of the coalition 
benefiting from the institutional change to sustain itself in power. We will follow this 
strategy later. Both these implications of contestation imply that an institutional 
solution that is in theory less efficient but where the distribution of benefits is more 
compatible with the existing distribution of power may actually provide better 
incremental economic benefits without a serious deterioration in political stability.  
 
By focusing on how political settlements define the enforcement costs of particular 
institutions, we can explain why the same apparently beneficial institution like 
industrial policy can produce excellent results in some developing countries and very 
poor results in others (Khan 1999). Equally, this framework can help to explain why 
very different institutions are observed to be effective in different countries. For 
instance, the most effective structure of firm appears to be very different across 
countries depending on pre-existing relationships within each society (Whitley 1992). 
The institution that is most likely to reduce overall transaction costs depends on the 
distribution of power in which that institution has to be located. Finally, we can begin 
to explain why growth-enhancing institutional evolution has more serious effects on 
political stability in some societies compared to others. If emerging institutions that 
promote growth are more significantly inconsistent with prior power distributions, the 
decline in political stability is likely to be more severe.  
 
Our core argument is therefore that the interdependent analysis of power and 
institutions has to be conducted at two levels. First, as we see in Figure 5 we need to 
have an understanding of the political settlement at a social level and its evolution 
over time. Secondly, as described in Figure 6, we need to locate the analysis of 
particular institutions in a particular country in the context of power defined by its 
current political settlement. We now look at these two levels of analysis in greater 
depth.  
 
4. Power and Institutions Defining the Political Settlement 
Institutions are clearly not just rules for making decisions; they also define 
distributions of benefits. In turn, a distribution of benefits helps to sustain the 
distribution of holding power that supported the institutions providing these benefits. 
However, here there is a substantial problem which distinguishes developing 
countries from advanced one. In developing countries, formal institutions cannot 
adapt sufficiently to provide a distribution of benefits that is compatible with the 
distribution of holding power in society. A major reason for this is that the productive 
sector protected by formal rights is small. The distribution of benefits coming from 
the small productive sector cannot reflect the broad distribution of power in society. 
Moreover, the productive capabilities of the most powerful political organizers are 
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typically very limited and so they could not immediately benefit if formal productive 
rights were immediately assigned to them. Nor is it possible to specify formal rules of 
redistribution that allocated the net product of productive activities to currently 
powerful factions and organizations. As a result, the only way in which institutions 
could support the distribution of power in the typical developing country is through 























   
    

















A Political Settlement emerges when institutions generate a distribution of benefits 
that is compatible with and sustains the distribution of power (subject to economic viability)




Figure 7 The Interdependence of Power and Institutions  
 
The circular and interdependent relationship between institutions and the distribution 
of power is shown in Figure 7. Institutions evolve in response to the activity of 
powerful groups; power in this context referring to both economic and political 
holding power. The ‘rent-seeking’ activities of powerful groups result in the creation 
of both formal and informal institutions. The informal institutions that we are 
primarily interested in are institutions that are based on informal enforcement and 
which achieve significant distributions of benefits for the organizers of power. In turn, 
formal and informal institutions sustain distributions of economic benefits for the 
participants in these institutional arrangements. The creation or modification of 
institutions in response to power and ultimately the creation of streams of benefits is 
shown by Arrows A and B. The distributions of benefits in turn support the 
distribution of power, shown by Arrow C in Figure 7. A political settlement emerges 
when the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits generated by the 
institutional structure are compatible in the sense that they support each other and the 
broad features of the system of power and institutions are identifiably stable. But the 
survival of these arrangements also requires a second set of requirements about 
viability: the institutional structure has to achieve minimum economic viability. 
 
A political settlement is stable precisely because the distribution of power is 
(eventually) sustained by the institutional structure through an appropriate distribution 
of benefits. It is in this sense that a political settlement describes a sustainable and 
compatible combination of power and institutions. The equilibrium is never perfect, 
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as power and the distribution of benefits are always changing through economic, 
political, demographic, organizational and other processes. Nevertheless, stability 
requires by definition, a rough balance between power and institutions.  
 
The Significance of Informal Institutions in Developing Countries 
A significant characteristic of developing countries is that their inherited distributions 
of power cannot be supported by the incomes generated by formal institutions alone. 
Informal institutions play a vitally important role in all developing countries because 
informal institutions are the only feasible mechanism for sustaining economic benefits 
for powerful groups who would otherwise have lost out. Till informal institutions 
emerge to sustain the aspirations of these groups, conflict and resistance prevent the 
achievement of minimum stability. The problem is that powerful groups in developing 
countries often have few capabilities that could benefit from the protection of property 
rights and a rule of law.  
 
Even if powerful groups captured productive assets and established property rights 
over them, they would typically not survive in competitive markets without 
significant additional assistance and capability building. These are relatively slow 
processes of productive transformation. In any case most developing countries do not 
have sufficient formal institutional and governance capabilities to convert political 
accumulators into productive entrepreneurs. Nor can redistributive flows to powerful 
groups be enshrined in formal public rules of redistribution such as taxes and 
subsidies even if appropriate fiscal resources were available. This is because such 
redistributions to the not-so-poor would be difficult if not impossible to justify in 
terms of general public principles of welfare. Informal arrangements are therefore 
used to enable powerful groups to have continued access to incomes through 
‘political’ accumulation. The political settlement in the typical developing country 
therefore has a significant component of informal institutions as part of its 
interdependent system of (formal and informal) institutions and power.  
 
Our analysis of a political settlement provides an explanation for the significance of 
informal institutions in developing countries that is very different from the ones 
usually provided by institutional economics. The usual explanation for informality in 
developing countries is that the governance capabilities for enforcing formal 
institutions are weak, leaving a lot of activity to be guided by informal institutions. 
Sometimes, the weakness of enforcement is also explained by the presence of 
unfavourable cultural values that increase the costs of enforcement. These 
explanations imply that if the governance capabilities for enforcement could be 
sufficiently strengthened (with appropriate changes in cultures to the extent that this 
can be achieved) developing countries would become more like advanced countries, 
with Weberian (impersonal) states enforcing property rights and a rule of law.  
 
In contrast, the analysis of political settlements suggests that informal institutions are 
likely to remain important in developing countries regardless of attempts to improve 
formal governance capabilities. The scope of informal institutions in this analysis 
reflects not the weakness of formal governance capabilities (which are undoubtedly 
weak) but the distributions of holding power that are far removed from the ones that 
could be supported by any emerging formal institutions. The ‘solution’ which 
maintains political stability at acceptable levels in developing countries is the 
emergence of significant informal institutions that allow benefits to be captured by 
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powerful groups. This is reflected in the combination of formal and informal 
institutions and the distribution of power that constitutes the political settlement in a 
developing country.  
 
Informal institutional arrangements like resource allocation and accumulation through 
patron-client networks are examples of arrangements through which powerful groups 
create economic benefits for themselves during developmental transitions. The 
informal institutions in this context are mechanisms through which social and political 
stability is maintained. They help to generate distributions of economic benefits that 
are more in line with existing distributions of power and in doing so they also sustain 
these distributions of power. Political settlements across developing countries do of 
course vary greatly. These variations reflect differences in evolutionary paths from 
very different class and social structures and colonial strategies. Differences in 
political movements, party organizations or social movements have also resulted in 
differences in the ways in which political settlements are constituted in different 
countries.  
 
An important question is why the distribution of holding power in developing 
countries is not based on the incomes and other formal rights defined by previously 
existing formal institutions. Why is the distribution of power so significantly out of 
line with the incomes and rights defined by their own formal institutions? We will 
discuss this further in a later section on typologies of political settlements. An 
important part of the answer is that developing countries are transitional societies. 
Their ‘pre-capitalist’ economic and social systems have collapsed and modern 
‘capitalist’ economies have not emerged. When pre-capitalist political settlements 
were operative holding power was indeed based to a much greater extent on formal 
institutions. Of course by describing developing countries as societies in transition we 
are not suggesting that there is any teleological path that will eventually take them to 
a productive capitalism.  
 
Nevertheless, the concept of transition is important because the emerging capitalist 
and market-based formal institutions in the typical developing country are not 
developed enough or productive enough to make the beneficiaries of these formal 
rights the dominant power group in these societies. The proposition that the 
organization of power plays a significant role during periods of crisis when formal 
institutions are being radically restructured is not controversial. In fact, developing 
countries are effectively going through long and relatively slow processes of 
transformation. Their historic ‘pre-capitalist’ formal institutions have all but collapsed 
and new formal institutions that are self-sustaining in economic and political terms 
have not yet emerged.  
 
A further part of the answer is that colonial impacts often made the gap between 
holding power and formal institutions even bigger. In many developing countries, the 
pre-capitalist political settlements were collapsing anyway, but the colonial impact 
accelerated this collapse. In many cases, strategies of colonial rule required the 
colonial powers to recognize the organizational power of different groups who did not 
have formal rights but who had to be incorporated sequentially into the system of state 
benefits to ensure stability. Ironically, anti-colonial struggles were often led by these 
very groups and the process of successful organization against colonial powers further 
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enhanced the importance and legitimacy of organizational holding power in post-
colonial developing countries.  
 
The newly independent countries also witnessed accelerated social mobilizations by 
previously excluded groups to gain access to redistributive rents. These processes 
have created a growing gap between the actual holding power of relevant groups and 
the holding power that could be attributed to formal rights and incomes. Success in 
political organization, and sometimes the organization of violence, has become the 
critical determinant of holding power in these contexts. For obvious reasons, the 
power of these emerging social mobilizations cannot be sustained by benefits created 
by formal institutions. But these mobilizations can and do use informal mechanisms 
to capture resources in ways that both reflect and sustain their holding power.  
 
Economic Growth with Informal Institutions 
A common perception is that the absence of well-defined formal institutions like a 
system of property rights constrains the development of poor economies. The 
underlying theory is plausible but does not help us to understand the dynamics of 
development in contexts defined by political settlements with a significant structural 
role for informal institutions. When productive activities emerge in these contexts, 
they are not organized as islands of formal economies in the midst of a sea of 
informality. Rather, the productive activities emerge out of and are deeply embedded 
in the mix of formal and informal institutions that characterize the political settlement. 
A transition to greater formality may gradually happen, but to be consistent with a 
viable evolution of the political settlement, it will have to happen in line with 
gradually changing social distributions of power. Otherwise attempts at enforcement 
will fail, or if enforcement is attempted with violence, the political settlement can 
collapse into significantly greater instability and violence as groups with significant 
holding power can be expected to fight back.  
 
Moreover, there are a number of additional features of ‘late development’ which 
mean that even if well-defined property rights existed, they would be insufficient for 
ensuring dynamism in contemporary poor countries. This is because a number of 
significant market failures exist that cannot be adequately addressed simply by 
strengthening or extending the emerging structure of formal rights. One example is 
the complexity in the historical definition of land rights. These complexities mean that 
the problems of acquiring land for industrial development, for instance, are not likely 
to be addressed simply by defining existing property rights a little better (Khan 
2009a). Another important example is the market failure constraining the transfer of 
technological capabilities to developing countries. Given the difficulty of absorbing 
and learning modern technologies and the intensity of global competition, a viable 
and productive economic structure is not likely to emerge just because formal 
property rights are defined for a few asset-owners, even if they were better defined 
(Khan 2009b). The achievement of technological capabilities in developing countries 
requires strategies of technology upgrading and learning. As these significant market 
failures cannot be easily addressed through existing or potential formal institutions, 
another driver of informality comes paradoxically from the economic requirements of 
developing a productive sector with formal rights. Thus, there are both political and 
economic factors that sustain the informality of institutional characteristics in the 
typical developing country. 
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The emerging productive economy thus has a dual challenge. First, it has to deal with 
weakly protected and inadequately defined formal institutions like property rights as a 
consequence of political settlements supporting significant informal arrangements. 
Standard contract-enforcement is therefore more difficult in developing countries 
because one way in which informal institutions and organizations claim a share of 
benefits is by making themselves indispensable for contract enforcement of all types. 
Making inadequately enforced formal institutions work therefore requires access to 
informal enforcement capabilities and networks of power. Successful entrepreneurs 
are therefore rarely likely to be far away from informal networks of enforcement. 
These networks deploy power, including enforcement power, and contract 
enforcement is one of the many activities through which income is redistributed to 
powerful groups through informal organizations.  
 
However, the second factor, the presence of significant market failures means that the 
relationship of the emerging productive economy with informal power is complex and 
not always one of predator and victim. The emerging productive economy is initially 
structurally uncompetitive as a result of market failures that would not be sufficiently 
addressed simply by enforcing property rights and contracts a little better. The dual 
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Figure 8 Productive Sectors also depend on Informal Arrangements 
 
The combination of structural constraints facing the development of formal 
institutions and significant market failures not addressed by the formal institutions on 
offer means that the emerging productive sector in developing countries operates 
intensively with a variety of informal institutions and informal power influencing the 
operation of formal institutions. As a result, while emerging sectors that appear to 
have formal characteristics may demand formalization and good governance, 
particularly given the dominant discourse in the international context, they are rarely 
prepared to break out of the informal networks in which they are embedded. A rapid 
shift to formality is not only unlikely given the political settlement, it would also 
leave many entrepreneurs exposed to possible rapid collapse given that many have not 
yet acquired sufficient competitiveness.  
 
Emerging entrepreneurs use their networks within and outside the state to acquire 
assets like land, to finance their learning strategies and to address other market 
failures to sustain production. The policies that assist them may sometimes be formal 
but in many cases, even formal policies were developed and fine-tuned through 
informal access. Some of these entrepreneurs may eventually become independently 
competitive but only if the combination of formal and informal institutions create an 
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appropriate combination of opportunities and compulsions for them to not only set up 
in production, but also to put in the effort to become competitive. As we have outlined 
in other papers in this series, the formal institutions that worked for the early capitalist 
developers are no longer sufficient. Yet models of appropriate formal institutions that 
can deal with these challenges do not exist, certainly not in the economic and 
governance models of the dominant paradigms of good governance reform. The 
limited success of the good governance agenda in enlisting the support of the 
productive sector in developing countries is not surprising.  
 
In principle, some of the market failures in question could be addressed by developing 
appropriate formal institutions that may work in the context of these political 
settlements, and that is indeed the challenge of the growth-enhancing institutional 
agenda. Attempts at catching up with formal institutional support have in the past 
often resulted in a waste of resources as inefficient entrepreneurs captured these 
resources without putting in sufficient effort (Khan 2009b). Many of the ambitious 
formal instruments used in the past, like broad-ranging industrial policies, were 
inappropriate for the political settlements in which they were attempted. Successful 
developmental states where ambitious industrial policies did work were fortunate 
because their political settlements were supportive and their structures of informal 
power could enforce growth-enhancing conditions. In other settlements, where clients 
of state policies were powerfully organized and divided into many factions, ambitious 
industrial policies failed (Khan 1999). Some of the differences between political 
settlements observed in developing countries will be discussed later. The challenge in 
countries with less supportive political settlements is to design appropriate formal 
institutions that can assist technological capability building in less favourable 
contexts.  
 
Our discussion also suggests why analytical frameworks developed in advanced 
countries have typically under-played the importance of power. In advanced countries 
there is (by definition) a well-established and productive economic system based on 
formal institutions. Formal institutions are dominant in the sense that they are 
responsible for the bulk of social output and incomes and the bulk of social power 
flows from the incomes generated by formal institutions. A separate analysis of the 
sources of power in advanced countries therefore often appears to be superfluous. 
Distributive conflicts exist and can be relevant for explaining institutional 
performance, but distributive conflicts are likely to be organized along the lines of 
incomes generated by formal institutions. Another feature of the ‘capitalist’ political 
settlement is that the owners of formal capitalist rights normally have the most 
significant holding power in advanced countries, so the limits of distributive conflicts 
are set by what is acceptable to the owners of productive rights. In terms of Figure 7, 
Arrow A is the dominant arrow and Arrow B is virtually non-existent.  
 
In contrast, in developing countries Arrow B in Figure 7 is very important because 
many powerful groups do not have formal rights and cannot immediately convert 
themselves into capitalists or otherwise maintain their power on the basis of formal 
rights. Informal rules and organizations such as patron-client networks are important, 
but primarily not because of culture, deference or inequalities in the distribution of 
formal rights (which may all be important). Rather, the essential problem common to 
all developing countries is that these are essentially societies where there is a 
structural (transitional) mismatch between the scale and productivity of activities 
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protected by formal institutions and the distribution of power. Informal institutions are 
used to enable different types of rent capture by organizationally powerful groups and 
these informally generated economic resources reinforce and sustain their holding 
power over time. Some of these rents are very damaging in comparison with 
alternative feasible ways of organizing society. But other rents, including 
redistributive rents may be essential for maintaining stability and preventing a descent 
into violence (Khan 2000b; North, et al. 2009). And finally, some rents even in these 
contexts may be playing a vital role in supporting the development of productive 
assets and technological capabilities (Khan 2000b, 2000a). Therefore, a perspective 
which sees all rents and all informality as a problem is not very useful in this context.  
 
Clearly the diverse sources of power and the ways in which power is organized are 
much more important in developing countries and these differences can explain 
significant differences in the organization of the political settlement. An analysis of 
these differences can help to explain why countries have performed differently and 
can also inform the design of reform strategies that are more likely to be implemented 
and have positive effects in particular settlements. More controversially, perhaps, an 
understanding of political settlements can help reformers and political movements in 
developing countries discuss marginal and feasible changes in the organization of 
power that can assist their societies to sustain growth or achieve higher growth. We 
now discuss the mechanisms through which political settlements can constrain the 
operation of formal institutions in developing countries and then turn to a 
classification of political settlements. 
 
5. The Political Settlement as a Constraint on Institutional Performance 
We now turn from the analysis of a political settlement at the macro-level to the 
question of how a particular political settlement can affect the operation of particular 
institutions. At the macro-level, when we look at a society as a whole, it is unlikely 
that the overall institutional structure can produce a distribution of incomes that is 
significantly out of line with the distribution of holding power (Knight 1992). 
Nevertheless, if we drill down to particular institutions, the formal structure of some 
institutions may imply distributions of benefits that are significantly out of line with 
the distribution of power of groups involved in operating and contesting that 
institution. As a consequence, we are likely to see enforcement that may be unusually 
poor for these institutions, the participation of informal organizations in sharing 
benefits from particular formal institutions, or sustained low level conflicts at the 
level of particular institutions.  
 
In addition, at the margin institutions are evolving and new institutions are being 
advocated by competing groups or by the state to further particular interests or in 
response to economic and political challenges. Proposed institutional changes do not 
always fully take into account the likely resistance to the implementation of the 
institution, and this resistance can determine the performance of these institutions and 
even whether they can be sustained over time. The partial implementation of formal 
institutions like property rights or industrial policies can explain significant 
differences in the development experience of countries.  
 
The resistance of powerful groups can range from legal attempts to reverse 
institutional changes, non-compliance with rules at different levels of intensity and 
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ultimately engagement in conflicts in the form of withdrawals of investments, strikes 
and, in some cases, violence. As we summarized in Figure 6, if powerful groups 
oppose the implementation of a growth-enhancing institution, two types of results 
could follow. First, the institution could be partially enforced. Effectively, powerful 
groups would get a distribution of benefits more acceptable to them, but at the cost of 
subverting the expected economic outcomes. Secondly, the implementation of the 
institution could result in some political costs due to conflicts (transition costs) that 
reduce political stability. These two effects, partial enforcement and political 
instability, are enduring features of developing countries, and reflect the fact that 
institutional evolution and resistance are always going on. For a particular institution, 
resistance can be expected to continue till either the institution is withdrawn or till 
gradual changes in the underlying distribution of power bring the resistance to an end. 
In many cases, the reason why useful formal institutions appear to be missing is 
because their introduction would have resulted in significant resistance. This, rather 
than oversight or ignorance on the part of that society is often the problem. We 
discuss partial enforcement and the costs of political instability in turn. 
 
Partial Enforcement 
The standard explanations for the poor enforcement of formal institutions in 
developing countries focus on the weakness of governance agencies and sometimes 
also on prevailing cultures and norms. The alternative explanation focusing on the 
distribution of power supported by a political settlement is summarized in Figure 9. 
Institutions potentially have both efficiency and distribution effects. The standard 
analysis of institutions in the NIE looks primarily at the efficiency implications of 
formal institutional designs. This focuses on the incentive implications of institutions 
or the closely related analysis of the transaction costs of coordination, information 
collection and monitoring of free-riding behaviour under different institutions. This 
theoretical analysis can provide a useful starting point for an analysis of how 
institutions like particular allocations of property rights or types of firms could reduce 
transaction costs. The superiority of some institutions over others could depend on the 
economic characteristics of the problem defined by numbers of people who need to be 
coordinated, the nature of the technology and so on. But this analysis almost entirely 
ignores distribution and therefore the political problems of enforcing the ‘contracts’ 
implicit in these institutional arrangements. The purely theoretical efficiency effects 
of formal institutions that are the focus of NIE are shown as Arrow A in Figure 9.  
 
In contrast, the distributive effects of the institution, typically ignored in the standard 
NIE analysis are shown along Arrow B. These may or may not be compatible with the 
existing distribution of power (defined by the political settlement) between the groups 
interested in the institution. This can result in more or less serious mobilizations 
against particular institutions along Arrow C. For the assessment of particular 
institutions, the distribution of power determined by the macro-level political 
settlement is an exogenous variable. If the resistance is significant, the economic costs 
of enforcing the institution will be high. The overall transaction costs of operating 
under the institution are therefore only partially defined by the analysis shown by 
Arrow A. The overall transaction costs also depend on the joint effects of Arrows B 
and C. If enforcement costs are high the overall efficiency of a theoretically efficient 
institution will be low, and it may not even be sustainable.  
 
 33 
Part of the high enforcement cost may be hidden in informal transfers to organizations 
that are necessary to partially enforce the institution. The informal redistribution of 
benefits may have an indirect efficiency effect in terms of lower output. The loss in 
output is then the enforcement cost. But part of the enforcement costs may be very 
visible in direct conflicts that result in high enforcement costs and the response to this 
may be to accept poor enforcement. This effect can be described in a number of 
equivalent ways. If the enforcement is partial (violations are allowed), the loss in 
output can be a measure of the enforcement cost, and we can also describe this as an 
economic transition cost if we assume that these are costs that have to be borne as the 
system awaits better enforcement. In the broadest sense of transaction costs, all of 
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Figure 9 Power as a Constraint on the Operation of Particular Institutions 
 
As an example, consider the simple free access problem where a number of people are 
using a common resource like a lake for fishing. Overfishing can result in a collapse 
of the fish stock. The institutional problem is to create incentives for responding to 
emerging scarcities as well as to create an authority with the power to limit levels of 
fishing beyond a sustainable level. In theory, the incentives and the authority could be 
created in a number of different ways that could work equally well. One possibility 
would be a private property right giving one individual the authority to make 
decisions about entry into the lake and giving that person ownership of the economic 
surplus from fishing. Other possibilities include different types of collective 
ownership. Ignoring transaction costs entirely may suggest that any institutional rule 
may be equally good. Here, the NIE analysis focusing on the theoretical transaction 
costs of institutions may suggest that some types of institutions may be better in some 
contexts. But a consideration of the social context of power and of enforcement costs 
may overturn the NIE analysis entirely.  
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Before the NIE came along, different institutional solutions to problems like free 
access appeared to be equivalent. The NIE analysis pointed out that this may not 
necessarily be the case because, for instance, an individual owner may face lower 
costs of making decisions and monitoring, compared to a collective which may have 
the additional problem of monitoring its own members attempting to free ride on 
collective decisions. This kind of analysis focuses on the transaction costs relevant for 
achieving efficiency along Arrow A. An analysis of these transaction costs was the 
significant contribution of the NIE.  
 
However, this early institutional analysis was incomplete because it ignored the 
effects of possible conflicts over distributive outcomes shown by our arrows B and C. 
Returning to our example, individual ownership allocates most of the social gain from 
controlling overuse to one individual, while the fishing collective allocates the social 
gain more equally across a larger group of fishermen. Distribution is not just 
important for understanding the distributive justice of different solutions, but directly 
for understanding the efficacy with which the institutional rules themselves are likely 
to be implemented. This is because the institution will have to be implemented in an 
actually existing social context with a pre-existing distribution of power between the 
fishermen themselves and maybe other affected groups.  
 
If this distribution of holding power is out of line with the distribution of benefits 
brought about by the proposed institution, resistance is likely to raise enforcement 
costs. The critical determinant of enforcement costs is the degree of incompatibility 
between the distribution of benefits described by Arrow B and the distribution of 
holding power described by Arrow C. Note that this analysis makes no assessment of 
the justice of the actual distribution, whether egalitarian or otherwise. That is a 
separate question that is also important, but institutional arrangements that achieve 
greater distributive justice will not necessarily be easier to enforce unless the 
underlying distribution of holding power is appropriate. The important point now is 
that our assessment of the economic implications of an institution has to take into 
account enforcement costs. 
 
If the fishermen were initially more or less equal in terms of their ‘holding power’, an 
attempt to create private property rights for a single individual would result in 
significant contestation. The egalitarian distribution of power could be based on 
formal asset ownership or it could be that local fishermen belong to equally powerful 
informal networks. The allocation of significant benefits to a single individual in such 
a context would be out of line with that distribution of power. Contestation could take 
the form of the excluded fishermen violating the formal property right and continuing 
to fish as they had before or engaging in other forms of legal or illegal challenge. 
Instead of an efficiently enforced property right, the likely result would be some 
combination of partial enforcement and persistent contestation and transition costs.  
 
Given a relatively diffuse distribution of power between the fishermen, collective 
ownership that shared benefits between all or most of the fishermen may face lower 
contestation and enforcement costs. As a result, the overall transaction costs for 
collective rights may be lower compared to individual rights, even accounting for the 
higher costs of reaching agreements and controlling internal free-riding under the 
formal decision-making rules of collective ownership. In contrast, if the political 
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settlement supported a very unequal distribution of local power, individual rights are 
more likely to be more efficient. If a particular individual had significantly greater 
holding power than others in the locality, an individual right for that individual may 
be enforceable at low cost. Other fishermen would have little to gain by contesting the 
property right, and even if they did, the contest would be likely to be over relatively 
quickly. In this case the individual right would be well-enforced and enforcement and 
transition costs would be low. The overall transaction costs would then indeed make 
individual rights the more efficient institution.  
 
The overall effect of institutions on growth and efficiency can therefore depend on the 
compatibility or otherwise of the distribution of benefits with the distribution of 
power in that social and historical context. The macro-level analysis of a political 
settlement can provide insights into how formal and informal institutions sustain the 
holding power of different groups. This background sets the scene for the analysis of 
particular institutions. The extended analysis is more likely to explain differences in 
institutional performance across societies, as well as identifying the institutions most 
likely to assist growth in particular political settlements.  
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Figure 10 Political Settlements, Partial Enforcement and Institutional Performance 
 
The standard analysis of institutions in NIE therefore needs to be extended to take into 
account the effects of differences in enforcement costs. Figure 10 summarizes a series 
of further steps that are required to develop the analysis of particular institutions and 
their economic outcomes. The NIE analysis of institutions stops with its efficiency 
analysis of formal rules in the first box in Figure 10. The analysis of formal incentives 
can suggest that some institutions are theoretically better than others in reducing 
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relevant transaction costs. However, this analysis is a first step and can be misleading 
on its own. We need to take into account enforcement costs, for which we need 
information about the political settlement at the social level. The further steps in the 
analysis summarize our argument so far. Figure 10 also spells out that resistance to 
enforcement can manifest itself in two different ways, sometimes simultaneously.  
 
First, the institution may be imperfectly or partially enforced, resulting in poor results. 
This could happen because violations of rules cannot be consistently or successfully 
stopped. For instance, an insufficiently powerful individual may not be able to ensure 
that enforcement agencies enforce a formal property right. In this case, powerful 
groups exercise their informal power to directly appropriate benefits that should have 
been differently allocated according to the formal rules. The expected efficiency and 
growth effects of the formal institution may as a result fail to fully materialize. Partial 
enforcement could also take the form of formal owners voluntarily offering to share 
these benefits with powerful informal organizations to achieve better enforcement and 
protection of their formal rights. For instance, the enforcement of the right may 
require payments to informal networks. Once again, the rule is subverted compared to 
the formal rules but in this case the rule may appear to be better enforced. 
Nevertheless, the fact that benefits have to be informally shared means that once 
again, effective control over the stream of benefits is diluted and the efficiency and 
growth effects of the formal institution are negatively affected. Secondly, enforcement 
in a context of resistance may result in contestation and political costs. These 
transition costs can have an economic effect, but they often have directly political 
effects that are costs, but costs that cannot be reduced to economic values in a simple 
way. Partial enforcement and the transition costs of conflicts are jointly determined. 
We turn now to a discussion of the growth-stability trade-off along which different 
degrees of enforcement success and political transition costs are jointly determined.  
 
The Growth-Stability Trade-off 
The introduction of institutions that are incompatible with the interests of powerful 
groups can be expected to result in opposition and counter-mobilizations by these 
groups. The transition costs that powerful coalitions can inflict on those who are 
proposing the institutional change as well as on the general society have multiple 
dimensions. We include in our definition of these political transition costs all types of 
costs that a society can face as a result of organized ‘political’ resistance to the 
implementation and operation of particular institutions. The transition costs can be 
‘measured’ by the degree to which stability declines. If the institution is a growth-
enhancing one, we expect to observe a ‘growth-stability trade-off’ whose severity 
depends on the political settlement, the institution in question and the strategies the 
ruling coalition are pursuing in attempting to enforce the institution.  
 
As there is always some margin for tolerating a decline in stability, some growth-
enhancing institutions are always being introduced and partially enforced in most 
political settlements even if they are resisted by powerful groups. The severity of the 
decline in stability when improvements in growth are achieved determines the 
feasible limits to institutional change along the particular path being followed. Thus, 
the shape of the ‘growth-stability trade-off curve’ and the minimum level of stability 
that the society has to maintain are important determinants of the limits to institutional 
change possible in that society over the period in question. The shape of the trade-off 
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and changes over time are in turn determined by a number of variables and we will 
consider three important factors that will inform our subsequent analysis.  
 
First, holding everything else constant, the shape and position of the trade-off depends 
on the political settlement, as the distribution of power determines the strength of 
resistance to particular institutional changes. The distribution of power is exogenous 
for the analysis of particular institutional changes but is not exogenous for society. It 
changes through social mobilizations, political activities creating new political 
organizations and coalitions, and the process of institutional change itself. Second, the 
shape of the trade-off depends on the strategies used while introducing the 
institutional changes. If powerful groups are bought off by sharing some of the 
benefits from the outset the trade-off is likely to be less steep compared to a strategy 
of confrontation. However, over time, different strategies may imply different 
movements of the trade-off curve, depending on the type of institutional strategy that 
is being implemented. For instance, in some cases early compromises with powerful 
groups can build up more serious problems later. Thirdly, the position of the trade-off 
curve over time can also depend on whether incremental or discontinuous changes in 
the institutional structure are being attempted. Discrete institutional changes focusing 
on specific institutional changes are likely to face more limited resistance while 
multiple changes can unite resisting coalitions. But this expectation too may be 
modified in particular political settlements. In general, though, incremental changes 
are more likely to be feasible as big changes increase the probability of different 
coalitions coming together to block change. Finally, with appropriate modifications, 
the trade-off analysis can also be used to compare institutional performance across 
countries in a more realistic way. 
 
Political Settlements and the Trade-off Curve 
The growth-stability trade-off shown in Figure 11 can only be defined with clearly 
specified initial conditions. The initial conditions are specified not only in terms of 
endowments, rights and technological capabilities but also in terms of the formal and 
informal institutions and organizations that describe the distribution of power in that 
society. It follows that growth-stability trade-offs are specified for periods when these 
initial conditions and in particular the distribution of power is relatively stable. A 
change in the distribution of power or in any of the other initial conditions can be 
expected to shift the trade-off curve. The institutional changes along a particular path 
have to be well defined as well as strategies through which incremental institutional 
changes are introduced. The resistance to particular institutional changes can be very 
different even in the same country depending on the sectors and the balance of 
interests affected and the organization and power of these interests. In our trade-off 
curves we will not be looking at the general problem of institutional change, or even 
the best path, but at specific paths defined either in comparison with other countries, 
or paths that are relevant for understanding the performance of actually existing 
institutions or paths defined by coalitions pushing for specific changes. With these 
conditions, we are interested in the increase in transition costs associated with 
incremental improvements in growth along a specific path of institutional change. 
 
The vertical axis indirectly measures the political transition costs of institutional 
changes by showing the ordinal rank of institutional situations in terms of their 
implications for ‘stability’ as perceived by the ruling coalition responsible for the 
enforcement of institutions and therefore directly subject to transition costs. The 
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horizontal axis measures economic performance, in this case economic growth. 
Keeping all other variables fixed, incremental changes in institutions or incremental 
changes in the enforcement of existing institutions can improve growth. Both count as 
institutional change. If the resultant distribution of income is contested by powerful 
groups, higher growth could be associated with higher transition costs with obvious 
implications for stability as perceived by the ruling coalition. Our first proposition is 
that the more powerful the groups whose distributions of benefit are threatened by the 
institutional changes, the steeper the trade-off curve will be. Moreover, any 
exogenous strengthening (weakening) of these groups will result in the trade-off curve 
































Figure 11 Effects of Different Political Settlements on Trade-offs 
 
Transition costs are imposed primarily on the ruling coalition proposing the 
institutional change, but there are significant externalities, particularly in the case of 
violence, and transition costs in general are likely to affect much broader groups in 
society. An inclusive measure of all the dimensions of political conflict does not exist 
as transition costs can be inflicted through different mechanisms ranging from legal 
protests and mobilizations to violent conflict. Each of these mechanisms may inflict 
measurable transition costs, either specifically on the ruling coalition or more 
generally on society, in the form of days lost in strikes, the costs of different forms of 
violence and so on. But the different dimensions of transition costs are not necessarily 
commensurable and some dimensions may be more important than others in particular 
contexts. To enable comparisons across situations where the dominant transition costs 
are different, we use a general category of ‘stability’ to rank situations in terms of the 
most relevant transition costs appropriate to a particular institutional path.  
 
We assume that the most significant transition costs along a particular path of 
institutional change can be identified (electoral risk for the ruling coalition, economic 
costs of strikes, human costs of violence, and so on). We also assume that we can 
ordinally rank transition costs along a specific path of institutional change in terms of 
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greater or lesser transition costs even if we cannot measure these transition costs 
directly. This is a plausible assumption in most cases, as opposed to the requirement 
of a cardinal measure of transition costs. The stability axis locates institutional 
situations by their rank in terms of the transition costs most relevant for that path of 
institutional change. Locations higher up the figure (higher stability) rank lower in 
terms of transition costs and vice versa. It is worth pointing out that the decline in 
political stability shown along any particular trade-off curve is not permanent, and 
refers only to the period of resistance to a specific institution or institutional change. 
Political stability can improve not only if the institutional change is reversed, it can 
also improve with the institutional change staying in place if the groups engaging in 
resistance give up. The latter implies the emergence or revelation of an incrementally 
different distribution of power.  
 
The horizontal axis measures the actually achieved growth rate (or other measure of 
economic performance) associated with each institutional situation. Each point on a 
trade-off curve (shown as a continuous curve for convenience) therefore represents an 
institutional situation with an associated growth rate and measure of stability. The 
pace at which stability declines will clearly depend on the strength of the groups 
opposing the institutional change. If these coalitions are weak, the trade-off curve is 
more favourable (higher up and/or flatter), if they are strong, the trade-off may be 
very adverse (lower down and/or steeper). Changes in the strength of these coalitions 
will also result in shifts of the trade-off curve, as the same institutions will then be 
associated with greater or lesser effective resistance. Changes in the organization of 
the political settlement are therefore an important endogenous cause of shifts in the 
position of the trade-off curve for a particular society. 
 
Depending on the particular political settlement, and the initial institutional situation, 
incremental improvements in institutions or their degree of enforcement to enhance 
economic outcomes is likely to face increasing resistance from adversely affected 
groups. This is because any institutional change or change in the degree of 
enforcement has implications for the distribution of benefits between affected parties. 
If we make the realistic assumption that strengthening the enforcement of formal 
rights is likely to negatively impact the incomes of informal coalitions who may have 
been involved in their (informal) enforcement or in otherwise determining 
institutional outcomes, we can expect these groups to organize increasing resistance to 
progress in these directions.  
 
The ‘minimum sustainable level of stability’ in Figure 11 plays an important role in 
our analysis. This is the level of stability necessary for keeping together the different 
interests who define a political settlement. The minimum sustainable level relevant for 
a particular path of institutional change also depends on the political settlement and 
the identity of the groups supporting and opposing the direction of reform. For 
instance, if the resistance is being organized by coalitions on which the ruling 
coalition also depends, the minimum level of stability may be quite high. The 
minimum level of stability defines the point beyond which institutional change cannot 
be pushed without unravelling either the ruling coalition or the political settlement as 
a whole. Crossing this point in some situations could simply mean an electoral defeat 
for the representatives of a particular policy. In other contexts it could mean levels of 
protest and violence that induce the ruling coalition to abandon its attempts. In 
extreme cases violence could escalate out of control and the political settlement could 
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itself unravel. Once this happens, the trade-off curve can collapse because the society 
can descend into significantly greater degrees of conflict and violence. A political 
settlement also requires a minimum level of economic performance to sustain itself. If 
economic performance falls below this level the distributive arrangements that sustain 
the political settlement are also likely to unravel as powerful groups may engage in 
new mobilizations to ensure that their economic interests are protected. 
 
In Figure 11, the maximum growth that can be achieved with the initial political 
settlement PS1 is at point A1. If a change in the distribution of power weakened the 
coalitions resisting institutional change, and the political settlement moved to a more 
favourable position like PS2, this would allow higher growth to be achieved at A2 
along the same path of incremental institutional changes. On the other hand, if an 
autonomous change in the political settlement resulted in the trade-off curve to move 
to PS3 the society would find itself in an unsustainable position because it would not 
be able to satisfy its minimum economic and stability conditions simultaneously. A 
settlement like this is likely to unwind into crisis and conflict till a new distribution of 
power emerges that allows the minimum economic and political viability conditions 
to be satisfied. 
 
Implementation Strategies and the Slope of the Trade-off Curve 
The slope of the trade-off curve can also depend on the strategies that the 
implementing coalition adopts in response to the resistance they face. Here, there are 
many dynamic possibilities and only a few instances will be discussed to illustrate. A 
strategy based on confrontation with the organizations resisting the changes will result 
in a much steeper trade-off curve to begin with and therefore very limited feasible 
improvements in the growth rate. In Figure 12, the confrontation strategy results in a 
steep initial trade-off curve PS1, and as a result growth can initially only be safely 
increased from A1 to A2. (We will discuss later why big institutional changes that take 
society close to minimum stability conditions can also be dangerous). The high 
contestation costs and the relatively low growth that is achieved at A2 are obviously 
the costs of a strategy where concessions are not made (or very limited concessions 
are made) to the informal organizations resisting the institutional changes. On the 
other hand, if the organizations resisting these changes give up their resistance, the 
positive outcome in this case is that the trade-off curve can move up to PS2, and 
stability improves to A3, allowing further growth-enhancing institutional changes in 





























Implementation through confro ntation
 
Figure 12 Trade-offs in Confrontation Strategies 
 
In contrast, if concessions are offered very early on to powerful groups, the trade-off 
could initially be much flatter and may achieve more rapid improvements in growth 
as a result. For instance, some organizations or networks could be co-opted with 
benefits in exchange for their support in managing and enforcing the institution. In 
Figure 13, growth can increase from A1 to A2 with virtually no decline in stability. 
For some growth-enhancing institutions, sharing some benefits with powerful 
enforcers may not have seriously negative effects on efficiency. For instance, if 
informal organizations are given a role in protecting property rights, the efficiency of 
property rights may not seriously decline as a result.  
 
However, for some institutions, the non-involvement of powerful groups in the 
management of the rules may be necessary for their future efficiency. For instance, if 
industrial policy support is introduced in such a way that powerful groups benefit 
unconditionally or they are given a say in the allocation of industrial policy support, 
the effects may be quite different. In the early stages of industrial policy, the 
participation of powerful groups in determining the allocation of subsidies or in 
sharing benefits may not be too damaging. This would be the case if at first new 
production plants are being set up and growth is driven largely by the creation of new 
capacities. However, the achievement of competitiveness through learning soon 
depends on how effectively banks and other governance agencies can enforce 
conditions on subsidy-recipients. Early compromises which involved power brokers 
in the ‘protection’ of these subsidies may make disciplining very difficult if not 
impossible later. This is because any re-allocation to achieve greater incentives and 
































effectively in the future
 
Figure 13 Trade-offs with Significant Implementation Compromises 
 
The result could be that a strategy of early compromises can result in a significant 
worsening of the trade-off curve to PS2 in Figure 13 for some types of institutions. If 
this happens, the favourable trade-off achieved through compromise could turn out to 
be misleading because sustaining growth could be virtually ruled out. For these types 
of institutions, taking on powerful groups during the process of implementation may 
be necessary for dynamic efficiency. This also means incremental changes are more 
appropriate in these cases, along the lines of Figure 12. Thus, the dynamic effects of 
different types of compromises can have important effects on economic outcomes. 
For institutions like industrial policy, growth effects may not be sustainable unless the 
political redistributions required for stability can be organized in a way that does not 
hinder the re-allocation of particular subsidies. In our case studies, a common problem 
across countries was that early compromises were made in the implementation of 
industrial policy interventions. Given the nature of their political settlements, a 
gradual roll-out focusing on a small number of applications of industrial policy at a 
time may have been far more beneficial over time. 
 
Incremental versus Discontinuous Changes 
The political settlement and the trade-offs possible are neither exogenous for a society 
nor constant. The political settlement is evolving at the margin and therefore the shape 
and position of the trade-off curve can also shift as a result of institutional strategies. 
Changes in the political settlement can happen for a number of reasons. The most 
important is that autonomous changes in political organizations and new political 
mobilizations can change the distribution of power and alter the position of the trade-
off curve. We will see in our case studies that autonomous changes in political 
mobilizations have often had important effects on institutional performance and the 
prospects of institutional change. For instance, if groups who are resisting institutional 
change become stronger as a result of autonomous changes in political organizations, 
the trade-off curve can become more adverse, moving towards the origin and/or 
becoming steeper. Conversely, a shift in organizational strength that weakens these 


































Figure 14 Incremental versus Discontinuous Institutional Changes  
 
The political settlement can also change directly as a result of institutional strategies. 
The trade-off curves at any time describe the costs of contestation along specific 
paths. But if the process of institutional change succeeds, the contestation will end 
and the new streams of benefits created by the institutional change will eventually 
change the distribution of power. Alternatively, if the institutional change is badly 
organized and provokes a coalition of interests against it, the defeat of the growth-
promoting coalition is likely to establish an even more adverse distribution of power 
from the perspective of growth. In a dynamic analysis we need to take these effects 
into account, particularly since historically many developing countries have suffered 
by attempting ambitious policies whose reversal set them back much more 
significantly than the reversal of the policies themselves. The framework discussed 
here provides a method for analysing dynamic effects like these where the political 
settlement can itself change as a result of success or failure in incremental 
institutional changes. Figure 14 shows two divergent paths of progress, though by no 
means the only possibilities. One path is sustainable and positive, the other leads to a 
collapse of the political settlement. 
 
Consider a society initially at Y, achieving the minimum level of economic growth, 
G0, required to sustain system stability. Social coalitions who may benefit from 
growth begin to push for institutional changes to achieve higher growth. In the first 
trajectory, incremental changes in institutions take the society to A1 but no further 
institutional changes are attempted in this period. In the first scenario there is 
opposition to this level of change, it lasts for some time, but it eventually dissipates. 
How long this takes can vary significantly across contexts, depending on the 
calculations of the losers about the impact of their defeat on their future bargaining 
ability. A retreat will weaken them but given the small stakes they may find it very 
difficult to sustain their coalitions and alliances. Conversely, the successful 
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institutionalization of a new stream of benefits once the resistance ends can enhance 
the relative power of the growth coalition in subsequent rounds.  
 
When the resistance ends, the trade-off curve shifts up to PS2 because the incremental 
institutional change can now be sustained without the transition costs. This has 
significant dynamic implications. Thus, the improvement in the trade-off curve 
initially manifests itself as an improvement in stability to A2. But the shift in the 
trade-off curve as a result of an incremental evolution in the political settlement 
means that further institutional changes along the previous lines are now possible 
along a better trade-off. In the second period, a further move along this evolutionary 
path to A3 may be possible. Incremental institutional changes along this path can 
therefore become sustainable and growth enhancing. 
 
In contrast, the same society could end up in a deep crisis if the initial strategy was 
pushed too far, say to B1, where stability declines below the minimum stability 
conditions. This is shown as an alternative trajectory in the figure. This could happen 
if the institutional changes were not divisible or if political miscalculations were 
made. Here there is a significant increase in transition costs and an equivalent decline 
in stability. With the stakes very high, resistance to growth-enhancing institutional 
changes can be intense and can persist. The contestants can become rapidly stronger 
as a result of the high degree of instability undermining the political settlement itself. 
A defeat for the supporters of this institutional change in this case has an adverse 
effect on the political settlement, which can result in the trade-off curve moving down 
to PS3. Of course, this is not a necessary outcome. Supporters of big bang approaches 
to institutional change would argue that a big change followed by a confrontation is 
the only way to defeat the opposition to change. If they are right, the conflict ends in a 
significant upward shift of the trade-off curve. However, the configuration of forces in 
most developing countries means that a significant institutional change that sought to 
create growth-enhancing formal institutions very rapidly would threaten too many 
powerful interests at the same time to be a winnable fight.  
 
Figure 14 shows a particularly adverse outcome of an attempted discontinuous change 
where the shift in the political settlement destroys the political settlement. No part of 
the new trade-off curve satisfies the minimum growth and stability conditions 
required to sustain the political settlement. Retrogressive institutional changes are 
likely (to B2) but minimum viability conditions cannot be achieved. The political 
settlement is most likely to unravel in a serious crisis, perhaps with significant 
violence till a new set of more sustainable institutional and political compromises 
emerge. The framework thus provides a systematic structure for analysing historical 
experiences and discussing the likely characteristics of different reform trajectories in 
particular countries on the basis of what we know about the organization of their 
political settlements. The collapse of the Pakistani political settlement in the late 
1960s with the collapse of its industrial policy and the secession of East Pakistan had 
some of these stylized characteristics. One conclusion that emerges from these types 
of historical experiences is that in countries where the political settlement is 
unfavourable and fragile, feasible reform is likely to have to be incremental. In these 
cases, it is important to look for ‘divisible’ reforms where growth can be enhanced 
without the requirement of big bangs or ambitious industrial policies.  
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Comparisons across Countries 
With some modifications this framework can be used to explain why institutional 
change appears to be much easier in some countries compared to others. The relevant 
differences may have a lot to do with the shape of the growth-stability trade-offs 
facing two different growth-enhancing institutional paths. As political stability is an 
ordinal ranking, we can compare societies by scaling their trade-off curves such that 
the minimum sustainable level of political stability is set at the same level in a 
diagram. But this does not mean that the absolute transition costs are at the same 
level. It also follows that the ordinal ranking of stability only make sense for 
comparing situations in a particular society at a particular time. Comparing the levels 
of two curves showing different countries on an ordinal scale does not tell us that one 
country has a higher or lower absolute level of stability than the other at any point. On 
the other hand, growth is a measurable characteristic and a country ranking higher 
than another in terms of growth obviously actually has a higher growth rate. In the 
example shown in Figure 15, both societies are assumed to initially have the same low 
growth rate G0, which is marginally higher than the minimum required for sustaining 
their political settlements.  
 
In the diagram, the maximum growth that is achievable for country 1 is lower than 
that for country 2 even in the absence of any political constraints. For instance, in 
country 1 the evolutionary path being considered could be incremental changes in 
land rights as part of an agrarian strategy for accelerating growth. In country 2 the 
path may show incremental improvements in rules for providing industrial credit for 
technology acquisition. Of interest to us now is that in both countries incremental 
institutional reforms are likely to stop well before the maximum potential because of 
political constraints. The shape of the trade-off curves shows what happens to 
political stability as institutional reforms are incrementally implemented and enforced. 
The rate at which stability declines can determine the extent of feasible reform given 





































Figure 15 Trade-off Comparisons across Countries 
 
The first society has the more adverse growth-stability trade-off given its political 
settlement, PS1. From its initial position of A1 it is only able to reach B1 in the period 
under consideration before the minimum stability requirement blocks further 
incremental improvements. Its growth rate can therefore only be enhanced to G1. Of 
course there is no necessary compulsion for growth to even reach G1 because there 
may be no pressure on policy-makers or other interested parties to push reform to B1. 
But the latter is the point at which incremental institutional reform along this path is 
likely to stop were it to be pushed to its limit. The growth rate G1 is not necessarily 
the highest growth rate that this society could ever achieve, nor is the decline in 
political stability a permanent one. Both the political settlement and the ruling 
coalition can change over time, and different strategies of institutional reform may 
face different trade-offs. One of the policy implications of our approach is to make us 
more aware of the alternatives.  
 
In contrast, in the second society the political settlement offers a more favourable 
trade-off curve, PS2. Here, from the initial situation A2, institutional reform can 
proceed to B2, achieving a higher growth rate of G2. In the diagram shown in Figure 
15, institutional changes in the direction of higher growth initially result in greater 
political stability in this society. This may happen if the institutional changes initially 
benefit groups that are relatively stronger in terms of holding power. If powerful 
productive groups had been actively campaigning for these changes, their 
implementation can have a positive effect on stability. Nevertheless, the continuation 
of incremental changes in the direction of higher growth eventually reduces political 
stability as we are still assuming this is a developing country with strong informal 
organizations attempting to maintain their relative distributions of benefits. The rate 
of decline is more gradual reflecting a different distribution of power, allowing a 
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higher growth rate to be achieved than the first society. One of the important 
conclusions of this type of analysis is that the achievement of a move to B1 in country 
1 implies just as much political skill and reform effort as a move to B2 in country 2. 
Comparing the achievements of different countries and the seriousness of their reform 
efforts without an understanding of their political settlements can be seriously 
misleading. 
 
An analysis of the political settlement can enhance our understanding of institutional 
performance and processes of institutional change in a number of ways. First, it tells 
us that the theoretical analysis of institutional efficiency can be misleading without 
looking at the enforcement costs of different institutions, which are specific to 
particular political settlements. Institutions which appear to be second-best in theory 
could actually be first-best in particular settlements. Secondly, the analysis tells us 
that there are real costs of institutional change measured by transition costs. As 
societies face very different growth-stability trade-offs, their strategies of reform have 
to be appropriately different. Countries with unfavourable trade-offs can achieve 
significant policy successes and yet achieve lower growth. This is not necessarily a 
problem and indeed attempts to push countries with vulnerable and unfavourable 
political settlements to adopt ambitious policies can either lead to inaction or even 
worse, to a collapse. Most importantly, an understanding of the political settlement 
can help us to discuss the likely impact of different compromises through which 
growth is sustained. These compromises can in some cases make further growth-
enhancing changes much more difficult.  
 
Thus, a better understanding of how the political settlement is constructed in 
particular contexts can help to identify more promising paths of institutional change. 
A focus on the political settlement does not imply that societies with more adverse 
political settlements are doomed to suffer persistent poverty. Differences in the 
distribution of power are not entirely exogenous. While it is not at all responsible to 
suggest that political settlements can be recast in entirely new ways, political and 
organizational activity can (and historically have) changed the organization and 
distribution of power in significant ways that enabled better growth. Political 
organizations and movements in developing countries need a language and an 
analytical framework for examining the consequences of different types of political 
mobilization and organization.  
 
This is particularly important given that the analysis of political mobilization is often 
articulated in broad populist discourses of empowering the poor or the ‘citizens’. 
However well-meaning, general support for democratization and accountability 
comes from a Weberian good governance model of politics that has repeatedly shown 
itself to be unimplementable in the political settlement of developing countries (Khan 
2005b). A growth-enhancing agenda requires a different set of analytical tools and 
categories for engaging in discussions about the changes in the distribution of 
organizational power that may be growth promoting. If the growth-stability trade-off 
facing a society is very adverse, a language and analytical framework for discussing 
the sources of resistance to growth can be useful in assisting social mobilizations that 
seek to construct alternative developmental coalitions of power.  
 
Feasible changes in the political settlement through endogenous political activity in a 
developing country will certainly not result in the emergence of a Weberian state, and 
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the expectation that it will can set inappropriate priorities and agendas that result in 
wasted opportunities. However, feasible changes may enable the emergence of a 
different combination of formal and informal power that is more conducive for 
growth. In some societies the political settlement is indeed so unfavourable for growth 
that attempts to restructure some of the organizations sustaining the settlement (and 
thereby making some feasible changes in the organization of the political settlement) 
may be an important precondition for triggering or sustaining growth. An 
understanding of political settlements in developing countries tells us that a 
technocratic focus on improving ‘good governance capabilities’ of enforcing a rule of 
law or trying to significantly improve accountability through reform may be wasting 
opportunities if taken too seriously. The case of the 2007-2009 Emergency 
government in Bangladesh (discussed later in our case study section), which wasted a 
precious moment of opportunity in a futile attempt to achieve good governance and 
root out political corruption is a case in point. 
 
6. A Typology of Political Settlements  
The relationship between power and institutions can differ significantly across 
countries and over time. While differences between political settlements can be 
classified according to different criteria, we will focus on i) whether holding power is 
primarily based on formal institutions or not and ii) whether formal institutions are 
growth-enhancing or not. This allows us to broadly classify political settlements into 
four types summarized in Figure 16. First, we define a capitalist political settlement 
where holding power is (to a large extent) aligned with formal rights and institutions, 
and the latter largely define productive capitalist property rights. This potentially 
allows the capitalist political settlement to have ‘Weberian’ characteristics defined as 
impersonal and rule-following adherence to formal institutions, though this is by no 
means observed in every case.  
 
Secondly, we have a very broad group of clientelist political settlements which 
characterize contemporary developing countries. Here significant sources of holding 
power are not aligned with formal institutions. In this case there is a structural 
problem with the operation of formal institutions according to their own stated rules. 
As a result (though there may be other supporting reasons as well) formal institutions 
do not operate in impersonal and rule-following ways and their operation is 
constrained by the exercise of personalized power. This category covers a wide range 
of institutional forms ranging from military rule to clientelistic party competition in 
‘democracies’. These differences are important and will be discussed later. But they 
share a common characteristic. Power that is not formally institutionalized plays an 
important role in allocative decisions. Clientelist political settlements also vary 
greatly in terms of the economic outcomes that they achieve, and this can range from 
developmental states to states that are on the verge of crisis. However, even in 
developmental states which appear to have some characteristics of rule-following in 
resource allocation, the rule-following is typically at the discretion of the executive 
and is not substantially institutionalized in formal rules. The fact that power may be 
used systematically in a developmental sense in some ‘clientelist political settlements’ 
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Figure 16 A Typology of Political Settlements 
 
Third, we have another group that we describe as pre-capitalist political settlements 
which were historically stable but which generated low growth. Power was aligned to 
a much greater extent with formal institutions but these institutions were generally not 
growth-enhancing. Tax collection by military-feudal elites is an example. Clientelist 
political settlements typically arise out of the collapse of pre-capitalist political 
settlements. New institutional experiments and social forces emerge, but there is no 
teleology necessarily taking these countries in the direction of capitalist political 
settlements. Much depends on the distribution of power between contesting groups in 
transitional situations. If the distribution of power results in accumulation and 
investment in productive ways that are gradually formalized we observe a transition in 
the direction towards the more formal and ‘capitalist’ type of political settlement. If 
the productive transformation is slow, the ‘clientelist’ phase can continue indefinitely. 
In some cases, the existing level of formal rights and the rule of law can be 
undermined to the extent that the settlement falls into a sustained crisis.  
 
This takes us to our fourth and final category where the political settlement is 
breaking up into significant political instability and violence, and we characterize 
these as settlements in crisis. Here, formal rights have effectively collapsed and 
cannot be substantially enforced. All or most activity now depends on informal 
protection by violence specialists and in the worst cases the latter can engage in 
serious predation, leading these societies into a downward spiral. Our main interest is 
in the broad group of political settlements characterized as ‘clientelist’. The terms 
capitalist and clientelist are problematic because they have been used in many 
different ways. But there is also some merit in using terms that are recognizable and 
defining them in more specific ways rather than inventing an entirely new 
terminology.  
 
The Capitalist Political Settlement 
Formal institutions appear to work well in advanced countries that are often 
recognized as having broadly ‘capitalist’ characteristics. We can now define the 
characteristics of political settlements of advanced countries that make them so 
different from the perspective of our analysis. A capitalist political settlement requires 
not just the presence of some pockets of capitalist property rights in an economy, but 
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the dominance of capitalist profits compared to other sources of holding power. 
Dominance means that were there to be a conflict, owners of capitalist property rights 
normally could not be fundamentally challenged by other organized groups. By 
normal, we are referring to non-revolutionary situations. When the owners of formal 
rights are politically dominant, the property rights that sustain capitalist production 
are obviously effective rights that can be enforced by the state at relatively low 
enforcement cost. Potential contestants now know that in general they have 
insufficient holding power compared to the beneficiaries of these rights. This is only 
likely to happen if the capitalist rights are in general substantially productive and the 
owners of the associated rights can therefore deploy significant resources to sustain 
their benefits both directly in the context of conflicts, and indirectly through taxes 
paid to the state to protect these formal rights. When holding power based on the 
profits of productive asset owners with formal rights is sufficient to sustain their 
underlying rights, we have a capitalist political settlement. This does not mean there 
are no distributive conflicts in a capitalist political settlement. Indeed there are, and 
they are discussed below, but the power of capitalists, workers and other groups are 
primarily defined by their respective formal rights and incomes which define the main 
contours of the distribution of holding power in a capitalist society. 
 
The dominance of capitalist rights is not the same as having a section of the economy 
operating under capitalist principles. If the protection of capitalist rights requires 
access to holding power and resources generated in the non-capitalist sector, a 
capitalist political settlement does not yet exist, even if the capitalist sector is 
significantly large. A capitalist political settlement does not imply an industrial 
society. Eighteenth century England arguably already had a capitalist political 
settlement in our sense even though it was still significantly agrarian. The capitalist 
political settlement is rather a description of the dominance of productive formal 
institutions in terms of holding power. Private asset owners operating productive 
operations in this settlement have the holding power to protect their formal rights 
from potential contestants because the incomes they generate are substantial enough 
to dominate other sources of holding power. Under these circumstances, holding 
power will be aligned with the core formal institutions of the economy, private 
property being the most significant of these institutions.  
 
If formal rights do not provide sufficient incomes to the primary beneficiaries of these 
rights to ensure their dominance as the most powerful class, the political settlement is 
not yet capitalist even if the capitalist sector is large. The characterization of the 
institutions of capitalism as productive does not imply that they are always so, nor 
that other types of formal institutions cannot be productive. The capitalist political 
settlement is not necessarily Weberian, but the emergence of a capitalist political 
settlement is likely to be necessary for a state with Weberian characteristics to 
function. The capitalist political settlement ensures that formal institutions can be 
effectively enforced. The Weberian state requires in addition that the enforcement of 
formal institutions is based on an impersonal rule of law that can be sustained for 
most if not all citizens.  
 
A capitalist political settlement is necessary but not sufficient for a Weberian state 
because the latter requires the effective enforcement of formal rules and something 
more besides. A capitalist political settlement could simply enforce the rights of 
capitalists without the generalization of a rule of law. This is likely if the distribution 
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of capitalist assets is very narrow and the rest of the population is so significantly 
weak that property right holders can effectively enforce their rights without any 
informal distributive arrangements with the rest of society. Logically, a capitalist 
political settlement is necessary but not sufficient for a Weberian rule of law to 
emerge. However, if productive capitalist productive rights are relatively widely 
dispersed, a Weberian rule of law becomes much more likely. For instance, Germany 
towards the end of the nineteenth century arguably had a capitalist political settlement 
without the dispersed capitalism that would enable it to establish a self-sustaining rule 
of law state.  
 
The protection of formal rights in societies where formal capitalist rights are widely 
dispersed and substantially productive means that the effective protection provided by 
the state is likely to become impersonal at some point. Impersonality is simply the 
enforcement of formal rights without reference to the identity of the holder of the 
right. As the number of individuals and organizations with productive formal rights 
increases, and there are resources to enforce these rights because they are in general 
productive, at some point the enforcement of formal rights acquires the characteristics 
of a general and impersonal rule of law. If property owners are satisfied that their 
property rights can be protected through a rule of law enforced by the state, they will 
collectively have an interest in ensuring that the rule of law is not violated because 
this undermines the system of protection enjoyed by all property owners. At this point 
a Weberian rule of law becomes self-sustaining and many formal rights may be 
substantively protected for all citizens. The Open Access Order identified by North, 
Wallis and Weingast (North, et al. 2009) has the characteristics of a rule of law state. 
Our analysis suggests that this is because they are implicitly describing capitalist 
political settlements where the capitalist rights are sufficiently dispersed to enable the 
emergence of a general rule of law, though their explanation for the emergence of 
these characteristics focuses on different factors. 
 
The dominance of the holding power of property right holders in the capitalist 
political settlement does not mean that other classes and groups are unable to get any 
redistribution in these political settlements. Political compromises remain necessary 
and can result in significant redistributions of income. But once property rights 
become well-protected and well-defined, redistributions can only take place through 
formal mechanisms like taxes and subsidies that can be generally applied and 
distributed to generally defined groups. Any system of ‘taxation’ that targets specific 
owners of property undermines the protection of the system of property rights and are 
therefore likely to be resisted given the assumption of the dominance of the holding 
power of the beneficiaries of formal rights. Thus, redistribution in capitalist political 
settlements can be significant but always takes the form of collective formal 
redistribution, where both taxes and subsidies are defined by general rules along the 
lines of a welfare state. These types of redistributions are clearly possible and 
sustainable. Those who are taxed still resist, but their resistance to redistributive 
taxation is not absolute as there is also a collective self-interest of property owners in 
maintaining political stability. The significant difference is that maintaining stability 
in a capitalist political settlement does not have to undermine the operation of formal 
institutions, because the redistribution can itself be conducted through formal 
institutions like taxes, and the limits are set by political and economic acceptability of 
the redistributions from the perspective of property owners.  
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All formal institutions in a capitalist political settlement are not necessarily growth-
sustaining. However, the distinction between capitalist and pre-capitalist political 
settlements that we will look at later is that in the capitalist settlement not only do the 
beneficiaries of formal institutions have incomes based on rights that give them 
adequate holding power; their formal rights are substantially productive and growth-
sustaining. In pre-capitalist political settlements formal rights also sustain 
considerable holding power for holders of formal rights but the latter do not have to 
be substantially productive. This is partly because in pre-capitalist political 
settlements, some of the formal rights of the dominant classes included non-economic 
rights such as the differential right to bear arms. This ensured that the beneficiaries of 
these rights, like the landed or tax-collecting classes could sustain their formal rights 
on the basis of the holding power created directly by a set of rights that did not have 
to be significantly growth-enhancing. In contrast, capitalist property rights primarily 
confer economic advantages to the beneficiaries of these rights as long as they are 
productive. Unless these rights are capable of generating significant profits, the 
beneficiaries are unlikely to be able to pay for their protection and are likely to lose 
assets through bankruptcy.  
 
The institutional reforms that are normally discussed in the context of the ‘good 
governance’ debate effectively assume that some variant of a capitalist political 
settlement already exists in the countries that are being discussed. This is because the 
agenda of attempting to create a self-sustaining Weberian state must implicitly make 
the assumption that formal rules can be effectively enforced with technocratic and 
bureaucratic reforms that improve the governance capabilities of enforcement. But if 
the productive sector with formal rights is not productive enough to generate enough 
resources to dominant society politically, the project will fail as it repeatedly has in 
developing countries. One of the many weaknesses of the good governance agenda is 
that it does not recognize that Weberian characteristics can logically only be self-
sustaining once a society has a widely dispersed and yet substantially productive set 
of property rights.  
 
Long before this becomes a viable reform strategy, the focus of reform has to be on 
feasible incremental reforms that enhance the capacity of a productive sector 
operating in political settlements with very different characteristics. The focus on 
market efficiency as the objective of institutional reform is also misleading in contexts 
where a broad-based productive sector does not already exist. The economic 
challenge in these contexts is to promote and nurture the capabilities that may make 
such a sector more likely (Khan 2005b, 2005a, 2007). The critical formal institutions 
that are essential for growth are likely to be rights and rules that create the 
opportunities for setting up new enterprises and creating credible opportunities and 
compulsions for productivity growth and learning (Khan 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Khan 
and Blankenburg 2009).  
 
But even as an end-state, the implicit model of the capitalist political settlement is not 
a good guide for understanding institutional and policy priorities in developing 
countries in the interim. A desirable characteristic of institutional development may 
well be the eventual emergence of impersonal and rule-following governance 
agencies that enforce formal rules. This does not necessarily tell us very much about 
the feasible incremental steps that may eventually take us there. Indeed, incremental 
changes in governance capabilities that attempt to build impersonal and rule-
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following enforcement of formal rules in a context where this cannot be done may at 
best represent a waste of resources and reform opportunities and at worst create new 
conflicts and contestation in already vulnerable societies.  
 
The full characteristics of a capitalist political settlement emerge very gradually. Most 
developing countries have significant capitalist features but are far from having the 
characteristics that define a capitalist political settlement. Only relatively advanced 
developing countries where the capitalist sector is both substantially productive and 
economically dominant are moving towards a capitalist political settlement. 
Differences in class structures and organizational and economic strengths mean that 
there are significant differences between countries with broadly capitalist political 
settlements. The distributive compromises between classes, the formal institutions 
through which distributive compromises are achieved (for instance welfare state 
structures or their absence) can differ significantly between countries, with 
implications for formal institutions. We will not be looking any further at these 
differences as our main interest is to establish the broad difference between the 
capitalist and clientelist political settlements. 
 
The credibly superior holding power of capitalists in a capitalist political settlement 
ensures that distributive conflicts with other groups, and in particular labour, normally 
stay within the economic and political tolerance limits of dominant economic 
interests. The latter have greater holding power because they have greater economic 
resources and their institutionally strategic positions in production and investment 
means they have a significant capability of signalling dissatisfaction with distributive 
outcomes by withdrawing or slowing down investments. Demands from other classes 
for redistribution are therefore likely to be calibrated to ensure that capitalist 
dissatisfaction does not exceed their tolerance limits (though these are flexible and the 
norms of acceptability can change over time). Occasionally serious distributive 
conflicts do break out and as always there is always some openness in the outcomes 
of conflicts so significant gains can occasionally be made by non-capitalist classes. 
But most often, conflicts re-establish the asymmetric holding power of the dominant 
classes. In general, this means that the capitalist political settlement is able to sustain 
the enforcement of its formal institutions through apparently open and unrestricted 
political competition (Khan 2005b).  
 
Clientelist Political Settlements  
In contrast to the capitalist political settlement, many existing formal institutions in 
developing countries are often not enforced or are only partially enforced. Most 
developing countries have many of the formal features of advanced countries: they 
have property rights, they have courts enforcing these rights through a rule of law, and 
they often have institutions of democracy. But formal institutions here do not behave 
in the expected ways nor are they impersonally implemented in any developing 
country. This observation is systematic and cuts across differences in culture, history 
and economic structure. The dominance of ‘personalized’ or informal exercises of 
power in these countries supports our broad description of these countries as 
‘clientelist’. A society has a clientelist political settlement according to our definition 
when significant holding power is based on sources outside the incomes generated by 
formal institutions. There are important differences between the clientelist and 
capitalist political settlements with implications for the analysis of institutions and 
governance. There are also important differences between different types of clientelist 
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political settlements which have significant implications for the performance of 
specific institutions and the growth-stability trade-offs facing their implementation.  
 
Significant holding power in developing countries can be based on organizational 
capabilities, for instance of ‘intermediate class’ elites who organize clients and use 
them in political confrontations. This holding power is by definition not aligned with 
benefits generated by formal institutions. On the contrary, these groups can only 
capture benefits and sustain their power over time by using informal organizations 
and/or informal rules to distribute benefits to themselves. These include the use of 
informal organizations like patron-client networks and the capture of informal 
incomes like off-budget resources, land, and other types of rents that are created 
through the exercise of informal political power. Informal power can also be used to 
change formal laws to benefit groups who would otherwise not have benefited. The 
existence of these processes means that the protection and enforcement of existing 
formal institutions is constrained and necessarily so. The apparent economic power of 
emerging modern sectors with formal rights and the broad distribution of political 
power are therefore significantly out of line in developing countries, a feature of the 
transitions they are going through.  
 
Given the balance of holding power, the incomes and rights of the beneficiaries of 
formal institutions can be effectively challenged through informal processes. 
Beneficiaries of formal institutions often have to strike informal compromises to 
(partially) enforce their formal rights. In addition, to distinguish our clientelist 
political settlement from societies in crisis, we specify that the formal institutions, 
though partially enforced, are potentially productive and the formal economy is not in 
overall collapse. This does not mean that an economy with a clientelist political 
settlement is growing rapidly, though it may be. But we want to distinguish as a 
separate category the relatively small number of developing country societies where 
the formal institutional structure has entirely or very largely collapsed and economic 
activity is in the hands of ‘warlords’.  
 
Clientelist political settlements characterize developing countries during their 
relatively long periods of transition from traditional forms of formal economic and 
political organization towards modern capitalist forms of social organization. This 
period of transition does not mean that all these societies are making progress at the 
same pace, or even that they will all eventually achieve some variant of a capitalist 
economy. The transition is simply a description of the fact that one set of formal ‘pre-
capitalist’ institutions have broken down and a significant range of new formal 
institutions that sustain a productive capitalist economy have not yet become self-
sustaining. The mismatch between the organization of political power and the formal 
organization of the emerging economy is explained by the fact that formal rights do 
not yet describe the operation of a significant enough productive sector such that 
incomes flowing from these rights constitute the dominant sources of holding power.  
 
A significant part of holding power in clientelist political settlements is based outside 
the tiny emerging productive sectors. This holding power is often based on control 
over political processes and organizational capabilities that allow factions to threaten 
significant costs on society if they are not allowed to capture informal benefits. The 
sources and organization of political and organizational power have different histories 
in different countries. At the same time, in most developing countries there are 
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parallel and often very strong imperatives to develop the new productive sectors and 
the formal institutions that go with these sectors. Political processes of accumulation 
supported by informal power often create potential entrepreneurs who find that 
sustaining their privileges over time requires formal rights as well as informal support 
to make these formal rights effective and viable. As a result, these societies have a 
range of formal institutions that are in principle growth-enhancing though their 
operation may be more or less modified through different types of informal networks.  
 
Our use of the term ‘clientelist’ should be distinguished from existing usages in a 
number of ways. First, many standard explanations of personalized power in 
developing countries refer to primordial loyalties or deference supported by culture, 
the insecurity of the poor, or the absence of democracy (Eisenstadt 1973; Engerman 
and Sokoloff 2002; Médard 2002; Barbone, et al. 2006). Instead, we have a very 
general definition that looks for a mismatch between existing distributions of holding 
power and the structure of formal institutions. Our explanation of the informality that 
emerges in these contexts can incorporate a wide variety of exercises of power in 
developing countries that are responsible for the gap between the expected operation 
of formal rules and their actual operation. This is potentially an advantage because 
narrower explanations of personalized transactions cannot explain the general 
observation of some variant of personalized or non-formal power in all developing 
countries regardless of their political institutions, cultures and social histories. 
However, the specific social, cultural and economic characteristics of societies can of 
course explain important differences in the manifestations of personalized power.  
 
Secondly, we do not use the term ‘clientelist political settlement’ to describe any 
particular institutional structure or form of government or any specific set of 
outcomes. The group of countries that could be characterized as having clientelist 
political settlements is very diverse and ranges from military dictatorships to party-
based democracies in developing countries. They also include very high growth 
converging countries operating variants of industrial policy and countries with forms 
of clientelism that stifle growth and which are diverging rapidly from advanced 
countries. We will discuss these important differences later. Nevertheless, we do not 
expect an impersonal and broad-based rule of law in any clientelist political 
settlement.  
 
Even the partial enforcement of formal rules in these contexts requires compromises 
with organizers of informal power. The latter are not always standing in the way of 
productive activities, though they often may be. In some cases informal power is used 
to radically accelerate productive accumulation and technology acquisition, and in 
these cases we have very rapid developmental transitions. These differences are very 
important for understanding why the good governance approach and its essentially 
Weberian benchmarks can be misleading as an analytical framework for informing 
governance priorities and feasible directions of reform in developing countries. These 
reforms may be desirable but they are most unlikely to be enforceable. The reform 
approach must be to devise incremental improvements in institutions and governance 
capabilities for enforcement that make sense in particular clientelist political 
settlements. In particular, the goal has to be to try and align informal power with 




The significant feature of a clientelist political settlement from the perspective of 
institutional analysis is therefore that informal holding power modifies the operation 
of formal institutions and influences the allocation of resources through informal 
institutions and political discretion. For instance, informality can modify the operation 
of important formal institutions, giving many formal institutions informal 
characteristics. Similarly, the enforcement of formal rights may require payments to 
informal enforcers, making the enforcement of formal rights informal. Or important 
allocative decisions may directly be made by informal organizations like patron-client 
factions according to informal institutional ‘rules’. These and other related aspects of 
informality in clientelist political settlements can be related to the fact that significant 
sources of holding power exist outside the incomes generated by formal institutions.  
 
The sources of holding power in different clientelist political settlements cannot be 
generalized, but they can be described in historical narratives of how different groups 
and factions were organized to manage societies in the aftermath of the collapse of 
pre-capitalist empires. During this transition, the emerging capitalist sector is, by 
definition, not yet economically or politically dominant. Nor are the dominant 
property owners of the pre-existing economic system still able to politically and 
organizationally dominate these societies. A significant component of holding power 
was therefore transferred to organizations led by various groups of ‘intermediate’ 
class organizations. In many cases, their modes of organization and social legitimacy 
can be traced back to the colonial period and colonial strategies of constructing 
administrative and political classes to manage empire. 
 
The intermediate classes (but not only these classes) have organizational power 
because they are most successful in these contexts in organizing factions with holding 
power that can be deployed in political mobilizations. Implicitly, patron-client 
factions in developing countries claim access the resources by threatening to use their 
holding power to engage in conflicts. How the power of competing factions is 
organized and deployed is likely to be significant in determining the outcomes of 
conflicts over institutional enforcement and resource allocation. Differences in the 
structure of patron-client networks across countries can therefore tell us something 
about the distribution of power and these differences are likely to matter significantly. 
We will examine aspects of these differences later. 
 
The organization of patron-client networks have been influenced in many cases by 
colonial strategies of managing the empire. Colonial strategies of political 
stabilization had significant and lasting effects on organizational structures in many 
developing countries. Colonial authorities often selectively recognized the ‘rights’ of 
organizationally powerful groups as a method of political stabilization and as part of 
divide and rule strategies (Khan 2009a). These strategies often also involved the 
promotion of new administrative and political groups as part of political stabilization 
strategies. Arbitrary interventions in rights have therefore long been a part of 
‘modern’ state formation strategies followed by colonial states. Nevertheless, 
differences in these strategies across countries have meant that the development of 
formal and informal organizations followed different paths across countries (Kohli 
1994; Khan 2000a).  
 
It follows that an analysis of the distribution of informally based holding power 
cannot be identified in an abstract analysis. We have to see the distribution and 
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organization of holding power in clientelist political settlements as a historically 
evolving process where power is embedded in organizations like patron-client 
organizations, political parties and different types of social movements. The structure 
and organization of these activities differ significantly across countries and the 
evolution of these differences can tell us something about the distribution of holding 
power that is being sustained and protected through informal organizations. An 
examination of patron-client networks will play an important role in our subsequent 
analysis as a way of capturing important aspects of the distribution of holding power 
in developing countries.  
 
The informal distributive arrangements achieved through the operation of informal 
organizations like patron-client factions are not necessarily dysfunctional in the 
context of the clientelist political settlement. Indeed, these distributive arrangements 
may be required for maintaining a stable social order provided economic progress can 
also be ensured. Indeed, in some cases critical growth-enhancing formal institutions 
can be effectively enforced and informal power structures can also assist the process 
of accumulation and technology acquisition. Some clientelist political settlements 
have therefore achieved staggering success in organizing growth and social 
transformation because growth was aligned with the interests of powerful groups. 
Growth at this pace in turn changes the distribution of power and enables a gradual 
strengthening of formal growth-sustaining institutions. In the most dynamic cases, 
clientelist political settlements were gradually transformed into capitalist political 
settlements. Countries like South Korea or Taiwan would fall into these 
transformational categories. 
 
However, in other cases, the distribution of informal power may be more unfortunate. 
In these societies growth-enhancing formal institutions may be enforced in ways that 
damage growth and even these may be few and far between. Attempts to accelerate 
growth in these contexts can confront strong resistance and declining political 
stability. Growth in these settlements may be episodic and vulnerable. In the most 
serious cases, clientelist political settlements may collapse into a category we describe 
as ‘political settlements in crisis’. Differences in the ways in which political 
settlements are put together may help to explain some of the differences in 
institutional performance between developing countries. While all developing 
countries have clientelist political settlements, these settlements are substantially 
different across countries, and change over time within a country, while retaining the 
broad characteristics of a clientelist settlement. Our task in subsequent sections will 
be to define critical differences between clientelist political settlements that can 
explain differences in institutional performance and in the growth-stability trade-offs 
they faced.  
 
Our analysis of clientelist political settlement has some similarities with the Limited 
Access Orders identified by North et al. (2009). In both cases, the social order does 
not have the rule of law characteristics of the Weberian system. However, in our case 
there are significant variations possible within the broad clientelist political settlement 
that do not correspond with the categorization of ‘fragile’, ‘basic’ and ‘mature’ orders 
in the North, Wallis and Weingast framework. Our distinctions between more and less 
developmental clientelist political settlements are based on using a framework of 
patron-client organizational differences that are discussed below. Moreover, our 
framework does not identify the same ‘doorstep conditions’ for a transition to the 
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Open Access Order. The most important difference is that in our analysis the 
development and dispersion of productive ‘capitalist’ organizations is critical for the 
dominance of formal power that is a precondition for the emergence of a capitalist 
political settlement. Nevertheless, the significance of the North, Wallis and Weingast 
analysis is that they too recognize the presence of structural factors that make 
developing societies different from rule of law Open Access Orders, with the 
implication that non-Weberian characteristics are neither immediately rectifiable nor 
necessarily ‘pathological’.  
 
Pre-capitalist Political Settlements  
The two other variants of political settlements in Figure 16 are also important but will 
receive less attention here. The first are pre-capitalist political settlements. These 
describe an earlier historical period. In developing countries this was typically the 
period before the colonial impact. Here holding power was based to a large extent on 
the formal rights of dominant groups (such as feudal and military rights of the landed 
and military classes). The formal rights of ruling groups in these political settlements 
were typically aligned with their holding power based on their military and 
organizational capabilities. But formal institutions in these social orders were 
typically not growth-enhancing and their primary function was to maintain a 
relatively static status quo. The pace of technical progress was consequently much 
slower than in the capitalist order that followed. This places pre-capitalist political 
settlements in the top right-hand corner of Figure 16.  
 
Even though these political settlements were relatively stable historically, they were 
facing internal disintegration in many parts of the developing world with the growth 
of internal trading and artisanal manufacturing. In the Indian subcontinent this began 
to happen as early as the eighteenth century. But the real collapse of pre-capitalist 
political settlements in the developing world happened in the face of military and 
economic competition with more productive capitalist societies. Pre-capitalist 
economic structures and their political settlements by and large collapsed in the 
developing world as a result of the intrusion of economically more advanced countries 
during the colonial period. The military defeat of traditional pre-capitalist rulers by 
European competitors led to the emergence of colonial empires that lasted till the 
mid-twentieth century or later in most parts of the developing world.  
 
The long period of ‘transition’ that began with the defeat of the pre-capitalist political 
settlements is in a sense still continuing today. The collapse of these settlements 
meant that pockets of formal rights appropriate for a new economic and social order 
were set up, but large pools of organized power inconsistent with these rights 
remained. The colonial authorities managed these potential sources of threat through 
various mechanisms, but in particular through the tolerance of organizational 
activities through which the most entrepreneurial, and therefore potentially dangerous 
organizers, were sequentially absorbed by being provided with a share of the rents 
that the formal state controlled. These rather simple mechanisms of absorbing and 
dealing with informal sources of power have become more complex over time. The 
transfer of political power to independent states after decolonization meant that the 
organization of informal power became even more important as a source of rents as 
ruling coalitions needed the organizational abilities of powerful organizers to 
construct their ruling coalitions.  
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Political Settlements in Crisis  
The last variant is that of political settlements in crisis. This category describes 
situations where existing political settlements are breaking down perhaps to be 
reconstructed in new ways. Here, formal institutions have broken down to a 
significant extent and can no longer assist in the coordination of productive economic 
activity. Informal political power is correspondingly even more important and given 
the collapse of formal institutions, is clearly not aligned with formal institutions. A 
crisis in a political settlement can begin either because political stability declines 
below the minimum sustainable level or because the minimum level of economic 
wellbeing or growth cannot be sustained. The latter can in turn reduce political 
stability further. In the early stages of a crisis the political settlement can occasionally 
be challenged by outbreaks of political instability or even violence that exceed normal 
levels and threaten to take the political and economic system further below its 
minimum tolerable levels of economic performance and political stability.  
 
However, the political settlement in crisis emerges with a substantial unravelling of 
the clientelist political settlement. The social order begins to break down with 
outbreaks of sustained violence that can be described as civil war. A political 
settlement is truly in crisis when the previous political settlement has broken down 
and the society has descended into widespread violence. A breakdown implies that the 
social compromises and informal arrangements that enabled some formal institutions 
and the modern productive sector to operate have themselves broken down. 
‘Widespread violence’ is a somewhat malleable term, but it is necessary for the 
definition because considerable violence can characterize large parts of any 
developing country, including apparently stable clientelist political settlements like 
India. There is clearly a grey area because violence at the fringes can increase 
considerably without a political settlement breaking down. But clearly, as violence 
increases, a breakdown is likely to happen at some point when the balance of power 
between classes, groups and factions can no longer be sustained with reference to 
existing formal and informal institutions. A new political order has to emerge and the 
non-viability of the previous order is signalled by the emergence of the crisis.  
 
In terms of Figure 16, holding power in this context is even less aligned with formal 
institutions because the link between benefits based on formal rights and actual 
holding power is likely to have significantly broken down. A variety of military and 
organizational capabilities will be deployed by groups during the crisis to establish a 
new distribution of power but the holding power of these organizations not likely to 
be based on formal rights. At the same time the formal institutions that existed are not 
likely to be growth-enhancing in these contexts for the simple reason that organized 
production is likely to have broken down. Instead, the bulk of the economic resources 
sustaining conflict in these contexts are likely to be derived from grey or criminal 
economic activities like smuggling, organized crime, drugs, diamonds, funding from 
foreign powers, and protection rackets. This places political settlements in crisis at the 
bottom right hand corner of Figure 16.  
 
The escalation of conflict and violence that lead to the collapse of a political 
settlement can follow from a combination of inconsistent aspirations of different 
groups and their failure to judge the true holding power of their opponents. This can 
easily happen if the holding power of different groups and factions was already 
closely matched and no group is ready to give up in its desire to establish dominance 
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over others. The minimum economic and political viability conditions that define a 
viable political settlement can rapidly collapse in this case, often with significant 
negative consequences for many groups particularly the most vulnerable. The periods 
of crisis can be brief or long-lasting, till a distribution of power emerges that can be 
sustained with a combination of formal and informal institutions that meets both the 
minimum stability and economic viability conditions for that society. Once this 
happens, some variant of a clientelist political settlement will once again emerge. The 
restructuring of the political settlement that takes place in these situations can in turn 
have long-lasting effects on economic and institutional developments in the social 
order that emerges.  
 
7. Patron-Client Networks  
We are particularly interested in the different ways in which clientelist political 
settlements can be structured and the implications of these revealed differences in the 
distribution of power for institutional performance and growth-stability trade-offs. 
Subtle differences in the distribution of power within clientelist political settlements 
can be very important for understanding institutional outcomes. While the economic 
sources of holding power can be relatively easily observed (income and wealth 
differences), the sources of organizational holding power (organizational capabilities, 
legitimacy, and so on) are much more difficult to assess ex ante. If our analysis 
required a metric to assess organizational capabilities and holding power ex ante, its 
applicability would be limited. Fortunately, the exercise of informal power is typically 
reflected in and operates through observable formal and informal organizational 
structures like patron-client networks, political parties and other organizations. 
Observations of the structure and operations of these formal and informal 
organizations can provide critical information about characteristics of the underlying 
distribution of power that can in turn inform our analysis of institutional performance 
and institutional evolution.  
 
In developing countries, the informal networks used by powerful groups to generate 
and protect benefits can be generically described as ‘patron-client networks’. Any 
informal relationship or organization that involves individuals with different degrees 
of power can be broadly described as some variant of a patron-client relationship. 
There are systematic hierarchies and exchanges in these relationships but they are 
‘personalized’ because they are not formal contracts that can be enforced by the 
application of a ‘rule of law’. Patron-client relationships can clearly include a wide 
variety of relationships through which power is exercised. The goals of patrons and 
clients, their relative power, and the distribution of benefits they achieve can all vary 
widely. These networks can operate directly as informal networks or within formal 
organizations like political parties. As mechanisms through which power is exercised, 
the typical patron-client network involves a patron as an organizer of power 
organizing groups of clients who offer their organizational support in exchange for 
benefits that the patron offers. The organizational power that this type of patron-client 
network can deploy is an important explanation of why they are able to capture and 
sustain significant rents in developing countries, often through their involvement in 
the protection and operation of formal institutions.  
 
Patron-client networks that are deployed to bargain for or preserve informal 
distributions of benefits are typically organized as factions or collections of factions. 
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Bigger factions are typically coalitions of smaller factions organized by a higher-level 
patron. Both factions and coalitions of factions are typically organized as pyramids. 
At the lowest level, a faction in many developing countries consists of a patron with a 
group of followers who are locally powerful individuals. Collectively, they 
appropriate a share of benefits from the local economy by engaging in local 
enforcement and dispute resolution activities. Sometimes this also crosses the line into 
expropriation and the extraction of protection money. Bigger patron-client 
organizations are typically pyramidal organizations of lower-level factions. Here 
patrons at higher levels organize factions or clients below them to provide them with 
bargaining power in contests with other equivalent groups or factions for more 
significant rents. For instance, bigger factions may be constructed to participate in 
electoral contests. The enforcement or operation of formal institutions may in turn 
require that particular individuals or organizations are able to access patron-client 
organizations at the appropriate level to influence the operation of these institutions 
for a price.  
 
Patrons are typically more enterprising or powerful political entrepreneurs at each 
level who can mobilize significant groups of clients below them to capture rents and 
resources for their particular factions at that level. Clients lower down the factional 
ladder provide the organizational muscle to patrons higher up the pyramid for a share 
of the rents distributed downwards within the faction. The modern patron-client 
faction is therefore constructed on the basis of a rational calculation of interests by 
both patrons and clients and has little to do with traditional deference or cultural 
values. The class identity of patrons and clients can vary significantly across societies 
as can the organization of factions and the distribution of power within them. Finally, 
the ideological symbols that are used to mobilize people and distinguish factions from 
each other obviously also vary significantly. The fact that factions are often 
distinguished using traditional cultural symbols like caste, religion or tribe can serve 
to confuse the fact that these are typically opportunistic arrangements. Patrons are 
typically unable to keep their factions together unless they are successful in 
generating rents that they can distribute down the network, and clients are always 
ready to redefine their allegiances if other factions offer them higher rewards.  
 
Differences in the organization and structure of patron-client networks are likely to 
reflect differences in the productive organization of societies, differences in their 
organizational and political histories and differences in their colonial histories. 
Dominant political organizers in different countries may come from different 
economic backgrounds and mobilize groups from different backgrounds and 
organized around different signposts. Factions can be organized along ethnic, 
religious, tribal, caste or ideological lines; they can be large or small, centralized or 
fragmented, with strong or weak patrons and so on. The number of competing 
factions can also differ, affecting the competitive structure in politics and the 
possibility of coordination across factions. All these variations have important 
consequences for the ways in which conflicts over rents are organized in different 
societies and we will summarize some of these differences and the likely effects later.  
 
A number of features of the political competition in developing countries support this 
interpretation of politics as driven by patron-client organizations. First, political 
parties in developing countries are typically multi-class organizations that bring 
together a large number of pyramidal patron-client factions in a pyramidal structure. 
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Secondly, members of the “intermediate” classes dominate the organizational 
leadership of these factions. These groups have the capacity to organize factions and 
therefore it is not surprising that they should play a critical role in the organization of 
patron-client politics. Factions are very rarely led by capitalists and almost never by 
workers, the landless or poor peasants. Thus even though strong class divisions and 
class interests exist in developing countries, in most cases and for most of the time, 
the dominant political organizations represent factional and not class interests. This 
reflects the fact that factional politics gives feasible access to much more significant 
rents to the most organizationally powerful groups compared to class politics.  
 
These observations reflect the fact that the classes that occupy an intermediate 
position in society, often collectively described as the intermediate classes, dominate 
developing countries in terms of organizational power. The term was popularized by 
Kalecki (1972) who noted that the urban petty bourgeoisie, rich peasants and state 
bureaucrats politically dominated post-independence India. Our use of the term differs 
somewhat from Kalecki. We include a broader group of classes in the category, which 
we treat as a residual to describe classes that are not capitalist, working class 
(including the unemployed) or poor peasant (who are at, or close to, subsistence 
levels). The precise sections of the intermediate classes that are most relevant in 
particular developing countries can vary significantly depending on their economic 
and social histories. Nor do we want to say, like Kalecki, that these classes have some 
shared economic interests that Kalecki thought resulted in their support for an 
‘intermediate regime’ promoting non-capitalist development. Rather, our intention in 
identifying these classes is simply to point out that the polar classes do not dominate 
organizational politics. On the other hand, the intermediate classes too do not act as 
classes. They simply provide tens of thousands of recruits for leading and organizing 
factional politics at different levels of society. The economic policies the state follows 
cannot simply be read off from this fact, and here we differ from Kalecki. The tension 
between the redistributive demands coming from factional politics and the imperative 
of ensuring economic growth largely through the capitalist sector can result in sharp 
shifts in state policy. The state controlled by different patron-client factions has 
sometimes followed dramatically pro-capitalist policies, and at other times has almost 
destroyed capitalism. 
 
Our broader definition of the intermediate classes includes rich peasants, middle 
peasants, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the educated “middle class”, both employed 
and unemployed. While these classes have different interests, it is not surprising that 
they should have collectively provided a significant proportion of the political 
entrepreneurs of recent history.  Compared to workers, poor peasants and the illiterate 
unemployed, they have a relatively high degree of organizational ability based on 
their relatively high levels of education and wealth. Secondly, though still a relatively 
small fraction of the population, they are far more numerous than capitalists and large 
landlords whose numbers are numerically insignificant in most developing countries, 
and who therefore do not play a central organizational role in politics. Nor is 
capitalism so developed that the capitalist class can dominate politics indirectly by 
exercising their purchasing power. The important point is that while political 
entrepreneurs from the intermediate classes play a key role in political organization, it 
is not the case that the intermediate classes dominate the political scene as classes. 
Thus the political dominance of the intermediate classes can also be interpreted as 
reflecting the incomplete transition to capitalism.  
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For Weber too, pre-capitalist societies were characterized by variants of patron-client 
relationships, but for very different reasons. Weber contrasted the “rational” 
bureaucratic form of governance seen in modern capitalism with traditional forms of 
authority in pre-capitalist societies. Patrimonial rule was identified as one of the most 
important of these pre-capitalist forms of governance, where allegiance to a leader 
was based on personal loyalty and traditional legitimacy (Weber 1978: 1006-110). 
What we describe as informality is explained in Weber’s framework by the 
importance in patrimonial societies of authority exercised by “charismatic” leaders. 
As charisma entails allegiance to a person and not to an office, by definition, the 
exercise of power in these societies has to be informal.  
 
While Weber has inspired contemporary sociologists to look for personalized 
authority exercised through patron-client networks, the patron-client networks we 
observe in contemporary developing countries are typically not based on traditional 
legitimacy or charismatic authority. On the contrary, the “contract” between patrons 
and clients is often surprisingly modern and rational. It is based on an exchange of 
organizational muscle for material benefits and is readily re-negotiated if clients (or 
indeed entire factions) are offered better terms by other patrons. Neo-Weberians 
recognize that modern patron-client relationships are based on the exchange of 
favours and rewards, and are no longer typically based on charisma or traditional 
authority. However, they explain the persistence of personalized power in neo-
patrimonial models in terms of the weakness of formal structures of democracy that 
allows patrons to maintain their privileged access to power and rents (Médard 2002). 
 
Weber's analysis is also different from ours in its underlying analysis of the economy. 
What interests Weber is the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of patrimonial rule, 
which he contrasts with the formal and predictable nature of bureaucratic rule. 
Capitalism, he argues, requires the rule-governed predictability of bureaucratic 
governance. The arbitrariness of patrimonialism stifles capitalism by lowering 
investment and preventing long-term planning by capitalists. It also encourages 
patrimonial rulers to arbitrarily favour their clients by granting them monopolies. 
Since this description has an uncanny resemblance to features of governance in 
contemporary developing countries, Weber's analysis of patrimonialism has informed 
a new interest in the deleterious effects of patron-client networks and of ‘poor 
governance’. 
 
Despite its apparent fit with some observations of the governance problem in 
developing countries, Weber's analysis is misleading because it conflates the 
functional requirements of advanced capitalism with an analysis of the constraints and 
requirements of the period of transition during which capitalism is being created and 
institutionalized in developing countries. No advanced country organized this process 
of transition by first successfully institutionalizing a bureaucracy that would pass the 
test of impersonality and modernity at a time when its productive sectors were still 
based primarily on, say, peasant or handicraft production. Nor has any country 
succeeded in institutionalizing an effective rule of law protecting all property rights 
and contracts without significant incomes generated by a formal modern sector that 
are sufficient to pay for the enforcement of a general rule of law as a public good. 
Most developing countries are far away from meeting these entry conditions to 
formality. Periods of transition between the collapse of formal pre-capitalist systems 
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and the emergence of a modern capitalist economy have always been characterized by 
significant levels of ‘personalized’ or informal interventions and institutions despite 
the presence of pockets of modern capitalist economies. The relevant question is why 
these arbitrary processes (in the sense of not being strictly rule-following) have led to 
the growth of capitalist sectors and eventually a successful transition to a rule of law 
economy in a few countries but not in many others.  
 
We want to extract from observations of patron-client structures important dimensions 
of the distribution of power that are relevant for understanding institutional 
performance and growth-stability trade-offs in developing countries. Patron-client 
structures can throw light on two important dimensions of differences between 
political settlements, though these are not necessarily the only important dimensions 
that may be important.  
 
First, the organizational structure of patron-client factions that are involved in forming 
the ruling coalition of a country clearly matters. The distribution of power between 
the ruling coalition and excluded factions, and (within the ruling coalition) between 
higher and lower level factions, tells us something about the likely time horizon of the 
political leadership and their ability to enforce decisions. If excluded factions are 
weak, the ruling coalition is likely to take a longer-term view, as their incumbency is 
more secure. In addition if the lower level factions on whom the ruling coalition 
depends are easy to control, the ruling coalition is more likely to be able enforce 
decisions.  
 
Secondly, the capabilities and relative power of productive entrepreneurs within 
patron-client networks can vary significantly. The relative power of productive 
interests and their technological and entrepreneurial capabilities can determine the 
incentives and opportunities of ruling coalitions to pursue particular institutional 
paths. We now look at these important dimensions of the political settlement that the 
organization of patron-client factions can shed light on and suggest how they might 
affect the general characteristics of political settlements in clientelist contexts. 
 
Patron-Client Organizations and the Structure of the Ruling Coalition  
An important set of variations in the type of clientelist political settlement can be 
related to the organization of the ruling coalition. The classification in Figure 17 
distinguishes between two dimensions along which ruling coalitions can differ from 
each other. First, we look at the power of factions excluded from the ruling coalition 
relative to the ruling coalition. Secondly, we look at the internal distribution of power 
within the factions that constitute the ruling coalition, in particular between higher 
and lower levels. These dimensions are important for understanding the likely time 
horizon of the ruling coalition and its implementation capacities. These ‘political’ 
differences may be more important than differences in formal political institutions. 
Clearly, formal political institutions like the institutions of democracy and 
representation are important. However, a focus on formal institutions can often hide 
more significant differences in the informal distributions of power affecting the ruling 
coalition, with more significant effects on the enforcement and operation of formal 
institutions.  
 
Returning to our two dimensions of interest in the ruling coalition, the first is the 
‘horizontal distribution of power’. This describes the power of excluded coalitions 
 65 
relative to the ruling coalition. If excluded coalitions are weak, the ruling coalition is 
likely to feel secure and act with a longer time horizon. This means that the interests 
of the ruling coalition are more likely to be aligned with growth and development. 
Clearly, there is a range of variation possible here, with the power of excluded 
coalitions ranging from very weak to being almost as powerful as the ruling coalition. 
At its limit, if excluded coalitions become more powerful than the ruling coalition, the 
latter is unlikely to survive. Relative strength can be assessed by looking at the 
organization and strategies of excluded organizations, the success with which they 
have engaged in conflicts and the informal and formal distributions of benefits that 
they have been able to achieve. Excluded coalitions can be weak for different reasons. 
The most benign possibility is that all or almost all powerful coalitions have been 
incorporated within the ruling coalition. It could also be that the distribution of power 
across factions was unequal and factions within the ruling coalition are significantly 
more powerful because of legitimacy, organizational capabilities or other 
characteristics. Finally, excluded groups could be potentially strong but temporarily 








































HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER:
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Figure 17 Patron-Client Factions and the Structure of the Ruling Coalition  
 
The second dimension describing the structure of the ruling coalition is the ‘vertical 
distribution of power’. This describes the relative power of higher compared to lower 
level factions within the ruling coalition. The greater the relative power of higher over 
lower levels within the ruling coalition, the greater the implementation and 
enforcement capacities of the coalition. This is because given the pyramidal structure 
of patron-client organizations, the more powerful lower level factions become, the 
greater the number of points at which the enforcement of particular rules can be 
blocked. Enforcement and implementation now requires much greater collective 
action and the distribution of rents to many or all lower-level factions to ensure their 
cooperation. Otherwise, those who are adversely affected by a rule simply have to buy 
in a small number of lower-level factions to block its implementation. By definition, 
lower levels in a patron-client hierarchy are always weaker and to some extent 
dependent on higher levels. But this too can vary from a situation where lower-level 
factions have little bargaining power to one where they can effectively block or limit 
implementation if their demands are not met. The first case would correspond to a 
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situation where lower level clients have little holding power and higher level patrons 
can pick clients without great cost to themselves. The second describes a situation 
where lower level factions have significant holding power and can impose serious 
costs on patrons.  
 
These two dimensions range along a scale but the polar limits define four possible 
structures of the ruling coalition in Figure 17. The most favourable combination is at 
the top left-hand corner, which we describe as a ‘potential developmental coalition’. 
Here the ruling coalition has a long time horizon and therefore its interests are aligned 
with development and it has effective implementation capabilities. In terms of the 
growth-stability trade-off described in Figure 11, this variant of the clientelist political 
settlement has the most favourable trade-off. Distributions of power that are further to 
the right or lower down have relatively more adverse growth-stability trade-offs. The 
bottom right hand corner has the most adverse growth-stability trade-off, but may 
remain viable because of other characteristics of the economy determining the 
position of the trade-off relative to minimum viability conditions. The ruling coalition 
described in the top left-hand corner is a potential developmental coalition because 
these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a developmental state. The 
emergence of the latter of course requires other conditions, including the emergence 
of an appropriate developmental leadership, as well as minimal technological 
capabilities within the country. The ruling coalition in South Korea from the 1960s to 
the 1980s approximated these characteristics.  
 
A second type of ruling coalition is shown in the top right-hand corner, which we 
describe as an authoritarian coalition. Here the ruling coalition faces moderate to 
strong excluded coalitions but lower-level factions are relatively weak. As excluded 
factions get stronger, the ruling coalition becomes more vulnerable. By definition, if 
there are powerful, some institutional mechanisms for controlling excluded groups are 
necessary. These include legal or constitutional measures banning political activity 
outside the coalition, implicitly backed by the threat of force. The weaker the ruling 
coalition of this type, the more likely it is to have to regularly use force. 
Paradoxically, stronger authoritarian coalitions are less likely to have to use violence. 
For instance, Tanzania’s one-party state under TANU in the 1960s faced very little 
resistance from excluded factions, but organizational rights were limited in a pre-
emptive way to prevent resistance developing. The military controlled ruling coalition 
in Pakistan/Bangladesh in the 1960s was initially strong but became weaker and more 
violent over time as excluded coalitions became stronger. It was eventually 
overthrown by a mass uprising in 1969. The ill-fated BAKSAL one-party 
authoritarian experiment in Bangladesh in 1975 did not even take off. The distribution 
of power facing the ruling coalition included significant excluded coalitions (in 
particular the army) but also strong lower-level factions within the ruling party. In this 
case, the one-party system was very short-lived as internal factions conspired with 
excluded factions in the army to assassinate the President. 
 
Authoritarianism is typically overthrown when excluded factions become too strong. 
But the strength of excluded factions also depends to a large extent on whether the 
ruling coalition can keep its own supporters satisfied within it. After a critical point, 
the strength of excluded factions can set off a cumulative decline that undermines the 
authoritarian coalition. The strength of external factions provides bargaining power to 
internal factions as they can threaten to leave, and if the leadership is unwilling or 
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unable to pay the price, some do leave, further strengthening the excluded factions 
and further increasing the bargaining power of remaining lower level factions. As a 
result, authoritarianism is difficult to sustain for long in most clientelist political 
settlements unless there are special factors like natural resource rents or external 
military support. Like the developmental coalition, enforcement capabilities within 
the authoritarian coalition can be relatively good, but time horizons are likely to be 
poorer given the vulnerability of the leadership. Moreover, the presence of strong 
excluded factions is likely to increase the bargaining power of lower-level faction 
leaders over time. Thus, the capacity to enforce decisions within the coalition is likely 
to get poorer over time. As authoritarianism collapses, and has to deal with 
increasingly powerful lower-level factions, it can acquire hybrid qualities, as we will 
see in the case of the militaristic clientelism of Bangladesh in the 1980s and 1990s 
where authoritarianism adopted methods of competitive clientelism. 
 
The third type of ruling coalition is the dominant party that is ‘dominant’ to varying 
extents and could sometimes be quite weak. Here, excluded factions are weak either 
because powerful factions have been included within the dominant party or because 
excluded factions are very fragmented. The characteristic feature that distinguishes it 
from authoritarian arrangements is that a dominant party could win formal contested 
elections. If excluded factions are weak, the ruling coalition is likely to opt for 
competitive elections to boost its legitimacy. Like authoritarianism, the dominant 
party also faces a structural dilemma. If it includes all powerful factions within it, it 
can remove powerful factions outside that can challenge it. But it will have too many 
powerful factions within that are likely to block the implementation of almost 
anything. Excessive inclusion also means that the distribution of rents within the party 
will be thinner and leave many factions dissatisfied. On the other hand, leaving 
powerful factions outside results in the likelihood of external challenges and the 
possibility that lower-level factions will be induced by the excluded coalitions to 
leave and join them.  
 
Sooner or later, once dissatisfied internal factions start joining excluded factions or 
new groups organize outside that cannot be included, the process of cumulative 
decline begins. Thus, dominant parties are likely to have longer time horizons but 
weaker implementation capabilities compared to authoritarian systems, but both are 
likely to decline over time. India under the Congress Party in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Tanzania under the CCM, West Bengal under the CPM, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai in 
the 2000s were all variants of dominant party coalitions enjoying different levels of 
vulnerability and weakness. Bangladesh never evolved a sustainable dominant party. 
The early Awami League in Bangladesh from 1972 to 1975 was a weak and short-
lived dominant party that began to fall apart very rapidly. Mujib’s attempt to create a 
one-party state by constitutional amendment in 1975 was an attempt to create one-
party authoritarianism but it was misconceived because the distribution of power was 
not consistent for its survival.  
 
This brings us to the fourth and final variant which in some ways describes the state 
of entropy of the clientelist political settlement. This is competitive clientelism, where 
the number of potential factions is so great or they are so fragmented that the 
inclusion of all of them in a ruling coalition would not work but neither would a 
strategy of keeping excluded groups out by legal or military mechanisms. When 
cumulative decline undermines a dominant party or an authoritarian coalition, 
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competitive clientelism often emerges as the default type. In this variant, the ruling 
coalition is a formed by a leadership of political entrepreneurs which seek to bring 
together enough factions to be able to rule but at the lowest price for themselves. The 
excluded are technically free to organize, restructure and entice included factions to 
leave, to attempt to form a new coalition. Elections in this system provide a 
mechanism for testing the organizational power of competing coalitions, and elections 
are successful if they reflect the balance of organizational power on the ground and if 
there is an implicit rule of law amongst the competing coalitions that ensures that 
losers accept the outcomes of these contests without descending into open warfare. 
Competitive clientelism can provide comparative stability when the underlying 
factional structure is very fragmented and attempting to construct authoritarian or 
dominant party solutions would not immediately work. But by its structure, the ruling 
coalition here has a short time horizon and weak implementation and enforcement 
capabilities.  
 
The competitive clientelist system is only stable over time if credible mechanisms 
allow the ruling coalition to be replaced by an alternative coalition which can 
demonstrate greater organizational power during elections. Voting in these systems is 
a test of relative factional strength. However, the possibility that the ruling coalition 
can use administrative and police powers to excessively tilt the balance of the voting 
outcome can cause a breakdown of the electoral process. In a context of substantive 
informality, the temptation on the part of the ruling coalition to use administrative 
powers to target even a few of the informal activities of the opposition is often 
sufficient to make an impact on the electoral outcome. Once this type of intervention 
interferes with the establishment of the balance of forces on the ground, the 
competition between factions can break out in violence. India’s competitive 
clientelism is significantly different from other developing countries in that it has 
successfully allowed a cycling of factions into and out of power. One possibility is 
that India’s size and diversity helped to prevent any ruling coalition from imagining 
that it could get away with significant administrative intervention in elections. 
Intervention would have to benefit a complex coalition of factions and disadvantage 
another complex coalition, and the complexity itself can help to ensure an informal 
rule of law emerges for conducting elections.  
 
A further factor that helps the credibility of elections in India is that it is a large 
federal country and elections are organized at the state level. If excessive violations 
happen within a particular state, the federal government has strong incentives to 
intervene to prevent a particular state descending into crisis. The federal government 
can impose president’s rule and re-run the election. Therefore, while election fraud, 
violence and rigging does happen in India, the parties know that an outcome that is 
significantly out of line with their organizational strength on the ground cannot be 
sustained. Third-party ‘institutional’ oversight of electoral outcomes is far less 
credible in smaller states like Bangladesh because the ruling coalition includes 
enough of the relevant factions in a country to believe that it can get away with it. In 
practice it never can for very long, if only because of the processes of cumulative 
decline, but the ruling coalition can be tempted. Electoral crises are therefore more 
frequent and typically lead to occasional military takeovers. But these raise further 
problems because exit strategies from military rule are complex and many developing 
countries therefore cycle through periods of (vulnerable) authoritarianism and periods 
of competitive clientelism. The conventional way of looking at the conduct of 
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elections focuses on ‘institutionalization’ and the governance capabilities of 
organizations like Election Commissions. This is only partially useful. Our approach 
focuses on the organization of factional politics and examines an important additional 
dimension of the problem.  
 
It is very easy for a clientelist political settlement to evolve into competitive 
clientelism, but quite difficult to get out of it. Competitive clientelism has some 
desirable features. Political competition is difficult to constrain in this context and this 
makes it difficult to institutionally constrain the operation of formal democracy. But 
democracy is not always stabilizing in these contexts and does not necessarily 
generate developmental outcomes for the reasons just discussed. Competitive 
clientelism results in a ruling coalition with short time horizons and weak 
implementation and enforcement capabilities. Ceteris paribus, it has the most adverse 
growth-stability trade-off in Figure 17. And for competitive clientelism to even 
achieve a moderate level of stability there has to be a credible distribution of power 
that ensures that the cycling between factions can continue without an impasse caused 
by administrative interventions in elections. If this is absent, significant violence can 
break out between competing factions. All of South Asia is now governed by 
competitive clientelist coalitions as is much of Africa, through there are exceptions 
such as Tanzania. Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s was also characterized by 
competitive clientelist coalitions. But only India has achieved an internal distribution 
of power that makes its competitive clientelism operate relatively smoothly. An 
examination of the evolution of factional politics in countries like Bangladesh can 
identify critical problems with the operation of competitive clientelism.  
 
The organization of the patron-client factions within the ruling coalition and outside is 
therefore a lens through which to look at the interdependent evolution of institutions, 
politics and economics in clientelist political settlements. This allows us to look 
deeper than the formal structure of parties and constitutions, which may not tell us 
much about enforcement capabilities and institutional performance across countries. 
Formal military governments can be dependent to different degrees on patron-client 
networks, making military governments substantially different from each other. 
Indeed, army-led governments in developing countries have ranged from relatively 
strong but short-lived authoritarian regimes, as in Pakistan in the early 1960s, to very 
weak authoritarian regimes with characteristics of competitive clientelism in 
Bangladesh in the late 1970s and 1980s. In the latter, military leaders formed parties 
with many characteristics of competitive clientelism where excluded coalitions could 
compete to be included but could not replace the top man. At other times, military-led 
coalitions have had developmental characteristics, as in South Korea in the 1960s, or 
have been strong and long-lived authoritarian regimes like the Baathist regimes of the 
Middle East.  
 
Patron-Client Networks and the Political Power of (Emerging) Capitalists  
The strategies that the ruling coalition can follow and their likely effects depend on 
another dimension of the political settlement, also implicit in the organization and 
composition of the dominant patron-client factions. The capabilities and organization 
of productive entrepreneurs in developing countries can vary significantly. These 
characteristics determine the effectiveness of the resistance coming from 
entrepreneurs and other groups to the implementation of growth-enhancing 
institutions. Importantly, the resistance that is relevant can emerge not only from 
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factions that want to block an excessive distribution of benefits to productive 
entrepreneurs but also from entrepreneurs themselves when institutions are introduced 
that attempt to discipline their enterprises as part of market or industrial policy 
strategies. As will become clear, the organization of the ruling coalition and the 
distribution of power with entrepreneurs have mutually dependent effects on the 
growth-stability trade-off facing particular institutional changes.  
 
Two aspects of the initial characteristics of the (emerging) productive entrepreneurs 
are relevant for us. The productive entrepreneurs we need to identify depend on the 
question we are asking. We could be interested in a particular sector or region, or we 
could be interested in characteristics of the whole economy. The relevant level 
depends on the institutional question being addressed. The two characteristics of 
interest are first, the technological and entrepreneurial ‘capabilities’ of the 
entrepreneurs in question and second, the holding power they can deploy with respect 
to the ruling coalition.  
 
The technological and entrepreneurial capabilities of the entrepreneurs are effectively 
defined by historical processes of accumulation and learning and are relatively slow to 
change. Their organizational and political integration into the ruling coalition and 
their dependence or otherwise on patrons at different levels can change with 
significant implications. The holding power of emerging capitalists in developing 
countries, even if they are high-capability entrepreneurs running big organizations, is 
unlikely to be entirely or even largely based on the profits generated by their 
organizations. Sustaining these profits and ensuring that the enterprise survives in a 
context of considerable informal power presupposes that the entrepreneur is well-
networked into informal power structures through which formal rights can be 
protected at an appropriate price. But sometimes entrepreneurs are themselves 
powerful individuals who rose up using political accumulation and who still retain 
strong informal networks.  
 
Alternatively, powerful political networks could depend on the resources 
entrepreneurs make available either from their formal productive enterprises or 
because these entrepreneurs have trading and other grey networks from which 
resources can be generated for political patrons or factions. These entrepreneurs are 
likely to have considerable holding power because they effectively have their own 
factions or can buy protection and holding power from factions that are dependent on 
them. But productive entrepreneurs can also be politically weak if the ruling coalition 
can operate without the support of particular entrepreneurs. If the ruling coalition has 
access to funds from informal activities or their own business sources, productive 
entrepreneurs may be unable to buy themselves much power. This could be the case if 
the ruling coalition has access to natural resource rents or if, like Thaksin, they can 
leverage monopoly and trading rents to run the party. 
 
A number of possible combinations are summarized in Figure 18. The top left-hand 
corner describes relatively high-capability entrepreneurs who are networked with 
patron-client organizations in ways that allow them to deploy significant holding 
power. Paradoxically, powerful entrepreneurs are not necessarily conducive for 
growth in developing countries. This is perhaps true in general because powerful 
entrepreneurs can be expected to use their power to create rents for themselves, and 
some of these rents could be damaging for the overall performance of the productive 
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sector. Powerful entrepreneurs can be expected to try and prevent institutional 
changes that potentially achieve higher levels of competitiveness but expose them to 
higher levels of competitive risk or force them to engage in higher levels of 
investment and effort. As a result, there is likely to be political resistance both to 
institutions that aim to increase the exposure of existing enterprises to market 
competition or to the deepening of institutions of industrial policy. The resistance to 
industrial policy is particularly likely when it moves beyond the initial ‘easy’ 
protection phase to the creation of compulsions for effective learning that often 
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Figure 18 Patron-Client Structures and the Organizational Power of Emerging Capitalists  
 
However, not all rents created by powerful entrepreneurs are necessarily damaging. 
Some high-capability entrepreneurs, particularly those whose markets are global, are 
likely to use political power to gain access to resources or government contracts in 
ways that assist them to accelerate their accumulation and technology acquisition 
strategies. The implementation of these particular strategies may face less resistance if 
the capitalists who benefit are well-connected. But these strategies are only feasible 
for capitalists who already have significant technological and entrepreneurial 
capabilities, and by definition they are few in number in most developing countries. 
Nevertheless, pockets of well-connected and high-capability capitalists have driven 
growth in developing countries like India after the 1980s and in states like 
Maharashtra from a much earlier period (Khan 2008, 2009b). They were also 
instrumental in driving growth in the competitive clientelism of Thailand in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Doner and Ramsay 2000; Khan 2000a; Rock 2000). But the creation of 
new entrepreneurial capabilities is not likely to be rapid with this configuration of 
power and may indeed be thwarted by arrangements favouring existing capitalists.  
 
The bottom left-hand corner describes high-capability entrepreneurs who are 
politically weak in the sense of not being capable of deploying significant holding 
power. Paradoxically, this configuration of power can allow the implementation of 
very effective industrial policy if the ruling coalition is developmental. The political 
settlement in South Korea during the critical decades of the 1960s, 1970s and much of 
the 1980s was characterized not only by a developmental ruling coalition but also a 
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high capability productive sector that had limited holding power. These characteristics 
of the South Korean political settlement allowed the implementation of an industrial 
policy that not only directed significant resources to a growing productive sector, but 
was also able to enforce discipline and compulsion to ensure high levels of effort in 
learning. The political weakness of South Korean capitalists was related to the weak 
development of factional politics in Korea during Japanese rule, such that there were 
no significant independent political factions that Korean capitalists could have linked 
up with. Moreover, the close association of Korean entrepreneurs with Japanese 
industrial interests meant they had limited legitimacy in the aftermath of the Japanese 
defeat and could not immediately attempt to organize supporters of their own 
(Amsden 1989; Kohli 1994; Khan 2000a). 
 
However, high-capability capitalists who lack significant holding power can also be 
vulnerable if the ruling coalition is unable to take a long view and is more interested 
in immediate resource capture or in the development of other sectors. Thaksin’s 
Thailand in the 2000s is an example of a dominant party system led by an 
entrepreneur interested in capturing monopoly profits and sustaining power through 
populist strategies of redistribution, rather than in the development of the Thai 
productive sector as a whole. This led to significant problems for the Thai industrial 
capitalist class who faced growing implicit taxes to pay for Thaksin’s populism while 
suffering institutional changes that assisted Thaksin’s trading and speculative interests 
rather than the development of productive industrial capabilities. Eventually these 
tensions induced a constitutional crisis in Thailand (Khan 2008; Phongpaichit and 
Baker 2009). A somewhat different factional base of the dominant CPM in West 
Bengal led to the gradual sidelining of an industrial sector that once had some high 
capability sectors. The CPM’s agrarian base and its responsiveness to the interests of 
agrarian factions led to a gradual industrial decline of the state as industrial capital 
preferred to expand into other parts of India (Khan 2008).  
 
The top right-hand corner of Figure 18 shows the possibility of politically powerful 
and well-connected entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs who still have low to 
moderate technological and entrepreneurial capabilities. In this case, the holding 
power of the emerging entrepreneurs is more clearly based on their location within 
powerful political factions. If the ruling coalition is very fragmented, and faces either 
many powerful excluded factions or strong lower level factions or both, it is possible 
for individual entrepreneurs to line up with particular factions that can provide them 
with significant holding power in these contexts. This is because the ruling coalition 
may be very dependent on the support of a large number of factions and even a small 
faction protecting or associated with a particular capitalist could block changes 
affecting that capitalist. This would allow capitalists who still had rather limited 
resources in absolute terms to deploy considerable holding power. This combination 
of moderate to low technological capabilities and considerable holding power is a 
reasonable description of the general characteristics of South Asian capitalists in the 
immediate post-colonial period, in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
As in the top left-hand corner, here too capitalists can block growth-enhancing 
institutional changes that threaten their interests. The difference is that at lower levels 
of technological development the consequences of blocking growth-enhancing 
changes are obviously more serious. However, as before, all rent-seeking activities of 
powerful capitalists are not necessarily damaging from a growth and development 
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perspective. Powerful capitalists can induce ruling coalitions to promote productive 
sectors even if they are not immediately very productive. The initial accumulation in 
South Asia in the 1950s and 1960s was driven by the presence of emerging capitalist 
interests within the factions constituting the ruling coalitions. These interests can also 
drive early stage industrial policy while it directs resources and provides protection at 
early stages of industrial growth. Extensive growth can be very rapid, even if learning 
and movements towards the technology frontier are slow. So paradoxically, this 
configuration can create a very favourable growth-stability trade-off for the 
introduction of industrial policy and an increasingly steep trade-off when industrial 
policy attempts to move into disciplining and subsidy withdrawal. This can explain 
why in these political settlements growth was initially very rapid as new firms were 
established and then faded as industrial policy to raise productivity growth through 
resource re-allocation was successfully resisted. 
 
Nevertheless, even though industrial policy cannot be fully implemented in these 
contexts, and the withdrawal of support from poorly performing enterprises is 
virtually impossible, a significant development of technological capabilities can take 
place simply by bringing in new capital equipment and enabling entrepreneurs to 
engage in learning-by-doing. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh enjoyed dramatic 
growth accelerations with their industrial policies in the 1950s and early 1960s. Even 
though both output and productivity growth slowed down eventually and the 
strategies had to be abandoned, almost all of the technological capabilities that 
subsequently drove growth in different sectors in their more open economies after the 
1980s initially developed during this early period (Khan 2008, 2009b).  
 
It is plausible that the failure to achieve significant learning and productivity growth 
in the industrial policies of South Asia during the 1950s and 1960s was at least partly 
due to the political ability of the entrepreneurs receiving support to block attempts to 
discipline them (Khan 1999, 2000a; Chibber 2003; Khan 2009b). However, what 
enabled supported capitalists to resist the implementation of disciplining is disputed 
and yet very significant for designing future policy. What gave a small and 
collectively not very economically powerful group of individuals in post-
independence India the ability to resist disciplining when the ruling coalition was 
based almost entirely on factions dominated by other interests? Indeed, as in South 
Korea, Indian capitalists did not enjoy high levels of legitimacy in the post-
independence period and the official ideology of the dominant Congress Party was 
socialism.  
 
According to Chibber, individual capitalists had the power to block disciplining 
because of the ‘wrong’ choice of import substitution policies in India. This meant that 
capitalists collectively had no interest in supporting disciplining because an individual 
capitalist who was inefficient had no effect on the profits of other capitalists. In 
contrast, Chibber argues, if export promotion had been attempted (as in South Korea), 
capitalists would collectively need high-quality and competitive inputs from other 
capitalists to be able to export their own products and they would therefore have 
collectively supported the disciplining of capitalists who were underperforming 
(Chibber 2003).    
 
Chibber’s argument is intriguing but in the end not persuasive in identifying the 
source of capitalist power in India and in the Indian subcontinent in the 1950s and 
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1960s. His argument suggests that shifting from import substitution to export 
promotion may have broken capitalist resistance by converting capitalists into a group 
that collectively supported disciplining. Unfortunately, export promotion can also be 
done inefficiently, as Pakistan discovered in the 1960s. Its subsidies supporting export 
promotion could not be efficiently re-allocated because re-allocation was effectively 
resisted. As long as subsidies continued, low quality exports were feasible. The 
problem ultimately was not export promotion versus import substitution but rather 
that in both cases industrial policy institutions lacked the power to withdraw 
subsidies. In theory, import substitution could be combined with gradual opening up 
and a reduction of protection for selected sectors to achieve the same compulsions for 
productivity growth. If import-substituting industries knew opening up was credible, 
they would also have strong incentives to ensure that other capitalists provided them 
with high-quality inputs required for achieving competitiveness. The weakest part of 
Chibber’s argument is the claim that the Indian state could not discipline individual 
capitalists because capitalists collectively were not supporting disciplining. Apart 
from the fact that capitalists had no collective organizations with political clout, the 
support or otherwise from a class that was tiny in numbers and with relatively limited 
resources is unlikely to have constrained the decisions of a dominant party ruling 
coalition based on other power bases. 
 
However, Chibber is undoubtedly right to point out that disciplining was being 
blocked by capitalists, many of whom had not even achieved significant technological 
capability or economic power. The characteristics of the political settlement identified 
here can explain the power of individual capitalists in the Indian subcontinent to block 
disciplining using their association with powerful factions. Rather than the collective 
position capitalists may have taken about the usefulness of disciplining, a better 
explanation is that Indian capitalists could buy into significant informal sources of 
holding power provided by factions. Individual capitalists could not be disciplined 
because they were associated with political factions that were powerful. The failure of 
institutions like the licensing system to re-allocate licenses had little to do with 
whether capitalists collectively were interested or not interested in supporting 
disciplining.  
 
The strength and fragmentation of factions in the Indian subcontinent meant that even 
capitalists who were unable to mobilize significant resources could still buy into 
particular networks that were part of complex ruling coalitions. Indeed, the historical 
evidence suggests that individual capitalists were closely associated with particular 
politicians and factions in the Indian subcontinent from the very outset of industrial 
policy. This more plausible explanation of the power of individual capitalists also 
suggests that broad-based industrial policy would not have worked in the Indian 
subcontinent without significant changes in the political settlement. A shift from 
import substitution to export promotion would not have achieved a significant change 
on its own, and the experience of Pakistan in the 1960s supports this hypothesis 
(Khan 1999). Alternatively, given this political settlement, variants of industrial 
policy that focused on narrower sectors and technological goals may have performed 
better if the appropriate (narrowly defined) governance capabilities to implement 
these institutions could have been developed.   
 
Finally, the lower right hand box describes a difficult situation where entrepreneurs 
have low technological and entrepreneurial capabilities and are also unable to deploy 
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significant holding power. Here too, outcomes depend quite significantly on the 
nature of the ruling coalition. In principle, a developmental coalition could be quite 
successful in accelerating accumulation and learning in these contexts (provided some 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities existed). Ethiopia’s attempt to 
implement learning strategies in the late 2000s is an interesting experiment of this 
type. However, with limited political voice and holding power, entrepreneurs may 
also be ignored or expropriated if the ruling coalition has short term extractive goals, 
or if it is more concerned to promote a different set of class or sectoral interests.  
 
Tanzania’s dominant party ruling coalition has been less engaged with its existing 
entrepreneurial base, despite official support for the private sector in the 2000s. More 
directed policies of support for accumulation and technology acquisition have not 
been very aggressively supported because most Tanzanian entrepreneurs appear to be 
weakly integrated into political networks and have more limited political voice as a 
result. That many entrepreneurs are Asian or European in origin and not African 
perhaps makes it more difficult for the dominant party to openly support business 
interests. The availability of aid rents and natural resource rents further weakens the 
incentives of the ruling coalition to develop the politically weak productive sector 
with proactive policies when easier opportunities for meeting minimum economic 
conditions for the viability of the ruling coalition exist.  
 
An Interactive Framework for Analysing Institutions in Political Settlements  
The two dimensions of the political settlement that we have looked at by no means 
exhaust the different aspects of the distribution of power that can affect institutional 
performance. But already they indicate the complexity of identifying the most 
relevant aspects of the distribution of power that can affect the performance of 
particular institutions. The enforcement of a specific institution and the political costs 
of enforcement depend not only on the characteristics of the ruling coalition but also 
on the organization and capabilities of the productive sectors that are affected. A 
ruling coalition that can be associated with dynamic institutional outcomes with a 
particular configuration of entrepreneurial capabilities and powers may be associated 
with very different outcomes with a different set of entrepreneurial powers. 
Conversely, a particular power configuration describing entrepreneurs can be 
productive or otherwise depending on the characteristics of the ruling coalition.  
 
Figure 19 shows that institutions that may be associated with growth in a political 
settlement with one set of characteristics may be associated with declining 
performance if the combination of characteristics changes. For instance, industrial 
policy may be superior to open competition if a developmental coalition can support 
technological learning with high-capability capitalists. But with competitive 
clientelism or a weak dominant party and/or well-networked capitalists, industrial 
policy may produce poorer results at a later stage of development than institutions 
supporting competition. Continuing with industrial policy in these contexts may have 
negative effects. But the benefits of opening up may be rapidly exhausted as 
entrepreneurs with the capability to benefit may be few in number. Even political 
settlements inhospitable for industrial policy may need to devise institutional 
strategies for sustaining technology acquisition and accumulation that can work given 
the specific characteristics of their political settlements. These ‘non-linear’ interactive 
relationships mean that we need an iterative framework for assessing the likely 
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performance of specific institutions in the context of the characteristics of particular 
political settlements.  
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Figure 19 Interactive Relationship between Political Settlements and Institutions 
 
Observations of the organization of patron-client factions and their strategies can 
provide critical information about aspects of the clientelist political settlement. In 
particular, the location of capitalists within networks explains their holding power in 
developing countries, and the factional organization of the ruling coalition determines 
its ability to coordinate and to enforce. Both of these dimensions of the clientelist 
political settlement affect the degree of enforcement of particular institutions and the 
likely growth-stability trade-off facing their introduction. These characteristics allow 
us to examine the likely growth and stability implications of proceeding along 
particular paths of institutional evolution. However, given the interaction between 
these variables, a ‘linear’ analysis of institutions is in general likely to be misleading.  
 
An implication of our analysis is that institutions do not have linearly separable 
effects on growth. If growth were a linear sum of the effects of a number of variables, 
the positive effect of particular institutions may be wiped out by other adverse 
conditions like political instability or culture, but the positive effect of the institution 
would still be there ceteris paribus. The implication of interactive effects of the type 
described here is that growth effects are not a linear sum of institutional and other 
effects. The effect of differences in political settlements is not just that political 
variables can potentially swamp the underlying positive effects of institutions. Rather, 
the political settlement can affect both the magnitude and the sign of the effect 
(positive or negative) of particular institutions (Khan 1995). This further underlines 
the importance of identifying critical aspects of the political settlement and assessing 
the likelihood of the effective enforcement of and resistance to particular institutions 
in an iterative analysis.  
 
In the next sections we describe broad features of the evolving political settlement in 
our sample countries using the framework developed here. The aim is not to develop a 
full political economy analysis of each country or state, but to use the framework of 
analysis to discuss how the political settlement and changes in the political settlement 
are relevant for understanding critical aspects of institutional performance in our 
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countries. To do this we will need to recall aspects of the analysis of earlier papers as 
we want to show how changes in the political settlement help us to better understand 
the changing structure of rents and the governance of rents through institutions. 
Important aspects of rent management and governance in our case study countries 
have already been described in detail in earlier papers (Khan 2008, 2009a, 2009b). 
We reproduce summary tables of the major types of rents characterizing our cases 
from (Khan 2008) in an appendix to this paper. 
 
8. Thailand: The Rise and Fall of Competitive Clientelism  
The evolution of the political settlement in Thailand is particularly interesting because 
it demonstrates the potential danger of attempting to accelerate the achievement of a 
Weberian state in the context of a clientelist political settlement. In terms of the 
organization of ruling coalitions shown in Figure 17, Thailand’s ruling coalition from 
the late 1950s was a military-led authoritarian one. Business interests in these early 
years, according to the classification in Figure 18, were politically weak and only 
moderately capable. This was a period of rapid import substitution but industrial 
policy institutions could not be constructed. By the early 1970s, the growing strength 
of excluded coalitions meant that the authoritarian ruling coalition could not be 
sustained and Thailand began a process of evolution towards a structure of 
competitive clientelism following the 1973 student uprising. It is also around this time 
that the political power of business interests came into their own, with powerful 
business interests operating through the competitive clientelism that emerged. This 
allowed relatively rapid growth based on rent-creation by capitalist-dominated 
factions. This settlement collapsed after the 1997 crisis. The 1997 constitution that 
emerged partly as a result of a new middle class activism attempted to move the 
country towards Weberian good governance. It gave considerable powers to the Prime 
Minister with voting rules that made it easier for a single party to win. It also 
attempted to increase accountability through checks and balances. The middle class 
expected the new constitution to result in the emergence of good governance 
appropriate for a Weberian state, and the beginning of an end to the ‘money politics’ 
and clientelism of the past. 
 
Thaksin’s victory in 2001 with his Thai Rak Thai Party was a turning point for 
Thailand. It marked the end of the first period of competitive clientelism. But while 
his party had a manifesto, and actually delivered on it, it also had to operate through 
patron-client networks. In terms of Figure 17 Thaksin’s coalition was a dominant 
party ruling coalition, and not a party of the type that we would expect to see in a 
capitalist political settlement. Paradoxically, the construction of this dominant party 
was to have seriously adverse implications for Thailand’s productive sector, and 
eventually for its constitution. Thaksin’s movement was initially a capitalist-led 
response to the 1997 crisis, but the diversity of interests within the large ruling 
coalition led to early failures in evolving a productive economic response. The party’s 
failure to enforce discipline on capitalist interests who needed to be assisted out of the 
debts they had incurred during the financial crisis happened at the same time as 
Thaksin and his clique discovered they could, instead, access significant unproductive 
rents for themselves. The result was that capitalists and the middle class rapidly lost 
access to political power and the party turned to overtly populist strategies to stay in 
power. This proved to be wildly successful as an electoral strategy allowing rent 
capture for powerful interests within the ruling coalition. Despite the presence of a 
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sophisticated capitalist sector, there was a significantly adverse shift in the political 
settlement from the perspective of enforcing institutions supportive of productive 
investments and long run growth.  
 
Thaksin’s electoral strategy was so compelling that his re-named party was re-elected 
even after it was dislodged by a desperate coup backed by the middle class. It was 
finally dismissed only after extra-constitutional violence and disruption and sustained 
judicial action following the monarch’s advice to judges to save the country. A new 
government led by the Democrat Party was cobbled together through considerable 
horse trading in December 2008. This government was not an outcome of an election 
but relied on the disqualification of some elected MPs and the buying in of others. In 
terms of Figure 17, despite the fact that the Prime Minister was an educated and 
likeable leader of Thailand’s oldest political party, it was effectively a (temporary) 
return to a form of authoritarian rule with a democratic face. The new ruling coalition 
was constructed with the overt support of strong military-bureaucratic intervention. 
Factions led by Thaksin supporters who had successfully, if cynically, mobilized rural 
interests and the poor were forcefully excluded by administrative and military action.  
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Figure 20 Evolution of Political Settlement in Contemporary Thailand  
 
Clearly, the attempt to create a self-regulating party structure that would operate 
through the protection of formal dominant economic interests had failed, and our 
analysis can suggest why the attempt may have been premature. It is too early to tell 
how long it will take Thailand to reorganize a viable version of competitive 
clientelism that can incorporate the currently excluded interests so that overt and 
repeated bureaucratic-military intervention is not necessary. The broad features of the 
evolution of the political settlement in contemporary Thailand are summarized in 
Figure 20 and discussed in the subsequent sections. The reader should also refer to 
Figure 25 in the Appendix summarizing some of our earlier work on changing 
characteristics of growth and governance in Thailand. 
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Authoritarianism with Weak Capitalists: 1960s to early 1970s 
From the 1932 Revolution which ended absolute monarchy till the uprising of 1973, 
Thai politics was dominated by military-bureaucratic factions and the conflicts 
between them. In the critical period of the 1960s and 1970s, following Sarit’s coup of 
1957, the ruling coalition in Thailand was a vulnerable authoritarian one in terms of 
Figure 17. It was vulnerable because powerful factions within the Thai military and 
sometimes individuals close to the monarchy were dissatisfied with their relative 
position or were excluded from the coalition. In addition, Thailand faced a communist 
insurgency that was used by the ruling coalition to justify clamping down and 
suppressing demands coming from lower down the social ladder. Emerging 
leaderships of peasant movements, trade unions and students were repressed, 
occasionally with violence, and potentially powerful factions were thereby 
systematically excluded.  
 
Nevertheless, the ruling coalition never acquired the cohesive characteristics of a 
developmental coalition. This was primarily because the army itself was factionalized 
and competing generals were building their economic power bases by allying with 
particular businessmen from a very early stage. In the 1960s, Thai business interests 
had low technological capabilities, being mostly based in trading and light 
manufacturing. In addition, because most capitalists were of Chinese origin, they were 
relatively weak in their bargaining power with the military factions running the 
country. In terms of Figure 18, Thai business at the time could be characterized as 
located in between the two bottom row boxes: having moderate to low technological 
capabilities (but probably high entrepreneurial capabilities!) and with very limited 
holding power. But while business interests had little autonomous bargaining power, 
networks emerged from the earliest days with military-bureaucratic factions who 
exchanged favours and contracts for kickbacks on terms determined by the military-
bureaucratic elites running the country (Riggs 1966).  
 
The factions within the army and bureaucracy meant that the generals and bureaucrats 
did not act like a coherent developmental ruling group. Significant potential 
opposition from excluded groups like peasants, students and the small but growing 
numbers of capitalists and the middle class meant that the leadership could not afford 
to take on the generals too. The tradition in Thailand since the 1930s was for generals 
to freely participate in business contracts, get appointed to boards of companies and 
generally take any kickbacks they could negotiate on their own. Coups were frequent. 
Sarit’s coup in 1957 was one of many before and after. While Sarit’s period of rule till 
1963 was one of relative coherence, subsequent military-led ruling coalitions were 
more vulnerable and less able to impose discipline within the coalition. In particular, 
generals and bureaucrats increasingly had their own business clients (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 1997: 244-322).  
 
These characteristics of the political settlement of the 1960s and early 1970s can help 
to explain the institutional performance and rents that we observe over this period. On 
the negative side, it explains why despite much talk of developmental priorities and 
the apparent existence of an authoritarian state, there were no moves towards the type 
of industrial policy observed in South Korea or Taiwan. Industrial policy institutions 
based on conditional and selective assistance and technology acquisition would have 
been difficult to impose as any capitalist was likely to be the client of a powerful 
general. Disciplining a particular capitalist by any central authority on grounds of 
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non-performance or selecting a particular capitalist on the grounds of technological 
capability would have faced high internal transition costs in the political settlement 
described. Although capitalists were weakly organized and did not have significant 
network power of their own to have blocked the effective implementation of industrial 
policy institutions, the ruling coalition was not appropriate for a low transition cost 
introduction or implementation of effective industrial policy.  
 
However, the political settlement was very conducive for some types of formal and 
informal institutions that were significantly growth-enhancing in the context of very 
limited industrialization. Primitive accumulation that significantly enhanced the 
capital base of emerging capitalists required the granting of favourable government 
contracts for construction, imports and exports, and the organization of grey trade in 
areas like logging. With a political settlement that excluded significant outsiders 
challenging the allocation of these rents, and weak lower level clients (the emerging 
business interests), the ruling coalition had clear opportunities and strong incentives to 
expand and encourage the entry of new businesses. It helped that the ruling coalition 
was not so vulnerable that it took an excessively short term view. Relatively long-
term relationships were set up with emerging businesses, encouraging both sides to 
invest in productive relationships. For businesses this made sense because they 
needed to generate income to sustain their relationships with power groups. For the 
generals, allowing productive investments by their clients enhanced their long-term 
interests. Thus, the informal ‘institutional arrangements’ through which primitive 
accumulation was organized were effectively enforced and introduced at low 
transition cost. The growth-stability trade-off for formal and informal institutions 
supporting accumulation was very favourable.  
 
Another formal institution during this period was the introduction and operation of 
import-substituting industrialization policy. This too faced little political resistance 
and was effectively implemented. This is consistent with the relevant characteristics 
of the political settlement during this period. As long as import substitution was 
general and the strategy allowed any businessman with connections to enter and 
operate, there was little opposition. If basic import substitution had attempted to move 
further into a more disciplined technology acquisition strategy, our understanding of 
the political settlement suggests there would have been potentially high transition 
costs of moving in that direction.  
 
A general feature of the authoritarian political settlement in Thailand is that entry by 
individual capitalists was relatively easy provided they could pay for informal 
protection and support offered by the ruling coalition. This feature became even more 
pronounced as the loose authoritarianism of the 1960s merged into a more systematic 
competitive clientelism in the 1970s. The ease of entry of potential capitalists into the 
processes enabling primitive accumulation and providing startup support meant that 
early growth was very rapid. This helped to accelerate Thailand’s growth into 
manufacturing from the mid-1950s, and particularly in the 1960s. By the mid-1970s a 
significant industrial base had emerged based around light manufacturing. As we 
summarized in an earlier paper and now reproduce in Figure 25 in our Appendix, the 
rents that drove growth in Thailand during this early period (shown in the first row) 
were associated with the informal organization of rapid primitive accumulation. The 
political settlement of this period helps to explain why the institutional arrangements 
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responsible for these rents were easy to create and rapidly expand, and also why more 
effective industrial policy did not emerge.  
 
Summary  
The 1960s and 1970s were characterized by an authoritarian clientelist settlement 
with moderately capable but politically weak productive entrepreneurs. The 
characteristics of this political settlement made it easy to introduce formal and 
informal institutions that enabled rapid growth through primitive accumulation and 
the introduction of relatively simple manufacturing technologies. The introduction of 
institutions with developmental characteristics faced adverse growth-stability trade-
offs. More interestingly, the political settlement was undermined by the growth of 
factionalism within the ruling coalition and the emergence of powerful coalitions 
outside.  
 
Competitive Clientelism: Mid-1970s to 2001 
In 1968, a worried monarch responding to growing social tensions pressed the 
military to legalize political parties and organize limited elections. In 1969, tightly 
controlled elections were held, which a party set up by the military won. However, 
dissent was growing, and with it the strength of social coalitions outside the ruling 
coalition. Mass student-led protests and then bloody repression in 1973 were followed 
by an intensification of the Communist insurgency in rural areas. In this context, the 
pressure for ‘democracy’ led the already factionalized military junta to come apart 
with generals identifying with rival parties and businessmen choosing their patrons. A 
gradual transition to competitive clientelism began. The 1975 elections marked the 
transition to a party-based organization of factions, with the Democrat Party winning 
the largest number of seats. It failed to form a coalition big enough to form the 
government, and in any case a coup in 1976 further delayed the transition. The 
constitution was re-written in 1978 to enable a strong military role in parliament, 
allowing serving military and bureaucratic personnel to serve as Prime Ministers or in 
the Cabinet. With these adjustments, Thailand embarked on a long period of 
parliamentary rule from 1979 till the short-lived coup of 1991-2 (Phongpaichit and 
Baker 1997: 323-66). Following the brief coup, which was overturned by massive 
street protests, parliamentary rule re-emerged till the shock of the 1997 crisis began to 
significantly change the political settlement once again.  
 
The characteristics of this emergent competitive clientelist political settlement that are 
relevant for us were the following. First, the ruling coalition no longer tried either to 
include within it all possible factions with the power to inflict high costs, nor exclude 
them permanently by force or constitutional arrangements. Rather, the characteristic 
of competitive clientelism is that the ruling coalition is one of many possible 
permutations, and the particular coalition emerges through a competitive process both 
of coalition formation and electoral selection. Each coalition is formed out of lower 
level factions, as we have described earlier. Stability emerges in this system from an 
understanding between factions that the ruling faction will make money, but other 
factions are free to organize and even to woo coalitions within the ruling coalition to 
improve their chances of winning the next selection game. As long as insiders do not 
try to block the chances of outsiders too significantly, competitive clientelism can 
provide tolerable stability through the use of informal power and rent generation for a 
sequential selection of powerful groups.  
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In terms of Figure 17, any particular ruling coalition will face significant excluded 
coalitions who are always mobilizing support to gain enough holding power to win 
the next elections. The excluded coalitions are not necessarily engaging in excessive 
violence or inflicting serious costs as long as the implicit rules of the game are 
adhered to. The ruling coalition also faces strong lower level factions within because 
the ruling coalition is now dependent on buying in a significant number of lower level 
factions to form an electoral block that can rule. As a result, the higher levels are 
continuously engaged in negotiations with lower factions to keep them in the bigger 
coalition, given that the opposition is always trying to woo away significant factions. 
This structural feature of competitive clientelism increases the bargaining power of 
lower level factions and further limits the ability of the ruling group to enforce 
discipline within itself, even compared to weak authoritarianism. The power of lower 
level factions also has a tendency to increase over repeated rounds of coalition 
formation over a number of election cycles. The competition for coalition formation 
can induce the entry of a greater number of ambitious faction leaders at the local 
level, increasing the bargaining strength of existing factions and enabling small 
factions to extract holdup payoffs for joining the winning coalition.  
 
The specific feature of Thai competitive clientelism was, however, the growing 
strength of business interests. Even during the authoritarian period, business was 
becoming economically stronger and politically more confident. With the onset of 
competitive clientelism, the resources big business could deploy became very 
important for setting up winning coalitions. Lower level factions were increasingly 
dependent on business support. Thailand did not have strong intermediate classes 
providing leadership to factions because it did not have a colonial history where these 
classes were created for colonial political management. This helped Thai business to 
initially establish its dominance over factions rather easily. Initially, the consolidation 
of competitive clientelism strengthened the presence of business in politics. Prior to 
1969, lawyers and bureaucrats had dominated in the Assembly. But after 1969, the 
share of business in the Assembly rose rapidly to around one half of the seats. By the 
1980s, just under half the Cabinet consisted of businessmen, with the share reaching 
over 70 per cent in the late 1980s (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: Tables 10.1 and 
10.2). The businessmen in question were not all big businessmen, and there was a 
growing entry of provincial business interests into politics. Nevertheless, at the higher 
levels, Thailand was becoming increasingly sophisticated in its industrial structure, as 
we have described in earlier papers (Khan 2008, 2009b). The organizational structure 
of business interests was therefore one of moderate to high capability business closely 
linked to particular factions, the top left hand square in Figure 18.  
 
This combination of characteristics imply some specific features of the clientelist 
political settlement that are relevant for understanding Thailand’s economic 
performance in the 1980s. The free-entry rent seeking that favoured business interests 
already characterized Thailand’s political economy and continued despite the more 
open political system because of the dominance of business interests in the 
organization of factional politics. It was relatively difficult for oligopolistic interests 
to convert themselves into monopolistic ones as entry could not be prevented for 
already existing and powerfully networked competitors. It was equally difficult for 
ruling coalitions to expropriate capitalists or to seriously restrict their rent seeking. 
This also meant that significant industrial policy initiatives would remain difficult.  
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Despite the dominance of capitalist interests and a political system in which they had 
considerable voice, the structure of competitive clientelism, and paradoxically the 
very dominance of capitalist interests in the organization of factions meant that it was 
very unlikely that capitalists could be disciplined by institutions that provided 
conditional rents. The potential growth-stability trade-off faced by institutions 
supporting learning strategies remained very adverse. A partial exception to this was 
probably the long-running premiership of General Prem Tinsulanond, from 1980 to 
1988. Prem’s governments included significant numbers of businessmen, but his 
strong roots in the army (he was an unelected premier) and his reliance on technocrats 
gave his government a somewhat more developmental character than the others. He 
was less worried about opposing factions as he had the capability to repeatedly 
construct a ruling coalition, and he was therefore more able to contain his own clients 
and those of others. The limited industrial policy experiments that we see in Thailand 
in the 1980s, summarized in Figure 25, happen mostly during his tenure (Doner and 
Ramsay 2000; Rock 2000; Khan 2008). 
 
Thailand’s economic performance in the 1980s was also assisted by strong 
bureaucratic capabilities in sectors like the central bank and the Ministry of Finance. 
The dominance of capitalist interests in competitive factions helped to ensure that 
factional polices did not invade these technocratic spaces as the consequences for 
capitalists in the ruling coalition as well as effective opposition factions would be 
significant. This ensured that rent seeking did not initially result in fiscal 
irresponsibility. However, as factions became increasingly driven by provincial and 
lower-level business interests in the 1990s, these characteristics of relative probity 
changed. Big business became increasingly unrestrained by factional competition 
because opposition factions were no longer driven by productive business interests.  
 
The characteristics that ensured that the Thai political settlement had significant 
growth-enhancing characteristics began to be slowly undermined by both domestic 
and international factors. At home, the growth of provincial interests meant a growing 
factionalization of politics and the displacement of big capitalist interests within the 
factions. This weakened the hold of big capitalist interests on factions, and made 
parties more interested in rent creation for rural elites and emerging provincial 
businessmen. This weakened the technocrats and industrial policies moved further 
down the list of priorities. The second and equally important trend was globalization 
and the Japanese entry into South East Asia which brought unprecedented volumes of 
foreign capital into Thailand in the late 1980s. The ruling coalition now had an easy 
option for supporting growth: make Thailand attractive to foreign investors and forget 
about the difficult task of developing domestic technological capabilities. As the 
institutional changes which made Thailand more accessible for foreign capital did not 
challenge any of the rents that new powerful interests in the political settlement were 
reliant on, the introduction of these changes faced no significant stability trade-off. 
The changes in rent strategies in the late 1980s are also summarized in Figure 25.  
 
However, while the introduction of institutional changes that enabled the entry of 
foreign capital was relatively easy, the creation of institutions that could appropriately 
manage these capital flows was not. With inflating capital values, stock markets and 
property prices, it would have been difficult for any regime to introduce effective 
institutions to keep track of what was real and what was a bubble. For competitive 
clientelism it was even more difficult. The economic implications of the 1997 crash 
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have been discussed in an earlier paper (Khan 2008). We now turn to the significant 
implications of the 1997 crash on the political settlement in Thailand.  
 
Summary 
The competitive clientelism of the mid-1970s to the late 1990s was characterized by a 
competitive clientelist ruling coalition and technologically sophisticated and 
politically powerful entrepreneurs. Free entry into manufacturing was accelerated 
with the growth of relatively sophisticated manufacturing capabilities. For a while, 
developmental industrial policy initiatives were also attempted by a ruling coalition in 
the 1980s with some developmental characteristics. However, industrial policy 
initiatives generally faced adverse growth-stability trade-offs and poor 
implementation. The competitive clientelist settlement was undermined by the growth 
of rural business-led coalitions which had adverse effects on the efficiency of formal 
technocratic institutions. The financial crisis of 1997 fatally undermined the political 
arrangements underpinning the competitive clientelist settlement. 
 
The ‘Unproductive’ Dominant Party: 2001-2008 
The rise of Thaksin and the constitutional crisis that eventually engulfed Thailand is a 
complex story (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009). We will focus only on the broad 
outlines and the way they affected the political settlement. The crisis of 1997 was an 
important turning point in a number of ways. The crash destroyed the confidence of 
the Thai business class in globalization and created a nationalist demand to protect 
domestic industry. The frustration of domestic capitalists became particularly intense 
after the Democrat Party agreed to accept western advice coming from the IMF and 
other bodies that transferred significant Thai assets into the hands of foreigners at 
very low prices. At the same time, the crash brought to a head long simmering 
discontent and mobilization by the increasingly assertive and self-confident middle 
classes for constitutional reform that would see out ‘money politics’. A broad social 
movement that had forced parliament to allow the drafting of a constitution by 
consultation had produced a document that was initially opposed by most in the 
establishment as impossibly radical. But the collapse of confidence in the entire 
political system in 1997 enabled the new constitution to be rapidly adopted.  
 
The constitution deliberately sought to create a modern political system where strong 
parties would contest on manifestos. It tried to reduce the weight of clientelist 
provincial interests by introducing a number of seats to be allocated by party lists. It 
tried to reduce competitive clientelist lobbying by increasing the power of the Prime 
Minister over the party, for instance by stipulating that when ministers resigned, they 
would lose their parliamentary seat, making ministers more likely to stay with the 
party. The Prime Minister could call an election with forty five days notice, but a 
candidate had to be a member of a party for ninety days to stand for election. This was 
to reduce the threat of defections. A number of independent bodies were also created 
to check and balance political representatives. However, the framers of the 
constitution did not understand that constitutional rules cannot change the 
fundamentally clientelist nature of a political settlement. Ironically, these 
constitutional rules helped to create a dominant party that was in many respects worse 
for the middle class framers of the constitution and for many of the capitalists who 
initially supported Thaksin’s party than the competitive clientelism that it replaced.  
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Thaksin was a well-connected businessman who had dabbled in many things without 
making any significant money. His fortune changed in the early 1990s when he 
managed to get the concession for a mobile service and a paging service from the 
Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT). In a couple of years he was a baht 
billionaire, riding on the mobile boom that took his net worth through the roof 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2009: 25-61). When Thaksin set up the Thai Rak Thai Party 
in 1998, his agenda was strongly influenced by the crisis. He spoke of the need to 
protect Thailand’s competitiveness, respond to the aggressive behaviour of global 
competitors, and to have business values and attitudes replace bureaucratic ones in the 
running of the country. This struck a chord with both the middle classes who saw the 
old bureaucratic polity as a cause of the economic mismanagement for which the 
whole society was paying a price as well as the stricken Thai businesses looking for 
support and salvation on a scale that the IMF would not recommend. As an intuitive 
politician, Thaksin also recognized that a focus on big business would not sell and so 
his rhetoric turned rapidly to the small entrepreneur and the farmer. A rural uplift 
programme based on debt relief, spending programmes and the 30-baht health cover 
plan emerged. 
 
The 2001 elections were a combination of new manifesto politics combined with old-
style faction building. Thaksin showed that he understood how to do both, creating a 
winning combination. His party won 248 out of 500 seats but this soon ballooned into 
a massive majority as a number of smaller parties merged into the Thai Rak Thai. By 
2002 he controlled 364 seats. This, combined with the powers the constitution gave 
the Prime Minister converted Thaksin into a presidential style leader of a massive 
patron-client coalition. In terms of our classification of organizations of the ruling 
coalition in Figure 17, this was a moderately strong dominant party. The excluded 
factions had little power, but Thaksin had bought in many factions into his grand 
coalition and insider factions did have significant bargaining power. This proved to be 
significant as we shall see. 
 
The organization of business interests during this period is interesting and 
paradoxical. Initially, business interests were keen to see a businessman in charge of 
the country at a point of crisis. In his first term, there were attempts made to revitalize 
the economy and even to define feasible industrial policy. Indeed, many business 
interests were close to factions within the dominant coalition. Economic growth 
sharply increased as a result of Keynesian spending programmes focused on rural 
spending. The budget deficit did not grow and actually began to shrink as growth 
picked up because the initial spending was financed by borrowing the vast underused 
deposits of banks that had stopped lending.  
 
More interestingly, Thaksin started talking about developmental interventions to 
develop the competitiveness and capabilities of Thai business. Some preparatory 
actions were taken. The US consultant Michael Porter was paid a million dollars to 
identify sectors and policies for Thailand to develop competitive niches. By mid-2002 
he had identified five unsurprising sectors: tourism, fashion, food, computer graphics 
and automobiles. Porter provided general and sometimes contradictory 
recommendations like more openness and an end to ‘business connections with 
government’ but also micro-level support for specific sectors and firms. He also 
recommended a free trade agreement with the US without explaining how this might 
affect industrial policy interventions.  
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In the end, the experience of the government with the bailouts organized by the 
Thailand Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) showed why industrial policy 
would almost certainly not have worked without a reorganization of political 
arrangements. These limited experiments in the direction of industrial policy were 
critical for Thailand and the early compromises were possibly a lost opportunity. The 
experience may even have dampened any interest on the part of the leadership to 
proceed in this direction. The TAMC was set up by Thaksin to assist the recovery 
from crisis by taking up bad loans from banks and to lend to priority sectors. But the 
immediate lending of state banks and of the TAMC showed the enormous power of 
factions within the ruling coalition. Phongpaichit and Baker (2009: 112) provide 
examples of several big businessmen who received billions of bahts of loans and debt 
forgiveness for dubious business ventures when they were clearly not short of money 
given their lavish spending on buying golf courses and other activities that were 
simultaneously going on. The explanation was that these individuals were connected 
to powerful factions that were part of the new ruling coalition.  
 
Thus, the ruling coalition attempted to implement its industrial policy by engaging in 
significant compromises with powerful factions within the dominant party from the 
very outset. In terms of Figure 13, the compromise strategy with powerful factions led 
to the easy implementation of aspects of the policy (the bailout) because this faced 
virtually no resistance from any powerful group. However, the growth implications 
were limited. The bailouts prevented some enterprises going under. But unlike early 
industrial policy where the allocation of resources to powerful businessmen at least 
creates new capacity, in the case of bailouts the growth effects were more limited. But 
more seriously, the compromise strategy had serious negative implication for the 
future of industrial policy. The recognition of factional power within the party 
amounted to a significant worsening of the trade-off facing potential industrial policy 
interventions in the way suggested in Figure 13.  
 
Given the electoral strength of the dominant party, a more confrontational but 
incremental strategy of implementation as in Figure 12 may have resulted in less 
significant progress at first, but may have enabled incremental improvements over 
time. In practice this would have meant a more limited programme of support to 
particular enterprises with conditions that were enforced even at the cost of some 
conflict. Whether the leadership turned away from industrial policy options as a result 
of its negative experiences with bailouts, we do not know. But had the Thai Rak Thai 
party proceeded with industrial policy, it would have had to address possible internal 
conflicts given the evidence we have about the operation of its internal patron-client 
structures. Thaksin would have had to take on some factions politically, which would 
have meant slower incremental progress, or risk poor enforcement and outcomes.  
 
As it turned out, Thaksin’s response was two-fold. First, his own appropriation 
strategies involving his close family and friends became more open and intense. It 
could be that he was so hopelessly venal that the acceleration of unproductive rent 
appropriation by his family would have happened anyway. But if a developmental 
strategy was not possible because of the internal structure of the party, becoming the 
biggest of a gang of profiteers also made sense. Secondly, economic nationalism and 
industrial policy was quietly dropped and replaced with a more populist support for 
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the poor, for rural interests and the small businessman combined with a growing 
openness to foreign capital as a way of sustaining growth.  
 
By the time of the second election of 2005, Thaksin had re-invented himself and his 
party. He was no longer the business leader of Thailand Inc., but a champion of the 
small farmer and the poor and an enemy of the ‘influential figures’ in the old 
bureaucratic polity. He used his powers to pack his supporters in key positions in the 
bureaucracy and the army, bought in rural power brokers on a massive scale and 
offered them a winning formula they could not refuse. The Party would continue to 
build its appeal to the poor with its rural spending and cheap health programmes. 
Rural faction leaders belonging to the party therefore had a high chance of winning 
and a very low chance if they stayed out. The ruling coalition was now virtually free 
of any constraint from either the bureaucratic caste or business, and could create 
significant rents through their control over the political process. Given the absence of 
strong internal party discipline which is a prerequisite for creating productive rents, 
the ruling coalition was likely to create and capture unproductive rents based on 
government construction contracts (like the new airport) or asset sales. The ultimate 
losers were the middle classes, but paradoxically they had little voice under a 
dominant party with a huge parliamentary majority.  
 
The outcome was the most crushing single-party victory in Thailand’s political 
history. In the 2005 elections Thai Rak Thai won 377 out of 500 seats, and it looked 
like this was going to be the beginning of a long period of rule. In terms of the 
political settlement, the second election definitively established that the organizations 
of big capitalists were now largely excluded from power. The factions organized by 
Thaksin relied on rural organizers and some provincial small capitalist interests, and 
some business interests closely linked to his network. Excluded businesses lost 
access. So did the urban middle class. The combination of a dominant party with 
relatively high capability capitalists who were effectively politically excluded was 
both new and unexpected. The introduction of formal and informal institutions that 
squeezed business and middle class interests now faced little resistance. Tax 
collection from business and middle classes was tightened to finance the new populist 
schemes in the countryside. Rents were created in government contracts that made 
infrastructure expensive for business. Any possibility of industrial policy was off the 
agenda. The growth-stability trade-off suddenly became very adverse for growth-
enhancing institutional changes, though Keynesian expansion combined with a return 
of foreign investment was sustaining overall growth. It is in this context that the last 
row in Figure 25 makes sense.  
 
Despite Thaksin’s nationalist origins, growth in the 2000s was increasingly based on 
foreign investors, while domestic capital and the middle classes faced worsening 
institutional conditions. And despite the hopes of the framers of the 1997 constitution, 
Thailand was not only still a clientelist polity, the dominant party system provided a 
significantly worse method of constructing the ruling coalition given the particular 
configuration of power that had emerged. The growth-stability trade-off was now 
worse, on top of the repression felt by the middle classes and the economic squeeze 




The dominant party period of the 2000s under Thaksin was one of a single party 
ruling coalition based on rural factions to the exclusion of most factions based on 
business interests. High capability Thai capitalists unexpectedly found themselves 
politically excluded, as did the middle class. The organization of the ruling coalition 
and the exclusion of business interests implied a significant worsening of the growth-
stability trade-off. Damaging institutional interventions were introduced with little 
resistance. The ruling coalition engaged created damaging rents for itself and yet 
maintained massive popularity at the polls. It could only be unseated with significant 
bureaucratic-military intervention supported by the middle classes, a possibility the 
middle class framers of the 1997 constitution had probably never envisaged.  
 
The Backlash: Authoritarianism with a Democratic Face 2008 
The middle class backlash began with a successful mobilization against Thaksin’s 
many acts of corruption and misuse of power. Thaksin’s tax evasion in a multi-billion 
dollar sale of his stake in Shin Corp. (whose major asset was the mobile company) to 
Temasek Holdings of Singapore provoked a concerted public protest. Knowing he 
would win again, Thaksin called elections in February 2006. The opposition 
boycotted the polls and though Thaksin won unopposed parliament could not be 
called because of a technicality. The constitution requires a candidate to win at least 
20 per cent of the registered votes and as Thaksin was weak in the South, parliament 
could not be called because of a number of unfilled seats. In September 2006 in the 
face of a growing middle class mobilization against Thaksin, the army staged a coup. 
In May 2007, the Thai Rak Thai party was legally dissolved. However, the coup-
makers and the middle class did not have an answer to the basic problem that the 
party was simply a coalition of factions and these factions still had a winning strategy.  
 
In late 2007 the factions that Thaksin had put together took over a small party called 
the People’s Power Party (PPP) to contest the upcoming elections. Despite the 
absence of Thaksin, who was in exile, the PPP won the biggest number of seats and 
was just 8 short of an absolute majority. It formed a government with other parties. A 
new round of mobilizations by the urban middle class began. The middle class 
opposition appealed to the monarch, distinguished themselves as ‘yellow shirts’ (the 
royal colour) and began increasingly violent civil disobedience movements against the 
‘red shirts’ of Thaksin. In a series of moves that verged on both the farcical and the 
dangerous, the middle class, supported by the army and a resurgent bureaucracy 
struck back to remove the PPP by any means available. This included removing the 
sitting Prime Minister for appearing on a television cooking programme and accepting 
trivial expenses and working behind the scenes to prevent action against increasingly 
costly occupations of airports and government offices by the yellow shirts that 
brought the economy to its knees without any response from the law enforcement 
agencies. A series of court cases also found key Thaksin associates, Thaksin himself 
and his wife guilty of various tax evasion cases, and finally the PPP itself was 
dissolved while it was ruling as the governing party on the grounds that several of its 
MPs had engaged in electoral fraud.  
 
The remaining MPs in parliament were corralled under the Democrat Party to form a 
government in December 2008 under the likeable Oxford educated Abhisit Vijjajeya. 
Despite the external facade, this was clearly a ruling coalition set up and supported by 
powerful interests in the army and bureaucracy. They in turn were acting with the 
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support of the resurgent and increasingly class-conscious middle classes appealing to 
the monarch to save ‘the country’. Although the Democrat Party is hardly an 
authoritarian party, the ruling coalition has features of the authoritarian model in 
Figure 17. Powerful coalitions were excluded by administrative and legal means, 
backed by the threat of force. This is unlikely to be a sustainable situation. Unlike the 
1960s, the excluded factions in the rural areas and the urban poor are not likely to 
remain quiescent for very long. There are also powerful organizers who have tasted 
power and rents and it is a question of time before they begin to assert themselves.  
 
The growth-stability trade-off facing specific institutions during this transition period 
is not likely to remain relevant for long. Excluded business groups are likely to have 
increased their access to political power but it is not clear to what extent. The real 
challenge facing Thailand’s polity is how it will respond to accommodate the now 
powerful excluded factions mobilizing the rural poor, provincial elites and other 
groups that Thaksin so successfully mobilized. If business and middle class led 
political factions can incorporate them, a new variant of competitive clientelism could 
begin to emerge where rents will have to be created for a new and significant block of 
informal power. If the middle class and business interests attempt to keep this block 
out by force, Thailand could face more serious crises of adjustments in the future. The 
relevant feature of this experience of general interest is that it demonstrates the 
importance of understanding developing country politics from the perspective of 
clientelist political settlements. Political reform has to be embedded in the resolution 
of distributive conflicts based on informal power, and different mechanisms of 
addressing these problems have very different growth implications. The Thaksin 
experiment showed that an electorally unassailable ruling coalition can be constructed 
in a clientelist political settlement that has seriously adverse implications for growth.  
 
Summary 
The 2008 ‘victory’ of the Democrat Party was effectively a return to a version of an 
authoritarian ruling coalition because powerful coalitions were excluded by military-
bureaucratic interventions. In the context of an empowered rural factional structure 
and expectations of the poor, the sustainability of this ruling coalition is questionable. 
In the meantime, some of the more adverse informal institutional arrangements for 
rent capture by the ruling coalition were reversed. The growth-stability trade-off is 
less adverse for the operation of the institutional arrangements of competitive entry 
for high capability firms compared to the dominant party period. But the political 
settlement is vulnerable to the emergence of new conflicts as powerful factions were 
excluded by administrative mechanisms.  
 
9. Maharashtra: From Dominant Party to Competitive Clientelism 
Maharashtra’s strong position in manufacturing in India has a history that goes back 
to the development of the Bombay textile industry in the mid-nineteenth century 
(Khan 2008). The location of much of early industrial production in Bombay (later 
called Mumbai) meant that Maharashtra acquired at a very early stage the biggest 
concentration of industrial capitalists from all over India. This created a relatively 
sophisticated capitalist class in the state that was soon closely networked into the 
factional structures of the Congress Party even before independence in 1947. But it 
also created tensions with the indigenous Marathi speaking population who were not 
well-represented amongst the industrial capitalists. For a time, the Congress dominant 
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party system managed to square this circle by combining a successful factional 
strategy that gave it the rural vote while remaining responsive to and strongly 
supportive of politically powerful urban capitalist interests. But by the late 1980s the 
dominant party ruling coalition began to fall apart. Tensions had begun to grow much 
earlier with the growing mobilization of groups who were excluded by the Congress 
factional compromises. But now opposition parties like the BJP and Shiv Sena began 
to capitalize on and organize the excluded groups, making significant gains in the 
1989 elections. In 1995 Congress lost the state Assembly elections and in 1996 the 
Lok Sabha (national assembly) elections, marking the end of the dominant party 
system. Though Congress eventually made a comeback, the Maharashtrian political 
system is now much more fragmented, with coalitions and alliances of parties ruling 
in a competitive clientelist structure.  
 
To a large extent the collapse of the dominant party ruling coalition in Maharashtra 
mirrors the fate of the Congress as a dominant party across India. The exponential 
growth in the organizational power of excluded groups across India from the 1960s 
onwards created strains that the Congress dominant party structure could not 
accommodate. From the end of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency which saw Congress lose 
power at the centre for the first time in 1977, the dominant party structure was 
effectively over, and variants of competitive clientelism begin to emerge both at the 
centre and in most states in India. However, the class origins and organization of the 
excluded groups differ significantly across India, as does the political strength and 
capabilities of the capitalist classes. In terms of our classification of characteristics of 
the political settlement, Maharashtra moved from a dominant party system with 
technologically advanced and politically well-connected capitalists to a competitive 
clientelist system where the capitalists retained their political power and access.  
 
Unlike Thailand, in Maharashtra competitive clientelism achieved a less favourable 
political settlement from the perspective of growth compared to the possibilities under 
the Congress dominant party system. This shows once again the non-linear 
relationships between institutional and political settlement variables. The difference 
emerges because in Maharashtra capitalists were politically powerful and had close 
access to the ruling coalitions in both the dominant party and the competitive 
clientelist periods. But in the former, the longer time horizon of political leaders 
allowed both sides to follow informal rules of resource allocation that were more 
conducive for long-term investments. With the advent of competitive clientelism the 
business relationships with politicians were more difficult to convert into informal but 
long-term arrangements of mutual support and this resulted in less favourable 
institutional arrangements from the perspective of growth. The changes in the political 
settlement and the implications for institutional efficiency and growth-stability trade-
offs closely coincide with the changes in the rents affecting the productive sector in 
Maharashtra. The broad features of the evolution of the political settlement in 
Maharashtra are summarized in Figure 21 and discussed in subsequent sections. 
Readers should also refer to Figure 26 in the Appendix reproduced from Khan (2008).  
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Figure 21 Evolution of Political Settlement in Contemporary Maharashtra  
 
The Congress Dominant Party System: 1947-1980s 
The Indian National Congress was organized as an inclusive party to fight for Indian 
independence. Its aim was to include all relevant factions within one umbrella such 
that the excluded were not significant for the maintenance of political stability or the 
achievement of economic goals. The strategy of inclusion was never perfect and 
indeed failed to satisfy many significant minorities, most importantly the Muslims 
who lived in Muslim-minority provinces of India. The growing discontent of these 
factions was organized in the Muslim League, which originally operated as a group 
within the Congress. The demand for Pakistan came from Muslim political elites in 
central and western India where Muslims were a minority. In particular, Jinnah used 
the demand for Pakistan as a bargaining tool to try and achieve a guarantee of 
federalism which he believed would ensure that Muslims all over India could exercise 
significant voice in an independent India (Jalal 1985: 258). When Nehru and the 
Congress Party failed to reach an agreement with Jinnah along these lines, and 
particularly after Nehru rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan proposal for a federal 
structure for India in 1946, Pakistan suddenly became inevitable. After this 
catastrophic and possibly avoidable failure of inclusion, Congress was nevertheless 
able to recover its inclusive strategy in post-independence India.  
 
The trauma of partition probably made Congress much more sensitive to the costs of 
ignoring demands of factional leaders mobilizing significant constituencies on 
grounds of exclusion. As early as the 1950s, Nehru gave in to demands for a linguistic 
reorganization of Indian states even though initially he had been reluctant to concede 
linguistic identities on the grounds that this would create competing identities. 
Nevertheless, once the principle was conceded, the unwieldy bilingual state of 
Bombay, the successor of the even bigger Bombay Presidency of the British, became 
an obvious target for reorganization. The northern Gujarati speaking part was poorer 
but Gujarati traders and businessmen were more advanced and entrenched in Bombay 
city compared to those from the southern Marathi speaking part of the state which 
claimed Bombay as its own. Indeed, Bombay as one of the earliest hubs of capitalist 
development in India was home to businesses from all over India, with a significant 
presence of Parsis and Marwaris in the business community and working people from 
virtually everywhere. But Marathi business was relatively much less developed. 
 
Given the significant gap between the sources of economic and political power in the 
state, Congress was remarkably successful in constructing a strategy of incorporating 
the Marathi intermediate classes in its political structure. This allowed Congress to 
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continue as the dominant party after Maharashtra emerged as a linguistic state on 1st 
May 1960. Its strategy was helped by the caste composition of the Marathi 
population, which had a significant intermediate caste that Congress successfully 
targeted as its organizational constituency. Congress remained the dominant party in 
Bombay and then Maharashtra from 1947 till the late 1980s, with a brief spell out of 
power after Indira’s Emergency ended in Congress defeats between 1978 and 1980. 
By the late 1980s powerful factions had been organized outside the Congress Party 
who posed credible threats to Congress rule. The dominant party system was clearly 
coming to an end.  
 
The salience of caste in Indian politics is that political organizers from a particular 
caste find it easier and cheaper (in terms of the rents it is necessary to deliver) to 
organize people of their own caste. If the caste structure is itself very fragmented, it 
makes the organization of factions somewhat more difficult in terms of transaction 
costs. In the 1930s, before the advent of electoral politics, the Congress Party in 
Bombay-Maharashtra, as in many parts of India was dominated by the tiny Brahmin 
caste. In modern Maharashtra, Brahmins are barely four percent of the population. 
But by the mid-1930s as electoral politics began, the Congress had to find a 
leadership that could organize and mobilize potential voters. The next rung of the 
caste hierarchy in Maharashtra consists of an agrarian intermediate caste called the 
Marathas (not to be confused with Marathi as a language) and the slightly lower-
status but closely related Kunbis. The Maratha-Kunbi group alone accounts for over 
30 per cent of the population. With such a significant intermediate class group that 
could serve as organizers and faction leaders, it was obvious where Congress would 
have to focus to construct its factions for a dominant party. In addition, the most 
famous Maratha in history was Shivaji, the seventeenth century warrior who fought 
against the Mughal Empire in Delhi and asserted for a while the dream of Maratha 
supremacy across India. The Marathas were therefore the obvious social group to 
provide Congress its faction leaders (Palshikar and Deshpande 1999).  
 
By wooing leaders from the Maratha-Kunbi caste, Congress built up a class of faction 
leaders who could potentially deliver the ‘bahujan samaj’ or ordinary folk (though the 
term often excludes dalits as a special category). The faction-building strategy was 
particularly successful because the Congress also had access to significant informal 
funds that it could use for the informal distribution networks on which patron-client 
factions are based. These funds came from the organization of sugar cooperatives in 
the state from the 1950s onwards (Banerjee, et al. 2001; Roy 2010). Maharashtra is 
India’s biggest sugar producing state, producing about a third of the national output, 
and over 90 per cent of this comes from the cooperatives. These were set up to help 
small producers, who were previously captive to local private monopsonies as there 
are significant scale economies in sugar crushing and refining and sugarcane needs to 
be crushed soon after harvest. The cooperatives were set up to be monopsonies that 
were controlled by small farmers and would in theory offer the best prices. 
 
However, as we would expect, those with the greatest organizational power in the 
local economy end up controlling the cooperatives. The people who control the 
cooperatives turn out to be the intermediate class Maratha organizers on whose 
capabilities Congress began to depend. Control over the cooperatives provided 
significant sources of rents for the organizers as long as they received informal 
institutional support from the ruling coalition. Support from the ruling coalition was 
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necessary because the cooperatives were tightly regulated by government. With this 
support, the cooperative leadership could first set a purchase price of cane at a low 
enough level to leave large implicit rents remain in their hands. The buying price was 
a bargaining game between the leadership and small farmer members. There were 
limits to how low the price could be set because the leadership also required 
recognition as leaders. But the price would not be so high that no rents existed.  
 
A further source of rents comes from the fact that the cooperatives raise their working 
capital from the state’s district cooperative banks. The ruling coalition controls these 
banks and some senior politicians sit on their boards. Repayment of loans is 
traditionally not very good because of the many uses that are made of cooperative 
funds. By 2007, of the 182 sugar cooperative factories, nearly 40 percent were losing 
money and finding it difficult to service their loans (Kaur 2007). However, with good 
political connections cooperatives can keep going. The sugar cooperative leaders were 
expected to use these rents both to satisfy themselves as well as to deliver significant 
vote banks that ensured Congress victories in the countryside, and therefore political 
power in the state as a whole. This created strong incentives for loyalty to the 
Congress and created a stable ruling coalition as long as the coalitions excluded by 
these arrangements remained weak. 
 
Not only were the financial rents from the cooperatives used to fund the personal and 
political ambitions of cooperative leaders, the capital equipment of cooperatives like 
cars and trucks were openly used in election campaigns. Between the 1960s and 
1980s, one sugar factory (cooperative) provided 200 trucks, 100 cars and various 
other vehicles for the election campaign of the local Congress MP (Sirsikar 1995: 
121). The Congress Party would also have access to the manpower of the cooperatives 
during election campaigns with all the costs being covered by the cooperative 
(Sirsikar 1995: 86). In addition, the fact that the leaders of the cooperative supported 
or were standing for election on Congress tickets made it very unlikely that too many 
of the thousands of small farmers in a cooperative and their families would vote any 
other way. Most of the leading Congress Party leaders of the time including Sharad 
Pawar and Vasandada Patil were closely associated with the sugar cooperatives. Just 
one of the cooperatives controlled by Sharad Pawar, the Malegaon Sugar Factory, has 
ten thousand member families, with the typical factory having twenty thousand (Roy 
2010). Congress rule in Maharashtra appeared to be impregnable. 
 
The construction of this successful dominant party ruling coalition based on caste and 
sugar rents had a different outcome in Maharashtra compared to Thailand’s dominant 
party experience because the well-established capitalists of Maharashtra continued to 
maintain strong links to the heart of political power. Here, the political stability that 
the Congress enjoyed allowed long-term relationships to be developed between 
individual Congress politicians and big capitalists in Mumbai. This was a continuation 
of a long tradition in Bombay Presidency politics where politicians provided licenses 
and favours to capitalists and in exchange capitalists kicked back benefits over time. 
As long as the relationship was a long-term one and capitalists were under no pressure 
to kickback large amounts immediately, the informal relationships were potentially 
and in many cases actually very productive. They allowed capitalists to engage in 
long-term investments and provided politicians with growing assets to call upon in the 
future. These features of the political settlement in Maharashtra can explain the 
dynamism it enjoyed in industrial growth all through the 1950s to the late 1980s. The 
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major rent allocations that were consistent with that growth are summarized in the 
first two rows of Figure 26 in our Appendix. 
 
The long term informal relationships between politicians and businessmen were more 
important than the formal structure of licensing in explaining Maharashtra’s much 
greater success in industrial growth from 1950 to 1980. The allocation of formal 
licenses was in fact guided by informal processes within the licensing system, and 
Maharashtrian business was much more successful in getting more than their share of 
India’s industrial development licenses during the license raj period (Khan 2008). The 
political settlement in Maharashtra can explain why formal institutions worked so 
effectively in Maharashtra’s favour during this period. The informal exercise of power 
that allowed Maharashtrian business to get these formal rents was an important, if 
hidden, part of the story. Perhaps even more interestingly, the long-term informal 
relationships that were possible in Maharashtra because of its political settlement 
allowed business to plan long term. Big business houses like Ambani and Bajaj had 
close links with politicians but could take long-term investment decisions because 
their relationships with their politician networks were themselves long-term. 
Moreover, as we outlined in Khan (2008), big business benefited enormously from the 
clustering and supply chains that were made possible by the strong intervention of 
bodies like the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) that made 
available high quality land and infrastructure for industrial clusters to develop.  
 
These characteristics of the political settlement can explain why a number of critical 
formal and informal institutions worked in growth-enhancing ways in Maharashtra 
from the 1950s right to the 1980s. These institutions provided significant investment 
opportunities to established capitalists and facilitated clustering and other linkages 
through land acquisition and infrastructure provision. Their implementation was not 
threatening the distributive interests of any powerful coalition, and indeed could 
further the mutual interests of dominant capitalists and politicians. We would 
therefore expect their implementation to be relatively efficient and that they would 
face very flat growth-stability trade-off curves. However, moving beyond resource 
provision and the facilitation of investment to active industrial policy was not likely 
with this political settlement given the adverse growth-stability trade-offs such 
interventions would be likely to face. The very networks that worked to facilitate 
licensing and land acquisition would stand in the way of effective disciplining.  
 
This is one reason why the failure of the industrial policy regime in India is often 
misunderstood. The introduction of industrial policy was from the beginning 
undertaken with the active participation of capitalists. Indeed the Bombay Plan 
published in 1944 by seven leading Indian industrialists outlined the initial strategy of 
state support that they envisaged would assist India to industrialize. The close 
networks of Indian capitalists with politicians and bureaucrats ensured that the 
introduction of the capacity development and investment aspects of industrial 
planning would be relatively easy, but if the state ever attempted to enforce discipline 
the growth-stability trade-off could become very adverse. The characteristics of the 
political settlement would ensure that many politicians would assist in blocking the 




Once again, Figure 13 can help to explain the relative success of the expansionist 
aspects of industrial policy because the implementation of this part of industrial policy 
compromised with and indeed was driven by the interests of powerful capitalists. Yet, 
these very compromises ensured that the transition costs facing institutions attempting 
to discipline and ensure productivity growth would be very high. In Maharashtra, the 
political settlement was particularly conducive for the accumulation and expansion 
aspects of industrial policy. Its political settlement enabled the state to benefit the 
most from the national licensing policy. The fact that some of its capitalists were 
significantly sophisticated meant that in some pockets Maharashtra would eventually 
achieve global competitiveness. But the disciplining aspects of industrial policy were 
not attempted in Maharashtra or indeed anywhere else in India. 
 
Summary  
The relatively effective implementation of the formal and informal interventions that 
supported growth in Maharashtra till the late 1980s (summarized in Figure 26) are 
explained by the characteristics of its political settlement. Both during the licensing 
period and afterwards, till the late 1980s, Maharashtra had a political settlement where 
a dominant party coalition enjoyed stability because of the way in which the ruling 
coalition was constructed. In addition, the political power and access to particular 
politicians enjoyed by a sophisticated and organized capitalist class based around 
Mumbai ensured that growth-enhancing institutions were possible and would be in the 
interests of the ruling coalition. The political settlement explains why the formal and 
informal institutional arrangements supporting extensive growth were delivered at 
little cost in terms of political stability and were well-enforced.  
 
The Rise of Competitive Clientelism 1990- 
The stability of the dominant party was undermined by economic and demographic 
changes that altered the distribution of power between classes and groups in 
Maharashtrian society. This then allowed excluded political factions to enhance their 
organizational power by mobilizing and organizing these excluded groups. The sugar 
cooperatives did not do much for the overall poverty of Maharashtra’s agriculture and 
absolute poverty in the state remained worse than the national average in the 1980s 
despite its overall wealth due to its industrial and service sectors (Khan 2008). The 
Maratha caste itself was becoming increasingly divided and those who were not 
directly benefiting from Congress rent strategies were looking for other organizations 
to support. Below the Marathas, other castes became restive, known collectively as 
Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and below them the Dalits as well. The pull of so 
many different forces and organizations demanding inclusion could not be 
accommodated by the Congress system.  
 
In the 1970s Indira Gandhi precipitated the decline of the ruling dominant party 
coalition by attacking the mainstream Maratha hold over the state Congress Party. As 
in other parts of India, her strategy in Maharashtra was to support factions (in this 
case the marginal Maratha leader S.B. Chavan) against powerful factions (Y.B. 
Chavan and sugar cooperative bosses like Vasantdada Patil) (Palshikar and 
Deshpande 1999). This was partly because the growing voices of the excluded were 
getting stronger, partly because Indira wanted to be the arbiter of state-level conflicts 
in the fashion of older divide and rule strategies. In the end, the growing confusion 
across India led to the Emergency of 1975-77. After that, the Maharashtra Congress 
split and the government from 1978 to 1980 was led by Congress defectors including 
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Sharad Pawar. When Indira Gandhi returned in 1980 she dismissed the state 
government and imposed her own non-Maratha loyalists. As the Maratha coalition 
split, other castes and social mobilizations entered the social fray. 
 
The coming together of two Hindu fundamentalist forces, the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) and the Shiv Sena (SS) provided the strongest challenge to the Congress 
because these two parties appealed to very different Hindu constituencies. The BJP 
appealed to the upper castes and the more educated middle class voters, many urban, 
who were dissatisfied with the corruption of Congress and who also wanted a Hindu 
cultural and political revival. The SS in contrast appealed to a much lower group of 
social discontent, ranging from disgruntled lower-level Marathas and Kunbis, the 
OBC urban poor, the urban unemployed and even gangsters and the underworld. This 
was a new kind of politics that openly combined violence and gangsterism, and 
generated rents from activities like slum clearance. It openly used a demonization of 
Muslims to mobilize Hindus, but was also against Dalits because many were 
Buddhists (Katzenstein, et al. 1997). It also openly celebrated violence and proudly 
declared, for instance, that it had orchestrated the January 1993 anti-Muslim riots in 
Mumbai which created 200,000 internally displaced people (Lele 1995).  
 
The combination of the two forces created a significant challenge for Congress in the 
late 1980s. Its hold was now based on a fine balance of factional forces and could be 
upset by relatively small re-allocations of factional support or voting choices of 
electors. The 1995 state assembly elections and the 1996 national Lok Sabha elections 
were both won by the BJP-SS coalition. While Congress came back in 1998, it was a 
different, coalition-dependent Congress. The political settlement acquired and has 
retained all the characteristics of the competitive clientelism described in Figure 17. 
Capitalists have retained their political capabilities and now operate through factions 
in different parties, instead of the same one. While this may appear not to have 
changed things very fundamentally, it has actually had some important effects.  
 
Neither capitalists nor their political allies can afford any longer to take very long-
term bets. The result is that business-government relationships are now less about 
long-term investments in industry and more likely to be about urban property 
development or the allocation of infrastructure construction contracts where rents and 
kickbacks are rapidly achieved. The gradual shift of sectoral specialization in 
Maharashtra towards a much greater emphasis on services happens exactly in the 
1990s. This could partly be because the institutional structures required for assisting 
productivity growth and technology acquisition in industry were in any case weak. 
But in addition, the long-term informal arrangements backing investment strategies 
that were possible under the dominant party political settlement now lack credibility. 
If Maharashtra’s politics remains fragmented and competitive this may have 
important implications for its ability to sustain historical patterns of industrial growth 
without significant changes in its institutional structure that are effective in the new 
political settlement.  
 
Summary 
The social and economic changes that led to a growth of organizational capabilities 
outside the ruling coalition could not be accommodated by the Congress Party. Its 
failure to move rapidly enough allowed its competitors, particularly in Hindu 
fundamentalist parties, to make big inroads into Maharashtrian politics. The political 
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settlement changed to one of a ruling coalition that faces competitive clientelism. The 
political power of capitalists in Maharashtra and their technological sophistication 
remained constant or even increased. Nevertheless, the new political settlement made 
unworkable many of the informal arrangements through which industrial capital 
operated in Maharashtra. The effectiveness of these institutional arrangements 
declined, and short-term rent appropriation became easier and more attractive. The 
growth-stability trade-off became relatively adverse, enabling damaging rents to be 
more easily created, while the informal institutions that supported growth have 
become more difficult to sustain. 
 
10. West Bengal: The Limits of a Progressive Dominant Party 
The partition of India had traumatic effects on West Bengal and Bangladesh as 
Bengal was partitioned (along with Punjab). At that time, Bengal was ranked equal to 
the Bombay Presidency in terms of industrial development. But partition had deep 
and lasting effects not only on trade and inter-sectoral links, but also on class and 
organizational evolution whose political effects are still unfolding. Initially, West 
Bengal appeared to have come out better because it inherited Calcutta (now Kolkata) 
and the industrial base around it. Bangladesh was entirely an agricultural hinterland. 
But fifty years later, West Bengal had dropped down the state list in India in terms of 
industrial development to near the bottom of the big states and its per capita income in 
2010 is barely above that of Bangladesh. The political settlement as it developed in 
West Bengal has a role to play in explaining its relative decline, and partition has a 
role in understanding its evolution.  
 
Congress failed to construct a dominant party coalition in Bengal, either before or 
after partition. One reason for this was that unlike Maharashtra, the intermediate 
classes in Bengal did not belong to a single coherent Hindu caste which could be 
mobilized to organize political stability. The majority of the Bengal peasantry, 
including the rich peasantry, had converted to Islam. Islamic influences in Bengal are 
noted from the tenth century, but significant numbers of Muslims are only referred to 
from the sixteenth. The first British census in Bengal in 1872 established the presence 
of a Muslim majority in Bengal, but concentrated in the East (Eaton 1993: 113-34). 
The growth of intermediate class peasant mobilizations in Bengal in the early 
twentieth century involved in the main the Muslim East, where agrarian Bengal was 
concentrated. The Hindu intermediate castes were, of course, also mobilized. But 
unlike Maharashtra, the Hindu intermediate castes were themselves fragmented. 
While some of these intermediate castes had significant numbers in particular 
districts, no particular Hindu intermediate caste had significant numbers across the 
province as a whole. Moreover, and again unlike Maharashtra, castes below the 
intermediate were well-organized in Bengal, and fragmented into different groups. 
These were the Scheduled Castes, the equivalent of the dalits in Maharashtra 
(Chatterjee 1997: 69-80).  
 
The organization of an inclusive dominant coalition of intermediate class organizers 
which were split up in these complex ways did not add up to an acceptable equation 
within the Congress Party. Given the fragmentation of the Hindu intermediate castes 
and the overall Muslim majority, the equivalent of a Maratha base would have put 
Muslims in a dominant position within the Congress. Unlike the Marathas who were 
antagonistic to Brahmin dominance in the Maharashtra Congress, Hindu Bengali 
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intermediate castes were willing to work under the leadership of upper castes in the 
Bengal Congress. The Muslims apparently were not and the Muslim political 
leadership of Bengal exited from the Congress as early as the 1920s. Paradoxically, 
this further strengthened the Hindu upper caste control of the Congress because they 
were now dominant in the numerous East Bengal districts even though without the 
Muslim intermediate class faction leaders Congress had little effective power in these 
districts (Chatterjee 1997: 79). 
 
The departing Muslim intermediate class leadership did not initiate separatist or 
religious political parties. Their secular Krishok Proja (or Peasants) Party represented 
typical middle and rich peasant interests (against the zamindari landlords in the first 
instance) and provided a platform for organizers from the Muslim intermediate 
classes to organize their own upward mobility (Umar 1980a, 1980b; Rahman and 
Azad 1990; Hashmi 1994). The Muslim rich peasants were not interested in 
separatism or partition because in the limited democracy that was allowed after 1935, 
their electoral advantage allowed their party, the Krishok Proja Party to form 
governments in Bengal. The partition of Bengal in 1947 was largely the result of all-
India events and the failure of negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim 
League. The latter mostly represented Muslims in the Muslim-minority provinces of 
India. Nehru’s failure to continue negotiations on the basis of the Cabinet Mission 
Plan, the final federal deal that could have averted partition, resulted in a panic within 
the League. At that critical juncture, the absence in Bengal of an inclusive 
organization incorporating powerful organizers from both communities had a 
significant role to play in allowing the panic and rioting to go out of control in 1946. 
In the violence that followed, partition briefly became a desirable outcome, but one 
with many negative long-term ramifications. 
 
The departure of the Muslim intermediate classes in 1947 should have left West 
Bengal with a simpler task of organizing a ruling coalition. But this was not the case. 
Constructing a dominant party in a clientelist political settlement requires some 
mechanism for identifying a limited number of organizationally powerful leaders who 
are able to effectively organize political stability. Too few and political stability 
becomes problematic. Too many and the coalition has insufficient rents to distribute 
and starts to break up. Moreover, for a stable dominant party, the excluded faction 
leaders must be unable to organize enough power to threaten the ruling coalition. 
Congress found it much more difficult in West Bengal (compared to Maharashtra) to 
construct a dominant party with a clearly defined group of insider leaders who could 
provide it with even a few decades of stability. A number of features of the class and 
caste organization of West Bengal can help to explain this.  
 
First, caste and class did not map very neatly in Bengal. If the upper caste Hindus 
(less than ten per cent of the population) had been closely associated with a landlord 
identity, the rich peasant intermediate castes could have united against them to form a 
dominant ruling coalition. The economics of landlordism had disappeared anyway, 
but the upper castes, certainly in the important conurbation of Kolkata, did not even 
have a landlord identity. They were typically educated professionals and 
administrators, the proverbial bhodrolok or gentlefolk of Bengal. Hindu upper caste 
faction leaders in Bengal, unlike most other places in India, provided effective and 
legitimate leadership to all types of movements, including anti-landlord movements 
representing intermediate class or working class interests. But the loss of East Bengal 
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paradoxically weakened the upper caste leadership of Congress as their strength was 
based on their control of the defunct Congress organizations in the East.  
 
Secondly, the complex mix of upper and intermediate castes that had organizational 
power in West Bengal did not provide clear markers about how to identify the 
dominant insiders and outsiders in the ruling coalition. Even competitive clientelism 
requires the identification of two or more factional ‘tribes’ who can each try to cobble 
together viable ruling coalitions. These markers did not exist in the chaos following 
partition so the selection of insiders and the resources they could demand required 
much negotiation. These features of caste and class help to explain why the West 
Bengal Congress found it so difficult to construct a stable dominant party. It also 
explains why caste politics never played the same role in defining ruling coalitions in 
West Bengal as it did in most other Indian states.  
 
On the other hand, the departure of the Krishok Proja Party and the Muslim League 
meant that most factional organizers were now affiliated to the Congress so only a 
Congress government was likely. Secondly, the weakening of the Kolkata-based 
upper caste Congress leadership (as a result of the loss of their power base in the East) 
allowed rich peasant leaderships in West Bengal districts (with mixed caste 
leadership) to assert themselves. The result was a period of intense faction fighting 
through which a distribution of power and rents was achieved within the Congress 
and allowed it to operate for a while as a weak dominant party. These internal 
compromises were not based on caste, ideological or other markers and were 
therefore necessarily vulnerable to constant renegotiation. Congress continued to 
operate as a weak dominant party ruling coalition in West Bengal till the mid-1970s. 
Towards the end it was collapsing into competitive clientelism and a brief attempt at 
authoritarianism under Indira’s Emergency finally destroyed the Congress hold on 
power. In 1977 a new dominant party, the Communist Party (Marxist) or CPM, 
emerged. This was a new phenomenon: a progressive dominant party voted in again 
and again for more than three decades.  
 
Throughout this period, the political power of big capitalists remained weak and 
declined over time, in contrast to Maharashtra. As in Maharashtra, the dominant big 
capitalists in West Bengal were not ethnically from the state. But in Maharashtra 
capitalists initially had long-term relationships with Congress politicians and the latter 
typically played an important role in the national Congress party. This was not the 
case in West Bengal. Congress politicians in Bengal did not have a significant 
presence at the centre, and were in any case too busy keeping a weak coalition 
together. Long-term relationships between Congress politicians and business houses 
were therefore less in evidence compared to Maharashtra. With the advent of the 
CPM, with its focus on an agrarian constituency, the access of business to political 
power declined further. This aspect of the political settlement meant that the dominant 
party system in West Bengal was much less successful in developing long-term 
informal relationships with business. The broad features of the evolution of the 
political settlement in West Bengal are summarized in Figure 22 and discussed in 
subsequent sections. Readers should also refer to Figure 27 in the Appendix 
reproduced from Khan (2008) which summarizes aspects of governance and rents 
linked to the evolution of the political settlement.  
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Figure 22 Evolution of Political Settlement in Contemporary West Bengal  
 
The (Weak) Congress Dominant Party System: 1947-1970s 
It took skilled Congress tacticians like Atulya Ghosh several years of horse-trading, 
bargaining and reorganizing the party internally to achieve a modicum of stability as a 
dominant party by 1949. The distribution of power between factions had radically 
changed with the partition of the province, new expectations and mobilizations had 
emerged and the province was faced with the economic and political incorporation of 
a mass of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan. Although there were obviously 
incidents of violence against Muslims in West Bengal, post-partition violence was 
significantly less than in Indian Punjab. As a result there was no wholesale migration 
of Bengali Muslims to Pakistan on the scale seen in western India. Indeed, the 
significant population transfers to East Pakistan came from Bihar and other Indian 
states further to the west. The Hindu Bengali bhodrolok had voted to partition Bengal 
because they could not envisage living under the political rule of the intermediate 
classes of the East (Chatterji 1995). But their subsequent actions show that they did 
not harbour any deeper resentment of the Muslims and they certainly did not attempt 
to carry out any ethnic cleansing. 
 
Congress’s immediate problem was to accommodate the large numbers of Hindu 
migrants from the East who left because they felt threatened by the fact that Pakistan 
was emerging as an Islamic Republic. The hold on power of emerging Congress 
leaders was relatively weak because the new coalitions within the Congress were not 
very stable. A further problem was that the Bengal Congress had been treated with 
suspicion by the centre, and particularly by Nehru and Gandhi, ever since their 
conflict with Subhas Chandra Bose in the 1930s. There were few senior Bengal 
Congress politicians who were close to the centre in the early days. From the 
perspective of Bengal’s Congress politicians in these early days, nurturing and 
developing long-term relationships with business interests was not their immediate 
priority. The internal weakness of the Congress coalitions is demonstrated by the 
collapse of these arrangements by the late 1960s and the emergence of open 
competition between competing factions along the lines of competitive clientelism. 
 
From the perspective of big businesses, which were mostly run by non-Bengalis, local 
Congress politicians appeared to be too weak and not very influential at the centre. 
Big business focused their efforts on achieving direct links with central politicians but 
already began to feel distant from the mechanisms of state-level power. Interestingly, 
the smaller-scale Bengali capitalist class was also slow to develop and was not 
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significantly assisted by state policies. The West Bengal Industrial Development 
Corporation, the WBIDC (unlike its equivalent the MIDC in Maharashtra) was not 
backed by Congress politicians to promote industrial zones and encourage the 
clustering of small businesses which the big business houses could draw on.  
 
The contrast with the dominant Congress coalition in Maharashtra is therefore 
significant. In Maharashtra, Congress discovered a stable winning formula based on 
caste and sugar rents to sustain a dominant coalition in power through the 1960s and 
1970s. This left Congress politicians free to pursue longer term interests, nurture long-
term relationships with businessmen (which already existed) and use institutions like 
the MIDC to further enhance the profitability of business and their own long-term 
access to rents. In West Bengal, Congress also cobbled together a dominant party 
coalition but it was not based on a neat arrangement. The internal arrangements were 
more fluid, based on shifting allocations of different types of rents to different rural 
coalitions. Factional leaders did not have the long-term security to develop long-term 
relationships with business (Bengali or otherwise) and there was therefore no 
motivation to use collective political authority to develop local capitalism using 
institutions like the WBIDC.  
 
This combination of characteristics of the political settlement can explain why West 
Bengal politicians did not try to or did not actually succeed in aggressively getting 
licenses for businesses based in the state. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, West 
Bengal got around half the industrial licenses that went to Maharashtra, despite both 
states having equally big industrial bases in 1947 (Khan 2008). The ruling coalition 
was not only too weak to achieve any significant industrial policy interventions, it was 
too weak relative to the central government and too weakly connected with local 
business to have a credible strategy of enhancing state-level accumulation. They 
failed to get a fair share of implicit central government subsidies attached to industrial 
licenses. They also showed little interest in developing formal or informal institutions 
to accelerate the development of a Bengali capitalist class.  
 
Congress dominance in West Bengal collapsed a decade before it did in Maharashtra. 
It was precipitated by the growing inability of Congress to respond to rural poverty 
and the growing violence coming from the Naxal uprising. In 1967 Congress was 
defeated by a United Front which included the CPM and a breakaway faction of the 
Congress called the Bangla Congress which represented middle peasant interests. But 
this loose coalition collapsed in 1970. Another loose coalition of some of the same 
parties again collapsed in 1971. The 1972 elections brought the Congress back to 
power in an election that was widely felt to have been extensively rigged. Naxal 
violence continued to escalate and Indira Gandhi’s Emergency in 1975 was a last 
authoritarian attempt to preserve Congress rule. It marked a symbolic turning point in 
West Bengal. The 1977 elections saw a resounding victory for the CPM-led Left 
Front. Congress would be out of power for at least the next three decades and even 
after the Left Front started weakening in 2010, the Congress on its own is nowhere 
close to having the support necessary to form a government again.  
 
Summary 
The Congress dominant party system from 1947 till its final collapse in the 1970s was 
internally weak, weakly connected to the centre and weakly connected to business 
interests. It could not influence the informal institutional arrangements through which 
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industrial licenses were allocated by the centre. The growth-stability trade-off was 
adverse in the sense that if the state leadership pushed big business interests through 
formal institutions they would very likely confront opposition from internal factions 
desperate to capture rents for their own survival, and would possibly have to confront 
powerful interests in central government who were allocating licenses to their clients 
in other states. Big business did not invest much in building long-term relationships 
with local Congress politicians either, and were already looking elsewhere for their 
long-term locational decisions.  
 
The CPM: A Progressive Dominant Party 1977- 
The CPM represents a number of paradoxes that are relevant for understanding the 
political settlement during its long tenure. It was a Communist Party with an 
ideological commitment to revolution that was repeatedly voted in by election. 
Despite its significant electoral mandate it did not try very hard to change the 
distribution of assets or power in ways that could be described as revolutionary. Yet, 
with rather limited implementation of land reform legislation and the registration of 
sharecroppers, it appeared to get the undying loyalty of the poor for over three 
decades. It operated what appeared to be a modern disciplined party machine in a 
social context where power and personal relationships were dominant organizational 
forces. It is the last that is of greatest significance for us, and understanding this 
paradox a little better can help to shed light on the other questions. 
 
These paradoxes can be understood by recognizing that at its grassroots level the 
CPM could not be acting in a way that was entirely contrary to the requirements of 
operating in a clientelist political settlement. Its party organizers mobilized power by 
organizing supporters at the village level in the same way as other faction leaders 
would do. They also used this power to act in ways that informally changed the way 
formal institutions operated, or to enforce formal institutions (such as land ceiling 
legislation) better using this informal power. The use of power as an instrument to 
create and capture rents for organizers and supporters is of course the typical 
characteristic of a political organization in a clientelist political settlement. The CPM 
shared all of these characteristics with any other party operating in such a context.  
 
But there were significant differences as well. Ideology matters and the ideological 
label that the CPM used to distinguish its ruling coalition from others was initially 
very useful in creating a dominant party coalition that was big enough to rule (and 
with enough support to keep winning elections), but not so big that all potential 
organizers could join. Its ideology also determined its primary clients and this was 
important in empowering large sections of the poor as clients who benefited from the 
protection and mobilization that CPM cadres offered. By incorporating a significant 
chunk of rural middle caste and bhodrolok organizers into a single party, the CPM 
achieved significant political stability and was more successful in countering violence 
against the poor and against minorities than most other Indian states. However, its 
huge base in rural middle-peasant organizers also limited its economic strategies in a 
negative way, and we will turn to this problem later. And finally, the CPM was also a 
disciplined and modern party machine that combined very modern aspects of 
organization with an ability to penetrate and operate in rural power structures. It was 
this combination of modernity with a ‘traditional’ ability to play rural power games 
that gave the CPM incredible longevity as a progressive dominant party structure. 
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In his detailed analysis of the operation of the CPM in the Burdwan district of West 
Bengal in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ruud (1994) provides many examples of the 
ways in which the party combined aspects of the informal organization of power in 
what we describe as a clientelist political settlement with new elements of Marxist 
ideology and modern party organization. The party’s cadres or core organizers were 
obviously from the socially powerful intermediate classes as only these individuals 
had the organizational capabilities, education and indeed the free time and resources 
to invest in political and organizational activity. Party organizers in this case had their 
close followers but they also appealed to a broader category of the poor to become 
clients and provide significant organizational power to the faction. The poor would 
benefit because the party could deploy power to solve their legal and formal 
institutional problems. For instance, if the faction could deploy hundreds of peasants 
armed with sticks, the organization could be used to gherao (surround) landlords who 
were not complying with existing laws recognizing sharecropper rights or land 
ceilings. The organization could also be used to gherao police officers who were 
refusing to enforce the formal law.  
 
These and other examples demonstrate how at the grass-root level the party mobilized 
informal power primarily to resolve conflicts in favour of supporters and often to 
enforce formal laws when its clients were adversely affected. Its appeal to the poorer 
peasants who were mobilized was that belonging to this faction would offer them 
greater protection as well as rents through the marginally better enforcement of formal 
laws, or through the resolution of their conflicts in ways advantageous to party 
supporters. In a general context of poorly defined rights, there was plenty of scope for 
that. It was the deployment of informal power in these ways rather than changing 
formal laws or rights that provided the party with its support. The details of Marxist 
theory also mattered little, except that the overall thrust of policy was to organize the 
poorer to protect them against the richer. But this did not necessarily stop horizontal 
conflicts frequently being resolved in favour of party supporters. The operation of the 
party as an effective organizer of power can help to explain why its policies were not 
revolutionary and yet attracted a large factional loyalty from the poor for so long.  
 
What is missing from Ruud’s story is what the organizers and faction leaders got from 
the party. Some were no doubt motivated by a social conscience and a core of 
supporters came from the party’s revolutionary and idealistic past. But the party also 
rapidly grew in the context of the election victories of 1967 and 1971. For instance, 
from 1968 to 1969, party membership more than doubled from around 10,000 to 
23,000 (Ruud 1994: 366). As older party cadres pointed out about the new members, 
their general education, let alone knowledge of the principles of Marxism, was often 
very poor. Many of the new people joining were themselves organizers and we can 
assume they hoped to get something by joining the new winning faction. Initially, this 
is likely to have been exactly what all factional organizers hope to achieve: social 
power and prestige, and an ability to resolve conflicts including their own on terms 
that give organizers access to rents. Over time, the success of the CPM was also based 
for a time on agrarian strategies that gave middle and rich peasants opportunities for 
agrarian growth through better access to fertilizers, rural infrastructure and credit.  
 
The party also had distinctive characteristics which should not be ignored. Its 
ideology was appealing for many. It also introduced higher levels of discipline and 
inner-party democracy, which were both appealing and effective. In election 
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campaigns, its ability to mobilize large numbers of cadres and general supporters in a 
disciplined way no doubt contributed to some of its success (Chatterjee 1997: 137-82) 
But neither should these aspects of the party be exaggerated. The structure of the 
party relevant for its day to day operation was highly decentralized. Party units in 
different villages and regions effectively operated as locally based factions addressing 
very local problems and using locally mobilized power.  
 
However, aspects of the ‘modern’ organization of the CPM can help to explain why a 
significant block of intermediate class organizers could be organized in this way when 
the Congress had so signally failed. The Congress lacked any principle, caste or 
otherwise for defining who were the insiders. In the absence of a principle, the 
number of permutations of factions and the distribution of rents between them become 
difficult to manage. Congress could have organized a party appropriate for a 
competitive clientelist context, but it failed to sustain a dominant party in West 
Bengal. In contrast, the CPM defined a set of principles that initially attracted a 
relatively small number of organizers. As they proved enormously successful in 
mobilizing the poor to deliver effective rents from protection and conflict resolution, 
they became an electoral force. New organizers flooded in, and here the modern 
organizational structure of the party and its hierarchical discipline served to create a 
natural and legitimate mechanism of limiting the number of faction leaders. 
Newcomers had to wait their turn to rise through the party ranks. The anarchic entry 
and squabbling typical of more open parties was less in evidence. By then, a 
successful electoral strategy and a large number of effective faction leaders created a 
sustainable and effective dominant party ruling coalition in alliance with the Left 
Front partners of the party.  
 
The overall strategy proved to be enormously successful in constructing a dominant 
party coalition that was unprecedented in its longevity. There were some other 
features of the social context that probably helped as well. The CPM did not just assist 
party supporters and the poor to address local problems using local informal power. 
This was perhaps the most important part of the party’s everyday presence but not the 
full story. In a land scarce poor agriculture, where the poor have no self-respect, the 
party gave a sense of belonging, for a time at least, to a large number of people. After 
1977, its formal policies of limited enforcement of land redistribution and 
sharecropper registration did make a difference at the margin to poorer sections of the 
rural population. However, as we summarized in an earlier paper (Khan 2008), the 
effect on poverty reduction was small and certainly not revolutionary. The more 
significant effect of the CPM’s strategy was to direct resources to middle and rich 
peasants. This strategy drove high levels of agrarian growth for over a decade 
beginning in the 1980s.  
 
The CPM faced several problems over time. It was effectively a dominant party in a 
clientelist settlement and so over time, many aspiring and entrepreneurial organizers 
felt excluded or blocked in their progress. The method of exclusion was subtle and 
based on the formal organizational structure of the party. Nevertheless, over time, 
ambitious organizers found it was less attractive to join the party and more hopeful to 
stay outside and organize against it. It is important that even at the height of its 
successes, the Left Front’s vote share was always around fifty per cent. The first past 
the post system ensured this was enough to define a dominant coalition, but relatively 
small declines in voting support could equally have disproportionately large effects. 
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When the tide started turning against the CPM in the late 2000s after the crises at 
Nandigram and Singur, a seven percent drop in the vote share for the Left Front in the 
2009 general elections translated into its Lok Sabha seats dropping from 35 (out of 
42) to only fifteen. 
 
The second and more significant problem was the effect on capitalist access to 
political power. The organization of a factional structure that was largely focused on a 
rural constituency meant that big business’s access to political power was now even 
more constrained. Moreover, the combination of a left-leaning ideology which led to a 
formal support for trade union rights and the fact that big business in West Bengal 
was largely non-Bengali constrained the open support that the CPM could offer big 
business. Nevertheless, in private long-term relationships did develop, but it was 
mostly used for solving labour disputes rather than positively assisting business to 
accelerate accumulation or develop into new areas. The high capability big business 
sector was less powerful in West Bengal than before, and this had significant 
implications for the strategic choices made by both sides, and the types of formal and 
informal institutions that the Left Front could introduce and enforce. 
 
The growth-stability trade-off facing formal or informal institutions affecting the 
modern industrial sector therefore became significantly more adverse. Ironically, this 
was most damaging for the CPM itself. In the 2000s, its agrarian strategy ran out of 
steam and the party decided to promote industrialization. A series of miscalculations 
in its formal and informal interventions in land acquisitions for big industry led to a 
significant decline in stability and undermined the government. We described these 
governance crises in detail in Khan (2009a). The constitution of the political 
settlement explains why the growth-stability trade-off was so adverse. It also suggests 
that the CPM’s own analysis of the situation did not warn it about the nature of the 
political settlement it was operating in and the likely effects of its overt institutional 
interventions. It appeared to have underestimated both the strength of the opposition 
factions that were now ranged against it and the ease with which they could inflict 
transition costs when the CPM appeared to be attempting the enforcement of 
institutions that hurt some of its own core constituents.  
 
With hindsight, it is easy to say that much longer preparation was required to build 
and justify the political links with business and to involve its core factional base in 
constructing formal and informal institutions that would have enabled core organizers 
to share the gains from industrialization. Sadly, the signs of discontent were there for 
some time and the party ignored them at its peril. Whether an electoral recovery can 
still be staged remains to be seen. If not, the configuration of parties suggests that 
some variant of competitive clientelism will emerge in West Bengal. This would be a 
loss for West Bengal because the dominant party structure with its discipline and 
commitment to growth could have created a political settlement that was conducive to 
some variants of industrial policy. This would have required a pro-active relationship 
with business and would have required satisfying the core organizers of the CPM 
through new formal or informal arrangements for sharing the benefits of 
industrialization. The fact that big business was not well connected to political power 
in West Bengal may actually have helped in the imposition of conditions, for instance 
for backward linkages to an emerging Bengali small business sector in exchange for 




The dominant coalition constructed by the CPM with its Left Front allies was a stable 
dominant party ruling coalition. Despite its appeal to Marxist ideology and modern 
party organization, it was essentially an extremely successful factional coalition 
operating in a clientelist political settlement, with a progressive ideology and some 
positive effects for the poor. Its real constituency was its rural intermediate class 
organizers and its economic strategies most benefited this group. However, a 
characteristic of the political settlement was that powerful business interests were not 
linked into the ruling coalition. This did not have any effect on the implementation of 
the CPM’s successful agrarian strategies, but when the party turned to an industrial 
strategy without adequately preparing its internal factions and constructing alternative 
informal distributions of benefits, it ran into serious trouble. Opposition factions took 
advantage of the disarray within the party when it attempted to enforce its pro-
business land acquisition strategies. The result was not only a failure in the 
implementation of these institutions, but also a significant worsening of stability and 
of the Left Front’s electoral prospects. 
 
11. Bangladesh: From Authoritarian Rule to Competitive Clientelism 
Bangladesh was carved out as East Pakistan, when Bengal was partitioned in 1947. 
Unlike West Bengal which was significantly industrialized, East Bengal was almost 
entirely an agrarian economy growing rice and jute. In the 1960s after very limited 
industrialization had been achieved, another set of violent confrontations between 
incumbent and emergent elites in Pakistan culminated in 1971 in the separation of 
East Pakistan as Bangladesh. This was followed by more violence, an attempted 
imposition of a one-party state, the assassinations of two heads of state, periods of 
military rule and finally the emergence of a competitive clientelism that faces 
occasional crises when parties refuse to accept (often with good reason) the 
organization or results of elections. Nevertheless, despite its apparently dysfunctional 
governance, Bangladesh has emerged in recent years as a relatively high-growth 
developing country with a significant base in manufacturing based on the garments 
and textile industries. With so many dramatic changes, its political settlement has also 
been changing rapidly over time.  
 
The political settlement evolved in four main phases, each with implications for 
institutional performance relevant for growth and stability. The first phase, from 1958 
to 1971, during the Pakistan period, was an authoritarian political settlement. The two 
wings of Pakistan shared little in common and had not engaged in a common struggle 
to achieve Pakistan. Pakistan was the outcome of a failure that primarily involved 
Nehru and Jinnah, neither of whom came from the territories that became Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, once Pakistan was created, the elites of the East and West had to find a 
way of sharing power and rents to live together. They tried for a decade and failed. 
The outcome in 1958 was a military government that engaged in formal and informal 
interventions to sustain a vulnerable authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, it was during 
this phase that Pakistan’s industrial policy was most effective, with significant 
industrialization, mostly in the West, but some in the East as well.  
 
The growth-stability trade-off was relatively favourable for extensive growth through 
industrial policy. As in India, emerging capitalists were well connected to factions, 
this time within the authoritarian state, making disciplining difficult and limiting the 
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prospects of industrial policy. The first phase came to an end because industrial policy 
created a distribution of benefits between East and West Pakistan that was politically 
unsustainable. The East’s population was bigger than the West, and when an 
embattled military government allowed elections in 1970, the East Pakistan based 
Awami League won a majority of seats in the Pakistan parliament on a programme of 
radical federalization. Once again, a failure to agree about federalization resulted in a 
further partition, and again with much violence.  
 
The second phase from 1971 to 1975 was a turbulent and violent one as new elites 
with significant political and organizational power but few economic assets came to 
power. The gap between formal rights and informal power was now almost 
unbridgeable. The result was intense primitive accumulation: the capture of assets 
using political power. The dominant party that had won the election faced the 
prospect of political and economic collapse. The growth-stability trade-off was not 
only adverse; it was worsening to a position where the achievement of the minimum 
economic and political viability conditions was threatened. Famine struck. The 
response of the ruling coalition was to amend the constitution to create a one-party 
state. In terms of our Figure 17, the use of administrative measures to define insiders 
and outsiders gave the ruling coalition authoritarian characteristics. The actual 
fragmentation of power in Bangladesh at that time was such that an authoritarian state 
of this type would probably not have lasted very long. But in fact it could not be fully 
implemented because President Mujib-ur-Rahman was assassinated.  
 
The third phase from 1975 to 1990 was a transitional phase towards full competitive 
clientelism. This was a form of authoritarianism but with already with some 
characteristics of competitive clientelism. Military backed political parties engaged in 
electoral competition with other parties with no formal restrictions on the latter. In 
fact, of course, everyone knew that winning these elections was impossible for the 
opposition because of informal administrative measures. But nevertheless, successive 
ruling parties were constructed out of factions from other parties, and so engaging in 
political competition was a way of increasing the price which powerful coalitions 
could demand for joining the ruling coalition.  
 
This was a period when Bangladesh began to slowly recover from years of conflict. 
The military rulers and military-backed parties began a slow process of privatization, 
opening up and encouraging industrialization. The garment sector takeoff began in the 
late 1970s, with institutional innovations under President Zia-ur-Rahman. The 
growth-stability trade-off began to improve but growth was still sluggish. The 
entrepreneurial class was weak in terms of technological capabilities but had access to 
political power, and this assisted a slow recovery through gradual pro-business 
interventions. But the political arrangements were unsustainable because excluded 
factions were growing stronger and would not accept the rules of the game set by 
clientelist authoritarianism. After a series of intense confrontations, the second 
military ruler, President Ershad, was forced to step down in 1990 and the period of 
open competitive clientelism began. 
 
The fourth and final period of competitive clientelism witnessed a steady increase in 
the growth rate. This was probably because the garment industry, after steadily 
acquiring capabilities, took off in the mid to late 1980s and became a major foreign 
currency earner. The growth of this sector has been an important contributor to overall 
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growth. Political competition was organized around two major parties distinguished 
by very deeply felt differences in the way they defined the ‘nation’. These differences 
had trivial implications for practical policy issues but allowed the definition of two 
coalitions big enough to form ruling coalitions. The major political problem was to 
ensure elections were not manipulated by incumbents to the extent that the excluded 
faction refused to participate in elections. Business groups became increasingly strong 
and had influence in and access to both major parties.  
 
The growth-stability trade-off depends on the institutions being examined. For sectors 
where entrepreneurs had sufficient capabilities to be internationally competitive, the 
growth-stability trade-off was quite favourable. Institutions that appeared to be 
dysfunctional were often made to work through informal means and payments. On the 
other hand, acquiring technological capabilities in new sectors faced significant 
market failures. Since responding to these market failures typically involves the 
creation of policy-induced rents, success required the management of productive rents 
using formal or informal mechanisms. Here, strong connections between capitalists 
and powerful factions constrained the growth-stability trade-off.  
 
A serious problem facing Bangladesh is that existing political institutions have proved 
inadequate for constraining the competing parties during elections. An outcome of an 
election is acceptable if the winner is actually the coalition that can field greater 
organizational power. But since the incumbent can leverage administrative and 
policing instruments to tilt the outcome slightly, the result can often be justifiably 
rejected by the loser if the winner is the incumbent. The attempt to solve this problem 
through the constitutional mechanism of caretaker governments organizing elections 
worked for three successive elections but failed in 2007. The sustainability of the 
competitive clientelist political settlement requires a solution that credibly ensures the 
possibility of factions cycling through elections. The broad outlines of the evolution 
are summarized in Figure 23, and a summary of the evolution of rents examined in 
earlier work is reproduced in Figure 28 in the Appendix. 
 
Military Authoritarianism with moderate 
capability / powerful capitalists: 
1958-1971
CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT
BROAD FEATURES OF INSTITUTIONS 
AND GROWTH
Weak Dominant Party and attempted 
One-Party Authoritarianism with low 
capability / powerful ‘entrepreneurs’:
1972-1975
Rapid extensive growth, limited 
implementation of industrial policy. 
Unsustainable regional imbalances
Intense Primitive Accumulation with steep 
collapse of economic and political viability
Clientelistic Authoritarianism with low to 
moderate capability / powerful capitalists: 
1975-1990
Faction-driven rent-seeking drives growth, 
MFA rents allow emergence of dynamic 
garments sector
Competitive Clientelism with low to 
moderate capability / powerful capitalists: 
1990-
Institutional support for low-technology 
manufacturing growth, no industrial policy 
and constrained infrastructure investments
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Military Authoritarianism: 1958-1971 
The deep political and economic crisis in Pakistan at the end of British rule was not 
accidental. The economic underdevelopment of the region was bad enough but in 
addition trade links with industrial areas elsewhere in India were severed. The reasons 
behind the political crisis were even deeper. A constitutional crisis in the newly 
independent Pakistan was almost inevitable given the way in which the country was 
created. East Pakistan was poorer and less developed, had virtually no indigenous 
capitalists, and virtually no senior bureaucrats or army officers. West Pakistan too was 
underdeveloped compared to more advanced areas of India, but many of the 
immigrant Muslim businessmen and senior bureaucrats from other parts of India 
settled in West Pakistan as they were culturally closer to that region. The army too 
was largely drawn from the Punjab region of West Pakistan.  
 
The irony was that the indigenous elites in neither wing of Pakistan had been strongly 
behind the idea of Pakistan. The two most important Muslim-majority areas of India 
were Punjab (whose western part became the heart of West Pakistan) and Bengal 
(whose eastern part became East Pakistan). The demographic dominance of Muslims 
in these provinces meant that Muslims already enjoyed substantial power under the 
electoral system introduced by the British in 1936. They were not supporters of the 
Muslim League and had generally not been preparing or mobilizing for partition. 
When partition suddenly took place in 1947 as a result of a last minute failure in 
negotiations between Jinnah and Nehru, the two main provinces were unprepared for 
statehood.  
 
The Muslim League was not organizationally strong in either Bengal or Punjab and 
faced serious problems in trying to cobble together a Pakistani state. However, West 
Pakistan’s largely Punjabi elites soon discovered they were the dominant group in the 
new state and this helped many of them to buy into the idea of Pakistan. In contrast, 
East Pakistan elites remained embroiled in conflicts with the central leadership. As a 
result of these tensions, the new state of Pakistan faced serious conflicts between 
elites from the outset and a decade of constitutional discussions failed to resolve 
formal sharing of power between the two wings.  
 
A central problem was that the relatively poorer and less developed East Pakistan had 
at that time a bigger population, making it difficult for the economically dominant 
West Pakistani elites to be assured that they would be able to ensure their political 
dominance through the electoral system. Even though East Pakistan was relatively 
underdeveloped compared to the West, its intermediate class political organizers were 
more organized as it had a longer history of mobilization against colonial rule. 
Moreover, rich peasants in East Bengal had been in power in the province since the 
1936 reforms through parties like the secular Krishok Proja Party. East Bengal’s 
political organizers could mobilize large numbers of people, possibly more than the 
political elites in West Pakistan could. These asymmetries in the economic, political 
and organizational capabilities of the two wings made a constitutional settlement 
virtually impossible. The military coup of Ayub Khan in 1958 was the result. 
 
The imposition of martial law curtailed the organizational freedom to set up political 
organizations. At the same time, the military realized that economic growth was vital 
for the survival of the country and so they fostered strong ‘political’ links with the 
West Pakistan-based business elites. Rents were now controlled by a dominant 
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coalition consisting of the military-bureaucratic elite and their close business allies. 
For a while, the threat of force disrupted the ability of excluded organizers to pose a 
significant threat to the ruling coalition. At the same time control over access to 
foreign exchange, the exchange rate, interest rates and tariffs and quotas allowed the 
state to create rents for privileged business elites. The initial effect was not only 
greater political stability but also a sustained growth spurt that lasted through much of 
the 1960s. But the location of political power and entrepreneurial capabilities meant 
that almost all the manufacturing growth was located in West Pakistan.  
 
The military could not rule without some organization of political forces. The major 
institutional mechanism for purchasing and organizing stability was the so-called 
Basic Democracy system that Ayub innovated in 1959, one of the first acts of his 
regime. This attempted to by-pass the established political organizers based in the 
towns by creating a new constituency of cheaper organizers in the villages. A system 
of 80,000 ‘basic democrats’ were elected on a non-party basis. They served as the 
electoral college for electing members of parliament as well as directly electing the 
President. Authoritarian regimes have often used this tactic of going over the heads of 
their immediate opponents and appealing to the interests of those below them. The 
latter initially demand a lower price and the authoritarian leader often believes they 
will be easier to control. The provision of relatively limited rents to this large army of 
rural representatives through rural infrastructure construction programmes and Food 
for Work programmes for a time created a countervailing source of support for the 
regime that made it difficult to organize dissent (Sobhan 1968). 
 
In the end, Basic Democracy was self-defeating for the regime. As the rural basic 
democrats became more confident and ambitious, they saw obvious opportunities in 
throwing their lot in with the growing dissent in the towns. When this began to 
happen in the late 1960s, not only did the ‘hot house’ economic development come 
under threat, the social order was fundamentally challenged as there were no easy 
ways of incorporating excluded elites into the system quickly enough. Under pressure 
in both wings of Pakistan, the military government allowed elections in 1970. They 
did not foresee that the East Pakistan based Awami League would gain an absolute 
majority in parliament as the East had a majority of seats in the central legislature. 
This led to an even more serious constitutional crisis as West Pakistan based elites 
were unwilling to let an East Pakistan party form the government. The last desperate 
act of the authoritarian regime was a bloody crackdown on political organizers and 
their intellectual supporters in East Pakistan in March 1971. As the conflict became 
increasingly bloody, the political settlement collapsed. The civil disobedience 
intensified and transformed into a war for liberation and independence. Pakistan’s 
historic enemy India intervened to assist the Bengali struggle for independence and 
the independent country of Bangladesh was born in 1971. 
 
While it worked, the authoritarian ruling coalition, combined with the significant 
political access and power of emerging capitalist groups created a feasible political 
settlement for the rapid imposition of industrial policy. Extensive growth was rapid, 
as outlined in our earlier paper (Khan 2008). But as in contemporary India with its 
dominant party coalition, the fact that powerful business groups were strongly 
networked with particular politicians, and in the case of Pakistan initially with 
particular bureaucrats or generals, meant that disciplining and resource re-allocation 
faced very adverse growth-stability trade-offs. The Pakistan experience is particularly 
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interesting because here despite an export-promotion strategy, individual capitalists 
could still block resource re-allocations away from themselves just as much as in 
India. This is relevant for an evaluation of Chibber’s (2003) thesis discussed earlier. 
The experience also challenges the thesis that authoritarian regimes are able to 
exercise their ‘autonomy’ to implement industrial policy effectively. It also meant that 
the locus of political power in the West resulted in unsustainable regional imbalances.  
 
The Basic Democrats provided inadequate feedback about the strength of organized 
resistance building up below. The military government went too far and too fast in 
pushing accumulation by a small number of capable capitalists. The response to the 
absence of significant numbers of capitalists in the East who could undertake large-
scale investments with state assistance should have been more assistance to the East 
or a slower pace of change overall. In the event, the forced accumulation by a small 
group who were entirely from the West created pent-up dissatisfaction that political 
organizers could suddenly mobilize with disastrous consequences for the country.  
 
General features of this problem were described in Figure 14 which showed that a big 
or ‘discontinuous’ institutional jump (such as the rapid creation of enormous wealth in 
the hands of a handful of capitalists) can appear to result in a relatively small decline 
in stability at first, but lead to a collapse of the trade-off once new organizers 
capitalize on growing social resentment. This is a simplified but plausible description 
of Pakistan in the 1960s where there was little initial resistance to the institutions that 
drove growth but was followed by a precipitous decline in stability in both West and 
East Pakistan from 1968 onwards. A more gradual or incremental set of industrial 
policy interventions could, with hindsight, have resulted in a more sustainable growth 
path. Sudden and significant changes in the distribution of benefits in a society, 
particularly if they are achieved under authoritarian limitations on mobilization can 
obviously result in misleadingly limited opposition at first, but erupt in significant 
explosions later. This is more likely if the emerging class inequalities overlap with 
national, religious or other cleavages that organizers can use to mobilize coalitions in 
a clientelist settlement.  
 
Summary 
The authoritarian ruling coalition from 1958 to 1971 together with a small number of 
moderately capable and politically connected capitalists defined a political settlement 
which was initially very favourable for growth-enhancing institutional changes. 
However, like India, the political power of capitalists prevented disciplining and 
constrained productivity growth. The imposition of discipline on the privileged new 
capitalists may have made both state and capitalists somewhat more legitimate in the 
eyes of the population. Instead, effective authoritarianism initially only allowed only a 
limited decline in stability. But this hid deep dissatisfaction lower down, particularly 
with regional imbalances. By the late 1960s, a new generation of organizers emerged 
who could mobilize the growing dissatisfaction with disastrous consequences for the 
overall stability of the system.  
 
The Rise and Fall of Dominant Party Authoritarianism 1972-1975 
The victory of the excluded Bengali political organizers in 1971 created a new crisis. 
The Awami League, which won virtually every seat in East Pakistan in the 1970 
elections, was clearly for the moment a dominant party. But the aspirations of the new 
coalition with political power were so extravagant that even the formal rights of 
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existing Bengali capitalists could not be protected. Not only were abandoned 
Pakistani assets the target of acquisition by the new coalition, almost all significant 
assets of Bengali capitalists were also nationalized to construct ‘socialism’. Gross 
over-employment in the now dominant public sector, corruption, looting of products 
and spares, and the conversion of public property into private property were 
mechanisms used for rapid primitive accumulation. Entirely new classes of the newly 
rich rapidly emerged. Paradoxically, under pressure from this emerging class ceilings 
on private investments were also rapidly being raised (Khan 2008). But the cost was a 
steep decline in economic performance and growing political conflicts within the 
dominant party as different groups contested for power and resources. 
 
Behind this crisis was a rapidly evolving political settlement. The dominant party was 
facing internal collapse with intense conflicts. As early as 1972 a significant section 
of the ‘left-wing’ of the Awami League left to form the Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dal, 
JSD. If the distribution of rents between internal factions depends on the decisions of 
a supreme leader, all coalitions have to be confident of their access to that leader, and 
the leader has to have sufficient authority to impose decisions once taken. The 
dominant party’s factions were already refusing to accept these decisions and some 
had already left to oppose and unseat the ruling coalition. Mujib’s decision that a one-
party system could be achieved by constitutional amendment and then enforced using 
the policing apparatus of the state was therefore a significant gamble. It is not at all 
clear that Mujib had the authority or the physical force to ensure that all individual 
organizers would come under a single party structure and then accept the distribution 
of rents that he imposed.  
 
A related problem was to define the limits of the dominant coalition. There are 
potentially indefinite numbers of organizers ‘out there’ who believe they have the 
capacity to organize for a share of the rents. However, the more organizers who are 
included, the smaller the rents that existing organizers can capture. The problem for a 
formal and well-defined ruling coalition in a constitutional one-party state is that it 
defines insiders and outsiders clearly and creates strong incentives for outsiders to 
unite against insiders. The one-party state is therefore a particularly difficult type of 
authoritarian ruling coalition to operate. It creates very strong incentives for outsiders 
to unite but if it includes too many it undermines the rents of insiders. Successful one-
party authoritarian regimes have to have some special feature that allows them to 
either keep outsiders out, or absorb them at a slow rate. For instance, they could have 
significant natural resource rents that could be used to finance a credible monopoly of 
violence at the centre. Or they could be developmental states with a disciplined party 
structure, where new entrants are offered relatively little but can expect a ‘career path’ 
in the party and share the benefits of growth over time. The Awami League in 1975 
had no special features which might have sustained one-party authoritarianism.  
 
Despite these dangers, and perhaps because the economic situation was unsustainable 
(Khan 2008), Mujib moved ahead with the ‘Second Revolution’ to create a one-party 
state. In January 1975, Mujib pushed through the fourth amendment to the 
constitution by threatening to resign in the face of opposition from his own party 
(Karim 2005: 348). The constitutional amendment changed Bangladesh to a 
presidential system, with power concentrated in the hands of Mujib who became the 
president. The amendment provided for the creation of a ‘national party’ with the sole 
right to engage in political activity, and all members of parliament and the president 
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had to belong to this party. In February all parties were suspended and the national 
party launched. This was the Bangladesh Krishok Sromik Awami League (Workers 
and Peasants Awami League) or BAKSAL (Mascarenhas 1986: 57).  
 
While there was little public demonstration against the constitutional amendment, the 
climate of fear was not appropriate for the free expression of views. In secret, many 
different groups began to plot Mujib’s violent removal (Mascarenhas 1986: 64). 
Mujib himself was aware that the fourth amendment could not represent a permanent 
solution and was an emergency response to a situation going out of control: ‘This one-
party arrangement is purely temporary. Once I have saved the country from counter-
revolution I will restore multi-party democracy’ (quoted in Karim 2005: 258). Mujib’s 
enemies were not only based in other parties and in the army, but within his own 
party. Many ‘rightist’ members of his cabinet and indeed some foreign embassies 
were aware that a strike was being planned against him and his family (Lifschultz 
1979; Mascarenhas 1986). And so it was that on the 15th of August 1975, less than 
four years after achieving independence, the founding father and president of the new 
country was assassinated. 
 
Summary  
The dominant party that won freedom in 1971 failed to establish one-party 
authoritarianism even though moves in that direction began in 1975. The conflicts 
within the party were intense and time horizons of factions short. Implementation 
capabilities for enforcing formal institutions were weak for the same reason. The 
power of capitalists had been severely curtailed. Bengali capital too was almost fully 
expropriated. But a new proto-capitalist class was rapidly emerging through primitive 
accumulation. But during the lifetime of the regime the political settlement was very 
adverse for growth and the growth-stability trade-off was probably entirely below the 
minimum viability conditions of growth and stability. Mujib’s desperate constitutional 
one-party state may not have worked but it reflected an awareness of the seriousness 
of the situation.  
 
Clientelistic Authoritarianism 1975-1990 
Mujib’s assassination brought the military to power through a series of bloody coups 
and counter-coups. But the military leadership knew by now that neither the Pakistani 
authoritarian model based on the exclusion of intermediate class organizers by a small 
military-bureaucratic clique nor the authoritarian one-party model of Mujib would 
work in Bangladesh. General Zia, who formally became president in 1977 was a 
decorated freedom fighter and widely popular. He took care to construct a strong 
constituency of supporters for his rule by constructing a political party that eventually 
became the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It remains one of the two dominant 
parties in contemporary Bangladesh. The new strategy for constructing the ruling 
coalition had a number of important features distinct from the earlier phases.  
 
First, the terms on which individual coalition leaders joined the ruling coalition were 
individually bargained. The terms were simple: the national leader wanted to 
incorporate the largest number of the most important organizers at the lowest price in 
terms of the rents that they demanded. A broad ideology of development and 
nationalism defining the new party allowed organizers from the far left to the far right 
to seek terms for entry. The price they could extract in terms of their access to future 
rents depended on their proven organizational capabilities and the significance of their 
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departure for undermining their erstwhile parties. As other parties were no longer 
banned, organizers had the chance of proving their abilities outside the BNP before 
negotiating incorporation. Opposition parties were allowed to set up, operate and 
contest elections. The only limitation was that the top job was not up for grabs 
because the dominant party was unlikely to be defeated given its control over the 
administration. This implicit administrative control defined the ruling coalition as 
authoritarian, even though formally multi-party democracy was reintroduced with the 
repeal of the fourth amendment.  
 
Secondly, no attempt was made to define ex ante the boundaries of the ruling 
coalition. The regime maintained the right to calibrate the size of the ruling coalition 
through a competitive process of assessment and negotiation. This too ensured that 
excluded elites had an expectation that they may be included on appropriate terms in 
the future if they played according to the rules of the game. The combination of these 
two characteristics ensured that the minimum required rents were competitively 
allocated to the most important political organizers, helping to maintain political 
stability.  
 
Finally, both Zia and Ershad attempted to check the power of established political 
organizers by creating new rural voices through ‘decentralization’. These strategies 
were quite similar to the Basic Democracy strategy of the Pakistani period, but now 
they were a complementary part of a broader strategy and not the exclusive strategy 
for organizing stability. Even so, these strategies, particularly Ershad’s attempt to 
create a new class of political representatives in the newly created ‘upazillas’ (a tier of 
government constituting a small number of villages), was strongly opposed by urban 
political organizers. They had a limited effect in enhancing overall political stability, 
and the attempt to force them through possibly had a negative effect.  
 
The period remained on the whole considerably unstable. Violence continued for a 
while, particularly within the army, where coups were frequently attempted. 
Nevertheless, the strategy of ensuring entry to political organizers through individual 
negotiations proved to be a viable strategy for constructing coalitions. It remains the 
strategy through which competing political parties in the fourth ‘democratic’ phase 
construct the coalitions that sustain their power. The strategy implied that the ruling 
coalition would be turbulent with constant negotiations, infighting and sometimes 
violence both within the coalition and against those out of power. But in the absence 
of any better method of determining a distribution of rents in line with organizational 
power, this has emerged as the operative default mode for constructing ruling 
coalitions.  
 
Secondly, the openness of the boundaries of the ruling coalition proved to be 
extremely useful in managing the entry of new aspirants. This allowed the system to 
respond to changes in organizational capabilities in society. On the other hand, it 
could not deal with aspirations to become the President. This meant the system was 
unsustainable in the long run. For instance, it created strong incentives for ambitious 
officers within the army to try and replace the supreme leader. There were frequent 
coup attempts under Zia in particular. In fact, Zia was finally killed in a coup in 1981. 
Eventually it also resulted in strong civilian opposition being organized by ambitious 
political organizers in other parties. Opposition to clientelistic authoritarianism came 
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to a head during Ershad’s rule. Increasingly intense and violent mobilizations resulted 
in Ershad being deposed in 1990, marking the end of clientelistic military rule. 
 
A number of important economic changes happened during this period. The most 
predatory types of primitive accumulation began to die down after most abandoned 
assets were appropriated. The beneficiaries of the primitive accumulation and the 
older capitalists gradually regrouped during this period and established political 
connections with factions within the ruling parties. As many of the new ‘capitalists’ 
were direct beneficiaries of ‘political accumulation’, they were closely networked into 
existing factional structures. However, damaging politically-created rents continued to 
be created as part of political stabilization strategies. These included, for instance, 
rents distributed to supporters of the ruling coalition in government construction 
contracts, or in import contracts for scarce commodities like sugar and cement.  
 
An important change with the Pakistani period was that rents were no longer seen as 
having any potentially productive purpose. The state stopped trying to create or 
allocate rents as part of an explicit industrial policy. . Subsidies were no longer 
justified in terms of industrial policy but began to be justified on welfare grounds. 
Market failure justifications for infant industry protection or technology acquisition 
disappeared. This was partly because of the memory of the political fight against 
Pakistan and the ‘socialism’ of the Awami League, and partly because the 
international climate of economic opinion informing policy in Bangladesh had also 
changed radically in the 1980s. Zia was an advocate of privatization for all these 
reasons. The rents that public sector industries and the newly privatized industries 
continued to receive was because the state was too weak to remove these rents from 
powerful clients, not because the ruling coalition believed that this would accelerate 
the modernization of the economy. Ironically, as we described in earlier papers, the 
garment industry takeoff in Bangladesh depended on the presence of a critical set of 
international rents and institutional innovations that Zia undertook to support the 
sector (Khan 2008, 2009b). The political settlement allowed the rapid introduction of 
institutional innovations like the back-to-back LC and the bonded warehouse system, 
both vital for the garment industry. 
 
Summary  
An emerging capitalist sector was now closely networked with the political 
leadership. The clientelistic authoritarian leaderships had sufficiently long time 
horizons to build relationships with capitalists and support them to a limited extent. 
Mutually beneficial relationships developed which supported accelerated 
accumulation. Technology acquisition could not be properly supported under this 
settlement but the existence of globally generated MFA rents did allow technology 
acquisition and disciplined learning in low technology sectors like garments. The 
political settlement was much more promising for growth than before, and for the first 
time a Bengali capitalist sector began to grow. Growth-stability trade-offs were 
favourable for the support and promotion of limited formal institutions supporting 
specific accumulation strategies.  
 
Competitive Clientelism 1990- 
The overthrow of Ershad and the holding of elections under a caretaker government 
converted the authoritarian clientelistic system into a proper competitive clientelism. 
The new ruling coalitions had all the characteristics of competitive clientelism 
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summarized in Figure 17. Capitalists were well-organized and closely networked with 
political parties, often keeping good relationships with more than one, as parties 
regularly cycled in and out of power. A fair election has come to mean that the 
outcome reflects the balance of forces on the ground without the interference of 
bureaucratic or military officials administering the police, the polling booths and the 
process of counting the votes. If these administrative tools are controlled by one side 
or the other, the outcome may not reflect the balance of forces and will then not 
achieve stability.  
 
The objective of a fair election is not to discover the true preferences of the electorate, 
partly because true preferences may not exist given the absence of serious differences 
in the policies that the parties are likely to implement. Rather, elections are processes 
through which the organizational strengths of the competing coalitions are revealed. 
Stability is likely to be achieved if the party with a demonstrable superiority in 
organizational strength wins the elections. The requirement is that no party should be 
able to leverage its strength by using the administrative apparatus to give it an 
electoral advantage that is unrelated to its strength on the ground.  
 
To solve this problem, the competing parties in Bangladesh amended the constitution 
in the mid-1990s in the 13th Amendment that set up a permanent institution of the 
Caretaker Government. A neutral government was to be set up at the end of every 
government’s term with the last Chief Justice of the Supreme Court becoming the 
interim head of government. This was a unique institutional experiment to create a 
credible electoral process for competing coalitions. However, this institutional 
arrangement was clearly not buttressed by a deeper set of political agreements. The 
caretaker government system worked for two subsequent elections, despite minor 
attempts by both parties to interfere in the elections when they were in power.  
 
The constitutional arrangements collapsed in the run-up to the 2007 elections when 
the incumbent BNP went too far and appeared to interfere with the dates of retirement 
of Supreme Court judges so that its preferred candidate could head the caretaker 
government. The result was an increasingly violent standoff which resulted in a series 
of general strikes (hartals) and violent street confrontations. In a context of increasing 
uncertainty a group of bureaucrats backed by the military and the international donor 
community took over power on the 11th of January 2007 as a new emergency interim 
government. Under the constitution, the caretaker government has to organize an 
election within two months, but this caretaker government stayed in power for two 
years under emergency powers it gave itself.  
 
The emergency caretaker government turned out to have been a significant wasted 
opportunity. The emerging system of competitive clientelism had clearly not yet 
acquired a set of politically sustainable checks and balances to be fully self-
sustaining. The emergency could have been an opportunity for investigating and 
establishing credible checks and balances and for establishing the precedent that if 
parties could not agree other institutions in the country would intervene to break the 
deadlock. But instead, the caretaker government, headed by an ex-World Bank 
bureaucrat and backed by an army that was closely tied to the ‘international 
community’ through its lucrative involvement in international peacekeeping missions 
took a ‘good governance’ perspective on how to solve the problem. Their 
interpretation (no doubt strongly influenced by dominant international policy 
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perceptions) was that the instability was caused by political corruption. The 
opportunity for political corruption created distorted incentives for politicians to 
interfere with electoral outcomes. This analysis suggested that if political corruption 
could be rooted out and if parties could be made to compete on the basis of alternative 
manifestos of delivering public goods the problem of electoral violence and standoffs 
could be rooted out. 
 
For the next two years the emergency caretaker government attempted to address the 
problem through ‘good governance’ reforms, and in particular through a focus on 
corruption, believing that the source of political violence was the engagement of 
political leaders in corruption. Hundreds and possibly thousands of political activists 
were arrested and incarcerated, including the leaders of the two main parties on 
charges of corruption. Hundreds of businessmen were arrested and some of them 
handed over millions of dollars to the new government as ‘ill-gotten gains’ under 
pressure (which later on turned out to include torture). Thousands of cases of 
corruption and extortion were introduced in the courts. The whole exercise was 
deeply flawed not only from the perspective of its flawed understanding of a 
clientelist political settlement but even in terms of the formal legal procedures that 
were followed. In the end, almost all the cases had to be abandoned on the grounds 
that evidence was missing or inadmissible. The experience of anti-corruption cases 
globally suggests that even a single successful prosecution is very difficult. Not 
surprisingly, the military caretaker government’s attempt to address the problem in 
this way failed dismally. The two arrested leaders of the main political parties had to 
be released, and one of them was elected prime minister in the 2009 elections.  
 
The main effect of the two-year experiment was a collapse in investor confidence. 
The two main parties whose intransigence and violence had caused the problem in the 
first place did indeed receive a shock, but in itself this is unlikely to have a lasting 
positive effect. Without a credible mechanism for organizing elections, the 
competitive clientelist system cannot deliver political stability and is therefore not 
sustainable. If we include the experience of the 2007 debacle, competitive clientelism 
has not worked too well in Bangladesh. The overall implications for growth-
enhancing institutional change have been negatively affected by long periods of strife 
which have mostly been about the political institutions organizing transfers of power 
rather than conflicts over the implementation of particular economic institutions. The 
former are obviously more important in ensuring that benefits are distributed over 
time in line with organizational power, and are therefore critical institutions for 
sustaining a viable competitive clientelism. 
 
The lack of credibility that elections will deliver the appropriate ruling coalition can 
result in short-termism and conflict as elections approach. This has indirect effects on 
long-term investments, particularly where government contracts are involved. For 
instance, it has proved to be very difficult to get private investors to invest in the 
power sector. This is an area where future income streams depend on subsequent 
governments honouring contracts made by previous governments. But one credible 
threat against incumbent governments is for the opposition to challenge their 
legitimacy. This makes investors wary of making up-front investments in sectors like 
power. Thus, vulnerable competitive clientelism can create high transaction costs for 
some types of contracts and some investments may not be possible at all. 
Governments have had to bribe investors in sectors like power with excessively large 
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tariffs and other conditions in countries like Bangladesh, with obvious efficiency and 
growth implications for the broader economy.  
 
Other types of investments and contracts can operate reasonably well with 
competitive clientelism, even with the degree of instability observed in Bangladesh, 
as long as the future income streams in question do not depend directly on payments 
from the government exchequer. But since infrastructure and power sector 
investments do require government guarantees for future payments, a vital set of 
contracts are adversely affected. On the other hand, competitive clientelism provides 
political access to competing businesses and helps competitive entry into many 
sectors. This is efficiency-enhancing in low technology sectors. These aspects of the 
political settlement can help to accelerate accumulation and create conditions 
sustaining growth.  
 
Summary 
The competitive clientelist period after 1990 has had a mixed record. The difficulty of 
ensuring credible rules for the removal of ruling coalitions has created periods of 
intense conflict and instability. It has also raised the transaction costs facing some 
types of vital long-term contracts to the detriment of growth. On the other hand, other 
institutions have performed well and their implementation enjoys favourable growth-
stability trade-offs. The challenge of technology upgrading and industrial policy has 
not gone away, but has become more difficult to organize. The real challenge for 
sustaining competitive clientelism is to achieve more credible and less violent 
methods of ensuring the replacement of ruling coalitions.   
 
12. Tanzania: From Authoritarian One-Party to Stable Dominant Party  
Tanzania is the ‘newest’ of our nations, achieving independence from Britain only in 
1961 as Tanganyika, and merging with Zanzibar in 1964 to become modern Tanzania. 
It has also had the least turbulent political history amongst our countries, with the 
party of independence creating a nation initially using relatively soft authoritarian 
methods. The party of independence, the Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) also became, under the leadership of Nyerere, the party of nation-building. 
Nyerere stepped down from the Presidency in 1962 to concentrate on building the 
party, and through it the institutions, power structures and even the language that 
would eventually bind the country together. In 1963, Nyerere declared Tanzania was 
to be a one-party state. The authoritarianism of the early years did not result in 
significant resistance or violence because excluded social groups (like the non-
African capitalists) were weak or lacked political legitimacy. In 1977 the name of the 
party was changed to Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) after TANU merged with the 
Afro-Shirazi Party with its power base in Zanzibar. In 1992 the Constitution was 
amended to enable multi-party elections and Tanzania made a relatively smooth 
transition to sustain its already existing ruling coalition through a dominant party. The 
CCM then proceeded to comfortably win the elections of 1995, 2000 and 2005.  
 
The transition from a single-party state sustained by constitutional limitations on other 
organizations to a multi-party state with the same party emerging as the dominant 
party is an unusual one. It suggests that the transition was not driven by internal 
pressure and mobilization from excluded factions. If excluded factions had been 
internally strong enough to have forced a change in the constitution, we would expect 
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to see an effect of this on the outcomes of subsequent elections. Rather, the 1992 
change is more likely to have been driven by external pressures and expectations. In 
the early 1990s Tanzania was receiving aid equivalent to almost 30 per cent of its 
national income and many donors agencies find it difficult to justify to their own 
parliaments why significant amounts of aid should be given to a one-party state. 
However, while the combination of significant aid rents with a lifting of formal 
restrictions on organization may have allowed the same ruling coalition to stay in 
power, the open electoral system is likely to have an effect on the organization of the 
political settlement in Tanzania over the longer term. Lower level factions are likely 
to become more powerful over time, and there is some indication that this is 
happening. 
 
The Tanzanian political settlement has also been characterized by the weakness of 
indigenous African capitalists. Not only was capitalism very underdeveloped in pre-
independence Tanzania, the post-independence strategies of socialist 
communitarianism further slowed down the development of a black African capitalist 
class. The most capable capitalists were and still are members of other ethnic groups 
like Indians, Arabs and Europeans. Over time the access of business to decision-
making politicians has increased. But the political constraints have kept relationships 
short term and reliant on the generation of quick payoffs for both sides. Despite the 
growing evidence of business influence on policy, other factors, in particular the 
ethnicity of capitalists and the political difficulties this raises can explain why the 
networks of capitalists with the ruling coalition are relatively weak. This explains the 
prevalence of decisions where quick profits are made, often with damaging economic 
and social ramifications. It also helps to explain the relative weakness of long-term 
support for investors, even those engaged in low technology investments which do not 
require demanding capabilities of disciplining rents over time.  
 
Thus, the political settlement in Tanzania has been characterized by a one-party 
version of an authoritarian ruling coalition, which later converted itself into a 
dominant party ruling coalition in a context of substantial aid and natural resource 
rents. The weakness of capitalists and indeed the overt anti-capitalism of the early 
Tanzanian state is also a distinctive feature of the Tanzanian political settlement. The 
construction of the ruling coalition, particularly in the early days was based on 
important compromises as well as the repression of organized interests that could 
threaten the unity of the party, which was equated with the nation. These nation-
building compromises did achieve a more united and internally integrated African 
country than many others, but also slowed down processes of class differentiation and 
the evolution of potential African capitalists. The growth-stability trade-off was 
therefore adverse during the early years of nation-building under Nyerere because 
authoritarianism was used for nation-building rather than industrialization. The 
difference with Pakistan’s authoritarianism of the 1960s could not be starker. 
 
Even after the turn towards liberalization and the private sector in the mid-1980s, the 
basic characteristics of the political settlement have not significantly changed in ways 
that might be more conducive for growth-enhancing institutions. The composition of 
the ruling coalition has of course changed a little with the transition to a nominal 
multi-party system and the political tolerance for economic differentiation and 
emerging capitalism has dramatically increased. But in other respects social 
compromises and distributions of benefits that maintain social stability remain the 
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priority for the party and constrain how far it is willing to go with institutional 
changes that can create significant transition costs. On the one hand, the organization 
of social resistance by independent political organizers is still weak, but growing, 
particularly with greater political openness. The weakness of political organizers 
mobilizing social dissent should make it easier for Tanzania to push in the direction of 
growth-enhancing institutional changes if the ruling coalition supports it. But on the 
other hand, if such changes empower capitalists of non-African ethnicity across a 
broad front, this can raise significant problems of political management in the future.  
 
Tanzanian leaders cannot be unaware of problems in neighbouring Uganda or Kenya 
with non-African capitalists. Tanzania’s endowment of black African capitalists is 
significantly more adverse compared to say Kenya. These aspects of the political 
settlement are important for understanding why the ruling coalition in Tanzania has 
been relatively forthcoming in supporting a small number of high-rent foreign 
investments in minerals, but not very forthcoming about supporting institutional 
changes which would assist the development of broad-based capitalism in industry or 
agriculture. The latter strategy, in the absence of strong industrial policies promoting 
black African capitalism, would almost certainly produce a domestic capitalism with a 
non-African face. This in turn would be difficult to manage politically. This constraint 
may help to explain why Tanzania appears to be failing to capitalize on its superior 
political stability and effective party machine to accelerate an economic transition in 
the 1980s and beyond. The summary of institutional strategies and rents in Figure 29, 
based on Khan (2008), is consistent with this picture, as is the analysis of land rights 
in Khan (2009a). Land rights in mining can often be created very rapidly for major 
foreign investors, but in villages where there is a possibility of encouraging a 
capitalist organization of farming in certain areas, change is very gradual and 
incremental and what is worse from the perspective of investors, institutional 
arrangements like land grants often appear to be reversible in the face of pressure.  
 
The development of a broad-based capitalism that is based on emerging African 
entrepreneurs is preferable on many grounds but is not likely to happen without very 
active industrial policy. Ironically, the new dominant party ruling coalition may be a 
less favourable arrangement for managing industrial policy compared to the previous 
constitutional one-party state. But a dominant party system may still be better than a 
competitive clientelism that is likely to emerge over the coming years. A better 
understanding of its political settlement may assist Tanzania to leverage its political 
unity and its relatively well-coordinated political organizations to develop an 
industrial policy before further changes in the organization of the ruling coalition 
make this even more difficult. The broad features of the political settlement in 
Tanzania are summarized in Figure 24, which should be looked at in conjunction with 
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Figure 24 Evolution of Political Settlement in Contemporary Tanzania  
 
One Party Authoritarianism and Nation-Building 1962-1992 
Compared to South Asia, Tanzania had both significant advantages as well as 
disadvantages in constructing a ruling coalition after independence. On the one hand, 
Tanzania’s agrarian society was not significantly differentiated and indeed areas of 
long-settled agriculture were limited. As a result, the fine distinctions between layers 
of society distinguished by class (and also usually by caste) that we observe in South 
Asia were simply not there (Daley 2005a). Colonial powers seeking to manage the 
economy did create structures of ‘traditional authority’ but they did not develop the 
complex social governance structures based on empowering and checking and 
balancing different groups of the intermediate classes in a way that we see in India 
(Khan 2009a). The intermediate class-led mass social movements and parties that had 
dominated Indian politics since the 1930s and provided the different streams out of 
which umbrella nationalist movements were constructed were less developed in 
Africa in general and Tanzania in particular. The less complex political landscape was 
an advantage in a relative comparison for constructing the nation and a ruling 
coalition after independence. 
 
On the other hand, the weakness of the intermediate classes and of potential 
productive sectors in the economy also created serious problems for constructing a 
new nation. At independence in 1962, there were only twenty Tanganyikan African 
students studying for university degrees (Coulson 1982: 90). There were only 3,100 
individuals employed in professional, administrative and technical jobs in 1962 and 
only 1,300 of these were held by Africans, of which 1,100 were teachers, medical 
technicians or nurses (Pratt 1976). The leadership of the independence movement 
came from this tiny class of educated Africans. By the 1950s TANU had recruited 
broadly and had as many as 200,000 members, drawing on the members of new 
cooperative societies and unions. But organizational power was concentrated with the 
professional leadership. There was little evidence of mass mobilizations organized 
directly by intermediate class organizers from below. Nevertheless, by the 1960s 
colonial powers like Britain had little appetite for prolonging the inevitable and the 
independence struggle in Tanzania was relatively short. After TANU won all the 
African seats in the multi-racial elections held in 1958, the transfer of power was 
achieved relatively quickly by 1962. 
 
The challenge for Nyerere was to construct a national identity and a cohesive nation 
out a country with a thin population, 127 ethnic groups, a potentially divisive mix of 
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Christian, Muslim and indigenous religions and without a long history of struggle 
against colonialism which could have united all these disparate forces. It is not 
surprising that nation-building should have been the top priority. The instrument 
chosen was the party, and the inclusion of all groups on terms that were centrally 
determined was perceived to be vital for the integrity of the country. This can explain 
why the party in those early years behaved in an authoritarian way both against 
capitalists (who were mainly non-black) and whose freedoms were incrementally 
restricted but also equally strongly against unions and other organizations (Shivji 
1976). After a wave of strikes in 1962, independent unions were outlawed in 1964 and 
replaced with an official party-affiliated union. Following the Arusha Declaration of 
1967, the party became overtly anti-capitalist. In particular, non-black African 
capitalists were made to understand that their privileges were unacceptable in the new 
social order and policies for correcting inequalities would be adopted. The 
villagization programme that was implemented with significant authoritarianism and 
violence in the 1970s also has to be seen as part of a strategy of constructing a settled 
society that could be controlled and therefore integrated.  
 
The distinctive features of Tanzanian authoritarianism was that it was not in the first 
place an attempt by a ruling coalition to exclude other already existing factions by 
legal or administrative means backed by a monopolization of force. Excluded political 
factions that could form an alternative ruling coalition were virtually non-existent. 
The authoritarian limitations of organizational rights that the Tanzanian ruling 
coalition imposed during this period therefore only make sense as a pre-emptive strike 
against potentially divisive organizations that could in the future be parallel coalitions 
challenging the ruling coalition. The justification, not implausible, was that a 
competition between coalitions at that stage of Tanzanian development would have 
destroyed the nation given the weakness of its national identity and the weakness of 
its economy. Rather, the perceived problem was that Tanzanian society was 
excessively fragmented, that freely organized social organizations could pull it further 
apart, and that the presence, let alone the further development of the capitalist sector, 
would be divisive for social integrity.  
 
In terms of our classification of ruling coalitions in Figure 17, the Tanzanian ruling 
coalition actually had characteristics that would put it quite close to a potentially 
developmental coalition. It faced very weak horizontal opposition from other already-
existing political factions and relatively weak demands from lower-level factions and 
faction-leaders. But this was partly because the economy was relatively 
underdeveloped and society was disorganized. The perception of the ruling coalition 
(accurate or otherwise) was that challenges could rapidly be mounted against it if it 
did not move fast. This persuaded the ruling coalition to focus on limiting 
organizational and political activities to ensure that alternative factions did not 
emerge. Nevertheless, the ruling coalition was actually relatively strong and had 
characteristics close to our definition of a potential developmental coalition. But for it 
to have capitalized on these coalition characteristics and engaged in a developmental 
strategy would also have required a rapprochement with capitalists and conditional 
assistance to develop an employment-generating capitalism. The strategy of 
development actually adopted, based on public sector companies and the restriction of 
capitalist rights, was not likely to be developmental. It was pursued largely as part of 
the same strategy of developing social cohesion rather than economic growth.  
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The party was the state during this period as the bureaucracy and the army were 
incorporated into the party. Public ownership makes sense from a perspective of 
nation-building as it was a mechanism of spreading the benefits of new investments 
across the core constituencies of the party: the middle class bureaucrats and 
professionals. The social engineering intended to create a distribution of social 
benefits at each level of society that was relatively egalitarian so that no particular 
ethnic, regional or other group felt excluded from a ‘stake’ in the emerging society. 
From this perspective, the ruling coalition was successful. Tanzania emerged as one 
of the most socially integrated African countries by the 1980s, with higher levels of 
literacy and access to basic amenities in rural areas than the African average. On the 
other hand, this political settlement had adverse implications for economic growth, 
discussed in Khan (2008) and some of these characteristics are summarized in the first 
row of Figure 29 which is reproduced in the Appendix from the earlier paper.  
 
Summary 
The authoritarian one-party state from 1962-1992 had a ruling coalition that had 
characteristics of authoritarianism, and in terms of the distribution of power affecting 
the ruling coalition, it was in fact close to that of a developmental state. However, the 
ruling coalition was motivated by a perception of a rapid potential fragmentation of 
society. It used administrative and political power to restrict organizational rights to 
reconstruct society in what it perceived to be a more cohesive and communitarian 
way. The authoritarian aspects of the ruling coalition were therefore used for nation-
building rather than to sustain a growth-based developmental policy. The capitalist 
class was in any case underdeveloped to begin with, but under the new strategy faced 
increasingly overt restrictions. The overall characteristics of the political settlement 
were not conducive for the support of growth-enhancing economic institutions and 
created new political configurations in society that would imply very adverse growth-
stability trade-offs for many types of growth-enhancing institutional changes in the 
future.  
 
The Limits of the Dominant Party Coalition 1992- 
In the late 1980s, economic conditions made Tanzania increasingly dependent on both 
aid and the advice of donors, including the World Bank and the IMF. The 
abandonment of its constitutional one-party state in 1992 has to be understood in this 
context. A presidential commission headed by Chief Justice Francis Nyalali toured the 
country, discovered that 77 per cent of the people it talked to wanted to retain the one-
party system, but decided in any case to recommend in 1992 that Tanzania should 
move to a competitive multi-party system (Kelsall 2003: 56). It is very likely that the 
move to the multi-party system was driven mainly by the concerns of the 
‘international community’ and less by the internal pressure from political 
organizations and factions that were excluded by the constitutional arrangements. In 
any case, new parties failed to make much headway, and the CCM now emerged as 
the dominant party ruling coalition. 
 
A number of features of the Tanzanian economy and polity help to explain the 
smoothness of this transition. But these features also explain why the fundamental 
characteristics of the political settlement have not significantly changed either. First, 
the social engineering of the previous three decades was very successful in ensuring 
that no independent organizations or factional mobilizations exist which could easily 
be absorbed into a new umbrella coalition. The management of social order has been 
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organized in Tanzania through the distribution of formal and informal political 
benefits through state bodies like village government structures rather than to distinct 
factional groups competing for benefits. The legal ban on setting up trade unions, 
political parties and other organizations meant that individuals and groups organized 
very loosely around state institutions to negotiate and capture benefits appropriate to 
their usefulness for the state-party. It is very difficult for an alternative party to delink 
some of these coalitions under an entirely new banner to contest for a different 
distribution of benefits.  
 
With the emergence of greater economic differentiation, distribution of power and 
therefore the benefits that different groups can claim have also changed in subtle 
ways. But even after the constitutional changes of 1992, individuals at the village 
level have bargained for their rents by being linked with different networks within the 
state-party structures, and have not found it beneficial to set up clearly separate 
independent local factions contesting for rents (Daley 2005b). The state and the 
dominant party still controls vital rents and delinking from factions within the party 
and setting up a completely separate faction faces a significant collective action 
problem. The independent faction may have zero bargaining power till many other 
such factions emerge in other villages and towns with whom umbrella factions of 
significant holding power can be constructed. Not surprisingly, opposition parties 
have largely remained relatively hollow shells.  
 
Tanzanian society also sets some hurdles for the construction of new factional parties. 
The ethnic, regional and religious diversity of the country means that a new party that 
wants to achieve a critical minimum size has to be significantly diverse in its 
leadership appeal, regional representation and so on. This gives a huge advantage to 
the incumbent CCM and works against other parties. Again there is a collective action 
problem. If many major factions already existed a new faction could ally with some of 
them to form a new umbrella. Otherwise, a regional or ethnic group that decided to 
vote for a faction can find itself out in the cold (Kelsall 2003: 60).  
 
However, the lifting of formal limits to organization and the growth of economic 
differentiation is slowly changing the distribution of power affecting the ruling 
coalition in the directions we expect. Normally, a dominant party ruling coalition 
emerges because a ruling coalition succeeds in including many or most of the most 
powerful lower level organizers in that society within a single organization. A 
dominant party ruling coalition is therefore likely to have fairly powerful lower level 
factions, which allows it to win in contests against other potential coalitions. In the 
case of Tanzania, the sequence has to some extent been reversed. The dominant party 
coalition emerged as a result of externally inspired changes in rules, but nevertheless, 
it is likely to have the effect of empowering lower-level party and state officials over 
time. The party must now be more concerned about keeping its lower constituents 
satisfied and this is likely to increase their bargaining power.  
 
The change is not likely to be rapid given the factors discussed above, but over time 
and gradually, we expect to see greater organizational power being exercised by lower 
level members of the party and state to negotiate benefits for themselves. Projecting 
even further in a somewhat speculative way, if enough of these lower-level party 
members become organizers of their own supporters, the possibility of opposition 
factions absorbing some of them increases, and with it the possibility of a move 
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towards competitive clientelism. The need to raise revenues for running competitive 
election campaigns is also likely to result in a greater devolution of power to local 
level organizers who are more successful in raising money through their involvement 
in economic transactions. Coincidentally, these opportunities are also increasing, 
largely as a result of a greater tolerance for capitalist investment in sectors where 
political resistance can be contained.  
 
The greater penetration of foreign investments in sectors like mining and tourism have 
required the support of local party and state officials, particularly in getting access to 
land. These acquisitions have often been strongly resisted by local people adversely 
affected by the changes but where the opposition was localized and involved a single 
but very big investment, there was an incentive for coalitions of party-state officials 
from local to very high levels pushing through the required institutional changes for 
mutual benefit (Kelsall 2003; Khan 2009a). Gradually, these processes have 
strengthened local and regional party and state officials, whose support and 
cooperation are required for pushing through mega-projects. Where the benefits are 
high and the social resistance limited to a particular area, the dominant party has been 
able to override resistance to particular institutional changes very effectively.  
 
A consequence of the growing power of lower level state and political functionaries is 
that it is also much easier now for individual investors to suddenly get changes in 
rules approved or get contracts that then turn out to be very damaging. Examples 
include the sudden ban in 2000 on the use of Bangladeshi jute bags for packing 
cashews so that a local but high-cost producer of sisal bags could corner the market. 
So expensive were the sisal bags and the decision was made so suddenly that many 
cashew producers could not export their crop (Kelsall 2003: 68). Another example 
involving a much bigger amount was the long-term power supply contract signed with 
the Malaysian firm IPTL in 1995 which turned out to be excessively expensive, was 
opposed by high level officials, but was nevertheless signed, raising many allegations 
of corruption (Khan and Gray 2006).  
 
Clearly there is now greater political access of capitalists and their ability to influence 
decisions in the case of individual projects has increased. However, successful 
influence appears to be restricted to some types of projects and some types of 
investors. The case for mega-investors in mining and tourism is clear. Both local and 
central political and bureaucratic representatives stand to gain much by pushing these 
projects through because there are significant rents that are involved in approving 
such decisions. The construct of a dominant party ruling coalition ensures that it is 
difficult for local opposition to spill over into more serious conflicts, given the 
absence of credible opposition coalitions who could exploit these grievances. When it 
comes to smaller projects the principle appears to be the same. The types of projects 
which appear to get special rules passed, like the sisal bags, are typically rent-
generating projects because they create immediate monopoly powers for some 
investors. These are generally (though not necessarily) economically damaging for the 
broader economy. It is easy to guess what the mutual calculations may have been. 
What is not in evidence is a long-term relationship between individual capitalists and 
political patrons, which results in benefits to capitalist that are repaid over time in the 
form of political contributions, taxes or other benefits.  
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The latter type of relationship demonstrates true political access. Given that Tanzania 
has a stable dominant party that expects to stay in power for some time, the absence 
of such long-term relationships and calculations must have some explanation. It is 
possible that such relationships are difficult in Tanzania because a long-term 
association with particular capitalists cannot be kept secret. As the capitalists are 
generally not socially legitimate on grounds of their ethnicity, such a relationship with 
particular politicians may turn out to be a liability for them. This could explain why 
even though deals are struck on an individual basis, Tanzania-based capitalists of 
Indian or other backgrounds find political access difficult (Khan 2009b). 
 
Summary 
The transition to a dominant party ruling coalition appears not to have had strong 
internal drivers, and did not result in a change in the ruling coalition. However, more 
power passed to lower levels of the political and administrative structure. More 
significantly, there has been improved political access for some big investors in 
sectors like mining and tourism. These have become easier because there are strong 
incentives to enable institutions to operate and to change institutions when required to 
enable these investments and limited political constraints. However, in the more 
important area of medium-sized domestic capitalists who could drive a broader 
manufacturing growth, the political settlement remains adverse for the effective 
operation of the required institutions. These features of the political settlement explain 
rather well some of the problems identified in earlier papers, summarized in Figure 
29. To overcome the political constraints that limit possible support for the productive 
sector Tanzania may have to be much more pro-active in developing an industrial 
policy that can promote the development of a black African capitalist class. 
 
13. Conclusions   
Political settlements are compatible combinations of institutions and distributions of 
power that are also sustainable in terms of the economic and political stability 
requirements of a society. Institutions and distributions of power are interdependent 
because formal and informal institutions together define distributions of benefits in 
society. If the latter are out of line with the distribution of power, powerful groups 
will organize to change the structure of formal and informal institutions. Therefore, an 
institutional structure has to be compatible with the distribution of power. However, 
compatibility can be achieved in different ways. Institutions can adapt to the 
distribution of power, or conflicts can continue till a new distribution of power 
emerges, or both. An institutional structure with a compatible distribution of power 
constitutes a political settlement if minimum economic and political stability 
conditions are also achieved.  
 
For a number of reasons, political settlements in developing countries are significantly 
different from those in advanced countries. Primarily, this is because in developing 
countries the size of the formal productive sector (the capitalist sector) is by definition 
rather small. Therefore, the incomes generated by formal rights cannot be the 
dominant source of social power in developing countries. Many groups have 
significant holding power based on organizations that are not strictly part of the 
formal institutional structure. This implies that informal institutions and the incomes 
and power distributions sustained by these institutions are a significant part of the 
‘institutional structure’ defining the political settlement in developing countries. 
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Another way of saying this is that in developing countries, the achievement of 
stability requires a parallel distribution of benefits based on activities supported by 
informal institutions. It is therefore not surprising that without exception, developing 
countries have economies that are characterized by significant informality and 
informal institutions that have considerable effects on sustaining the overall 
distribution of benefits and power.  
 
The operation and effectiveness of particular formal institutions cannot be understood 
without locating them within this overall context. Informal institutions and the 
mechanisms through which they sustain distributions of benefits and powers can 
significantly affect the operation of particular formal institutions. Our theoretical 
framework provides a general explanation for the phenomenon of informality that is 
consistent with the observation that informality in developing countries appears to be 
a general phenomena, and not one that is associated with particular cultures, 
economic systems or political institutions.  
 
Political settlements in developing countries have general characteristics that lead us 
to describe them as “clientelist”. In all developing countries informal power organized 
through organizations broadly described as ‘patron-client’ organizations play a role is 
sustaining distributions of benefits and power. The significance of informal 
arrangements in the political settlement also implies that formal institutions operate 
very differently in developing countries compared to the expectations of narrow 
transaction cost analysis. This is a critical theoretical result, which allows us to 
examine differences in institutional performance between countries, and to understand 
why institutions evolve through very different evolutionary paths in different 
countries.  
 
By locating the analysis of patron-client relationships in this framework, we also 
arrive at a broader understanding of patron-client politics and clientelist relationships 
in general. These are often ‘rational’ arrangements for sustaining significant 
distributions of benefits and power. In contemporary developing countries patron-
client relationships are rarely based on traditional cultural values or weak democratic 
institutions as some of the older literature on patron-client relationships suggest. 
These observations also help to explain why Weberian ‘good governance’ strategies 
are misplaced because they attempt to enforce institutional structures that are 
structurally unsustainable. A better understanding of clientelist political settlements 
can help us to identify institutions and reforms that make sense in the context of 
actually existing political settlements. If some organizations of power are very 
adverse for economic development, fundamental changes in the political settlement 
may be required. The framework of analysis suggested here shows why such 
judgements are deeply political and can result in significant transition costs that have 
to be factored into an analysis of the desirability of particular directions of 
institutional change.  
 
While clientelist political settlements share some broad common characteristics, there 
are significant variations within this group. Clientelist political settlements can range 
from developmental states at one end of the spectrum to states on the verge of crisis 
and collapse at the other. We identify two important characteristics which distinguish 
variations in the mix of formal and informal power within clientelist political 
settlements. First, there is considerable variation in the distribution of power between 
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the ruling coalition and other factions, and between the ruling coalition and lower 
factions on whose support it depends. These variations affect the time horizons of the 
ruling coalition, its capacity to coordinate and its capacity to implement rules that may 
impact on coalition supporters differently. These characteristics are important for 
understanding the operation of specific formal institutions in these contexts. Secondly, 
the political power and technological sophistication of productive entrepreneurs also 
varies. This determines how capitalists link up with different factions in the ruling 
coalition, and the likely resistance they and others can mount against the 
implementation of specific institutions. The relationship between these variables is 
non-linear so ‘improvements’ along any dimension can have positive or negative 
effects depending on the characteristics of other variables. 
 
While there are other potentially important aspects of a political settlement, we argue 
that these characteristics capture significant aspects of the distribution of formal and 
informal power that helps to explain the operation of particular growth-promoting 
institutions in developing countries. These features of the political settlement affect 
the efficiency with which specific institutions can be enforced. They also determine 
the political costs of trying to improve growth with specific institutions or along 
specific paths of institutional evolution. This determines what we describe as the 
growth-stability trade-offs for particular institutions that are operating in specific 
political settlements.  
 
Using this framework, the paper presents an analysis of how political settlements 
evolved in our countries in terms of the categories developed in the theoretical 
framework. The evolution of the political settlement in each case is shown to correlate 
with changes in institutional strategies in our countries examined in earlier papers in 
this series, some of which are summarized in the figures attached as an Appendix to 
this paper. Although the analysis presented for each country is at an early stage of 
development, changes in the political settlement in each of our countries helps us to 
understand better the performance of specific institutional experiments and paths of 
institutional evolution. The framework opens up a new way of investigating 
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15. Appendix: Summary Tables on Rent Characteristics from Khan (2008) 
 
Policies/Rents Governance Outcomes/Vulnerabilities
Rapid growth of large 
domestic conglomerates in 
relatively low technology 
manufacturing: Dramatic 
growth (particularly 1960s 
onwards) in low-tech
sectors where learning 
periods were short.
But competitive clientelism 
also damaged autonomy of 
critical agencies: by the late 
1980s and 1990s the Bank of 
Thailand, the  NESDB and 
other agencies became 
targets of ruling factions.
Competitive Clientelism 
ensured access to rents was 
relatively competitive because 
of competition between 
patrons.
Entry of new clients could not 
be permanently blocked and 
together with hard budget 
constraints for individual 
factions ensured that clients 
knew that assets had to 
become competitive. A 
permanent flow of rents to 
particular clients not feasible. 




Examples include diesel 
engines 1980-85, cathode ray 
tubes 1985 onwards.
But growing politicization of 
agencies in a context of 
cheap capital imports limited 
development of these 
capabilities. BOI moved to 
support firms independent of 
nationality by mid-1980s.
Negotiated through active 
business-government 
dialogues and regulated by 
international agreements 
such as WTO and FTAs
FTAs and WTO limit 
capability of governments to 
induce learning-by-doing in 
new sectors by creating 
temporary rents. Governance 
focus shifts to ensuring 
quality of skills in formal 
education.
Rapid growth of FDI in 
assembly operations where 
agglomeration economies 
already exist
Automotive sector success 
story but ownership of 
technology and bulk of profits 
is foreign.
Growing challenge of 
increasing low domestic value 
added. Country vulnerable to 
relocations of foreign capital. 
Effects of populist politics 
pose a continuous danger.
Requires specific 




capabilities existed in some 
agencies and there were 
moments of political support 
for such strategies even in 
overall context of competitive 
clientelism.
Rent allocation and rent 
capture to create domestic 
conglomerates, 1950-
Formal rents based on fiscal 
incentives, import and export 
controls, licensing and 
zoning laws.
Informal rents based on 
ability to negotiate terms on 
formal rents, and preferential 
access including to 
privatized assets, loans, 
licenses, natural resources 
and insider information.
Limited Rent allocation by 
technocratic agencies like 
Board of Investment (BOI) 
to accelerate learning and 
technology acquisition, 
particularly 1980s
Examples are targeted BOI 
incentives for specific 
technology acquisition 
strategies including duty 
concessions, time bound 
entry barriers, local content 
conditions supported by 
specific incentives.
Non-discriminatory rent 
allocation to all technology 
providers including FDI, 
particularly 1997-
Local content rules, local 
ownership rules and setting 
of national technology 
priorities all abandoned
Initially rents for FDI were 
provided by cutting tariffs 
and taxes but as these are 
bid down further incentives 
require big investments in 
education and skills.
 
Figure 25 Characteristics of Rents and Governance: Thailand  







Maharashtra gets a 
significant share of industrial 
licenses. 
High growth of all industrial 
sectors.
Affected by common Indian 
problem of disciplining 
learning rents 
BUT significant expansion 
of industrial base
Big business had long-term 
relationships of financing 
politics: As a result both sides 
could take a long-term pro-
industry view.
Growth Acceleration in 
Industry 1985-90
Driven by higher technology 
sectors like automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals.
Traditional parties split and 
less stable coalition 
governments emerge
Business less able to 
maintain long-term 
relationships with politics in 
this context.
BJP-Shiv Sena coalition 
government emerges in 1995 
signalling the emergence of 
new political patterns.
Shift of investors into areas 
where learning risks and 
other sources of market 
failures were lower
Rapid growth of high-valued 
services (financial services, 
software) and deceleration of 
industrial growth after 1990
Stable and long-term 
relationships between 
business groups and key 
politicians continue
But under growing threat from 
populist, nativist and 
exclusivist types of populism 
playing on persistent and high 
levels of poverty. 
Rent allocation to big 
business for learning on a 
significant scale 1950-80
Licenses, credit, limited 
amounts of industrial land 
allocated to investors.
Rent-creation for growth 
sectors continues after 
liberalization based on 
strong business-politics 
relationships 1980-90
Negotiation of incentives, 
formal policies, land, and 
implicit subsidies for 
technology upgrading 
continue.
Populist redistributive rent 
creation by fragmented 
ruling coalitions 1990-
Mobilization of intermediate 
class supporters using 
budgetary and off-budget 
rent creation.
Populist strategies of 
mobilization such as those 
based on Marathi 
nationalism.
 
Figure 26 Characteristics of Rents and Governance: Maharashtra  
 





West Bengal gets a smaller 
share of licenses and 
financing compared to its 
competitors but its 
contribution to Indian industry 
shrinks even more rapidly as 
domestic business relocates. 
Growth of small scale and 
low productivity 
manufacturing.
Affected by common Indian 
problem of disciplining 
learning rents 
PLUS specific state 
problem of weak long-term 
relationships with big 
investors who are often 
non-Bengalis
Big investors lack confidence 
in long term commitment of 
political process to incentives 
for industrialization.
Rapid agricultural growth 
for a decade
Agricultural yields and output 
increase but hits ceilings due 
to unfavourable population 
density, very small size of 
farms, and poor 
infrastructure.
Strong executive support 
but conflicts emerge with 
parts of the Left Front’s 
power base 
Weakness of Bengali capital 
continues to obstruct the 
development of a politically 
powerful domestic industrial 
constituency. 
Opposition’s ability to 
mobilize disaffected 
intermediate classes makes 
political price of big business 
policy potentially very high.
Rapid growth of industrial 
approvals in moderately big 
projects and 
implementation of at least 
one mega project in Haldia 
Petrochemicals in 2001
Haldia’s success balanced by 
failures in Singur (Tata Nano) 
and Nandigram (chemical 
hub) in 2007-08 when 
opposition parties 
successfully mobilize parts of 
the Left Front constituency. 
Clarity of policy weakened.
Disciplined mass party 
organization operating 
through  system 
of decentralization
panchayati
Effective targeting of rents 
and asset redistribution to 
core constituencies of small 
and medium peasants. 
Motivated by electoral 
calculations of ruling Left 
Front, which remains 
electorally unbeatable over 
this period.
Rent allocation to big 
business for learning but 
with limited dynamism 
1950-80
Licenses, credit, limited 
amounts of industrial land 
allocated to investors.
Rent allocation and 
redistribution of land in 
agriculture to benefit small 





subsidies distributed to 
target recipients through 
decentralized government.
Significant Policy Shift to 
Big Business: 1994 
Industrial Policy
Subsidies and incentives for 
big business plus extra 
incentives for mega-projects 
after 2000.
 
Figure 27 Characteristics of Rents and Governance: West Bengal  
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Policies/Rents Governance Outcomes/Vulnerabilities
Rapid growth of medium-
scale capitalists after 1980s
Competition between factions 
produced a relatively broad-
based capitalism
But aggressive primitive 
accumulation also source of 
intense political instability.
Ability of state institutions to 
implement growth-enhancing 
policies weakened by 
factional competition.
Series of transitions 
leading to competitive 
clientelism: 
Competitive clientelism 
weakly institutionalized in the 
post-1990 democracy, and 
vulnerable to breakdown 
during elections.
Leads to Emergency of 2007-
2008 that attacks political 
corruption but fails to 
introduce ‘good governance’.
Formal policies to upgrade 
technology generally not 
successful
Factional politics prevents 
disciplining and credible rent-
withdrawal necessary for 
sustaining growth.
Growth policies only 
successful when policies are 
narrowly defined and rent-
withdrawal is exogenous (eg 
MFA).
Effective because of strong 
support for the sector by 
the executive and a supply 
of entrepreneurs emerging 
out of primitive 
accumulation
MFA created a time-bound 
set of rents that could not be 
prolonged through domestic 
political processes. 
The executive had the 
capacity to engage in focused 
institutional innovations with 
significant effects.
Rapid growth of garments 
sector 
Unprecedented growth rates 
achieved by garments sector, 
supporting a growth 
acceleration for the industrial 
sector as a whole.
But extensions based on this 
experience required to 
achieve technological 
upgrading and move up the 
global value chain.
Technocratic capabilities 





enhancing institutions can 
emerge with political support: 
examples include bonded 
warehouses and back-to-
back LCs for the garments 
sector in the early 1980s.
Ongoing asset and rent 
capture by emerging 
propertied classes  1971-
Significant acceleration of 
primitive accumulation by 
Bengali elites after 1971, 
continuing with lesser 
intensity after 1975.
Driven by the use of political 
power to capture or 
influence the granting of 
government  contracts, land, 
bank loans and subsidies.
Rent allocation to 
accelerate learning and 
technology acquisition 
since the 1950s but with 
poor results
Examples include subsidized 
credit allocation by industrial 
banks up to the 1980s, tariff 
protection, subsidies for 
export promotion.
Fortuitous learning rents 
for garment sector created 
by MFA in the 1980s
Quota rents created by MFA 
had significant if fortuitous 
effects for technology 
acquisition in the garments 
sector.
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1967-78 but reversed after 
1978 Uganda invasion and 
external shocks
Disciplined party and 
aversion to private 
accumulation in Ujamaa 
period meant there were very 
few black African elites who 
could become potential 
capitalists when socialism 
began to be rolled back.
Disciplined one party state 
but inclusion of all 
managers within state-party 
meant disciplining of 
performance would be 
weak
In fact, experiment did not last 
long enough to test if the 
disciplining of non-performers 
was possible
Rapid growth of mining 
sector and some growth of 
manufacturing and utilities 
particularly with foreign 
participation
Significant imbalance in 
sharing mining rents with 
foreign investors.
Slow growth of manufacturing 
despite  very small base.
Governance reforms aimed 
at donor community such 
as PFM, commitment to 
anti-corruption, progress 
on multi-party democracy
Efficient service delivery in 
health and education may not 
be sufficient for achieving 
sustainable growth path.
Significant growth in public 
spending on health and 
education
High GDP growth rates 
sustained by public spending 
but questions about whether 
aid at these levels can 
continue. 
Expectations of aid financed 
spending can have damaging 
political and economic effects 
if aid is suddenly suspended.
Arms length formal 
relationships with business 
but informal relations 
probably based on 
suspicion and short term 
rent sharing 
Rent sharing in mining 
weighted towards investors
Key challenge of developing 
dynamic black African 
capitalist sector not 
addressed.
Ujamaa Socialism: Rent 
allocation to public sector 
for learning and collective 
development 1967-1985
Industrial development 
through public sector 
‘parastatals’. 
Agricultural development 




Privatization of parastatals 
primarily benefited foreign 
investors.
Significant growth 
contribution of gold mining 
due to attractive rent sharing 
opportunities for foreign 
investors.
Significant aid rents 
financing social spending 
1990-
High rates of growth of 
public spending 
arithmetically add to growth 
rate and could raise social 
productivity in the long run 
through health and 
education.
 
Figure 29 Characteristics of Rents and Governance: Tanzania  
 
Source: Khan (2008) 
